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Following the termination of World War II, a number of suspected Nazi
war criminals concealed their backgrounds in order to immigrate to the
United States and to other Western democracies. These countries have
adopted various responses to the presence of these former enemy combat-
ants.'
The investigation into Kurt Waldheim typifies the various considera-
tions involved in determining the appropriate disposition of former members
of the Nazi forces. In 1987, the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) of the
United States Department of Justice determined that President Kurt Wald-
heim of Austria, the former Secretary General of the United Nations, had as-
sisted or participated in Nazi-sponsored persecutions and was ineligible to
enter the United States The OSI report documented Waldheim's involve-
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1. See International Human Rights Conference (McGill Univ., Montreal, Quebec, 1987),
in NUREMBERG FORTY YEARS LATER: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST INJUSTICE IN OUR TIME:
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHrs CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 1987: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
AND RETROSPECTIVE 1993 (Irwin Coter ed., 1995).
2. See OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, IN THE MATTER OF KURT WALDHEIM 3
(1987). Individuals who are ineligible to enter the United States are placed on the "Watchlist."
Id. at 5. The so-called Holtzman Amendment renders ineligible to enter the United States any
alien who: during the period beginning March 23, 1933, and ending on May 1945, under the
direction of, or in association with-
(A) the Nazi government of Germany,
(B) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the Nazi gov-
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ment in transferring civilian prisoners to the Security Police (SS) for slave
labor and in deporting civilians and Jews to concentration and death camps.
Waldheim also was shown to have been involved in disseminating anti-
semitic propaganda, mistreating and executing Allied prisoners, and killing
civilians.'
Waldheim served a short stint in the Austrian reserves prior to under-
taking the study of law and diplomacy. His studies were interrupted when he
was called to active duty following Germany's annexation of Austria in
1938.' Waldheim already had served in two significant military campaigns
and had been decorated and promoted to First Lieutenant by the time that he
was assigned to the Balkans in 1942.'
Germany directed Croatia's merciless campaign of terror against the
partisans (Chetniks) and the Serbian civilian population. Waldheim likely
was involved in transferring prisoners to the SS or to the Croatian authorities
for slave labor,6 internment,7 and extermination.8 Certainly, he also was
aware of, and doubtlessly played a prominent role in, the deportation of Jews
from his base of operations in Banja Luka. In addition, Waldheim partici-
pated in a brutal and lawless operation against the Serbian population in the
Kozara mountain region9 which resulted in his being awarded a Croatian
medal for courageous and valorous conduct.' The OSI concluded that the
deportation and murder of Serbs, Jews, and suspected political dissidents
was the animating objective of Waldheim's combat unit. Its report observed
that contending that Kozara and the unit's other operations possessed a
purely military objective "is to deny the undeniable and to attempt to rewrite
history.""
Waldheim's most notorious and well-documented acts of persecution
occurred during his service as a staff and intelligence officer in Greece be-
tween 1943 and 1945. He initially was assigned to the Operations Branch of
ernment of Germany,
(C) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the Nazi
government of Germany, or
(D) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of Germany, or-
dered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person
because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion.
Immigration and Nationality Act (Holtzman Amendment) 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E) (1997),
cited and quoted in OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 4.
3. OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 3.
4. See id at 21.
5. See id at 28.
6. See id at 43, 61.
7. See id at 60.
8. See id at 59.
9. See id at 54. Waldheim also participated as an interpreter and liason to Italian troops
during a bloody operation in Montenegro and eastern Herzegovina. During this campaign, he
attended high-level strategy meetings. See id at 90, 94-95.
10. See id at 74.
11. Id at 78.
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the Task Force Southern Greece where he was involved in transmitting re-
prisal and deportation orders and in monitoring the deportation of Italian
soldiers to Germany for slave labor. 2 Waldheim then was shifted to the in-
telligence branch of Army Group E in Arsakli.' This led to his participation
in the deportation of Jews from Corfu4 and Rhodes 5 and in his involvement
in the distribution of anti-semitic propaganda that was designed to incite
German troops to countenance and to commit war crimes.'6 Waldheim was
the senior official in charge of interrogations and, in at least two instances,
turned prisoners of war over to the SS (Security Service, the Nazi Party Po-
lice and Military) for execution. He also monitored German reprisals against
civilians and may have been personally involved in directing these illegal
acts of retaliation. 7
In 1944, Waldheim was assigned to organize and implement reprisals in
Yugoslavia.'8 In 1948, the Yugoslav State Committee on Ascertaining the
Crimes of the Occupiers and their Collaborators petitioned the United Na-
tions War Crimes Commission to register Waldheim as a war criminal. The
Committee endorsed this request and listed Waldheim under the "A" cate-
gory. This category encompassed those whom the Committee "believes...
to have committed or been responsible for the commission of war crimes,
and is satisfied that there is, or will be at the time of trial, sufficient evidence
to justify their prosecution."' 9 The OSI report concluded that Waldheim's as-
sistance in military reprisals against Yugoslav citizens and internees, and his
participation in the transfer of British and Greek prisoners to the SS for exe-
cution, constituted a "possible war crime" as well as "an act of persecu-
tion."2 In addition, his involvements in reprisals against Serbians and in the
deportation of Jews were considered to be clear cases of racial and religious
persecution.2'
The United States, in 1987,22 determined that Waldheim was an exclud-
able alien and placed him on the "Watchlist."23 Waldheim, who recently had
been elected President of Austria, requested the Austrian Federal Govern-
ment appoint an independent, international commission of military historians
12. See id at 102-04.
13. See id. at 109,112.
14. See id. at 126-27.
15. See id at 130-31.
16. See id at 138.
17. See id. at 164-67.
18. See id at 168, 170.
19. Id at 178. There was some testimony that Waldheim may have been involved in the
execution and deportation of prisoners in Yugoslavia as well as Greece. Id.
20. Id at 202.
21. See id at 201-02.
22. The decision to place Waldheim on the Watchlist resulted from the OSI investiga-
tion. See id at 5-6, 19-20, 204.
23. Bruce J. Einhorn, The Implementation of The Bar On Persecutors: The Arthur
Rudolpha and Kurt Waldheim Cases, 11 B. C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 203, 207 (1991).
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to investigate the allegations against him.' The Commission concluded that
Waldheim must assume a measure of guilt for having been complicit in car-
rying out reprisals and in executing prisoners of war. He also was implicated
for having failed to protest or to impede the deportation and execution of
Serbs, Jews, and Allied commandos, and for having acquiesced in the trans-
fer of women, children, and the aged to concentration camps. The Commis-
sion noted that Waldheim was thoroughly familiar with these polices as a
result of his service as a translator and intelligence officer. He also attended
high-level meetings at which these malevolent measures were discussed.25
The Commission concluded that Waldheim not only failed to protest or to
impede these policies, but assisted and facilitated Germany's "unlawful ac-
tions.""
Waldheim claimed that he was obliged to comply with his superior's
commands. The historians, however, noted that the demands of law, moral-
ity, and the principles of humanity qualified this obligation. They pointed to
a number of instances in which officers resisted orders and had not been
subjected to retribution. The Commission, however, recognized that Wald-
heim, as a young and relatively low-level officer, was not in a position to
impede or to influence policy.27
The panel of historians concluded that Waldheim had hoped that all
traces of his past would disappear. He responded to the resuscitation of these
events by minimizing the significance of his military assignments.28 But, as
observed by one member of the panel, the hundreds of documents bearing
Waldheim's signature bear witness to the significance of his responsibilities
in the Balkans and in Greece.29
In Waldheim's 1985 autobiography," he recounted his conscription into
the Wehrmacht3" and subsequent deployment as a human shield for German
troops during the Russian campaign. Following a leg wound, he wrote that
he was evacuated to Austria and classified as unfit for military service, thus
enabling him to complete his legal studies. Waldheim rationalized that the
closing of the Austrian border had made emigration impossible and that his
service in the military had insulated him from the type of harassment which
had been directed against his politically progressive father. Waldheim fur-
24. See Jehuda L. Wallach, Report of an Unusual Task- The International Commission of
Historians Designated to Establish the Military Service of Lieutenant Kurt Waldheim, 18 ISR.
Y.B. HUM. RTS. 273 (1988).
25. See id (citing Report of the International Commission of Historians Designated to
Establish the Military Service of Lieutenant Kurt Waldheim, at 288, 290-92) [hereinafter In-
ternational Commission of Historians].
26. Id at 292.
27. See id at 292-93.
28. See id at 294.
29. See Wallach, supra note 24, at 282.
30. See KURT WALDHEIM, IN THE EYE OF THE STORM (1985).
31. See id Waldheim was drafted into the German army following Germany's annexa-
tion of Austria in 1938. See id at 16-17.
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ther noted that the army had been full of anti-Nazi activists and that he
regularly had read and discussed clandestine anti-National Socialist litera-
ture. 2 He somewhat ingenuously professed in the concluding chapter that
"war, with its hecatombs of innocent victims and ravages of minds and ma-
terial" had "convinced me of just how much men and women all over the
world cherish ... peace and security for themselves and their children.""
The OSI noted that Waldheim's autobiography omitted significant facts
and that he also misrepresented his war record in the documents that he
submitted to the Justice Department. 4 He later explained, when confronted
with his actual military record, that he failed to mention his service in the
Sudetenland, France, Yugoslavia, and Greece since his activities were of
minor significance. The OSI, however, pointed out that following Wald-
heim's recovery from his injury, he received various decorations in recogni-
tion of his impressive performance in positions of increasing authority and
responsibility in military theaters in which German forces had engaged in
extreme brutality and violence.35 His claim of insignificance was called into
question by a photograph of Waldheim at a high-level meeting between
German and Italian commanders.36
A number of German military officers in the Balkans were convicted of
war crimes by an American military tribunal following the war. The Court
wrote that the defendants compiled a record of depredation and destruction
"seldom exceeded in modern history. . . . Mass shootings of the innocent
population, deportations for slave labor, and the indiscriminate destruction
of public and private property... lend credit to the assertion that terrorism
and intimidation was the accepted solution to any and all opposition to the
German will."37 Waldheim, had he been prosecuted, likely would have been
found criminally culpable of complicity in illegal reprisals, the execution of
Allied prisoners, and the deportation of Jews. 8
The fact that Waldheim was a staff officer would not have constituted a
defense. An American Tribunal, in a related case, ruled that staff officers
were liable under international law for formulating, distributing, or imple-
menting clearly criminal orders.39 The Court noted that Hitler depended upon
32. See WALDHEIM, supra note 30, at 17-19.
33. Id at 267.
34. See OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 195-97.
35. See id at 194.
36. See id at 193. This photograph appeared in the N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1986.
37. United Sthtes v. Wilhelm List, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 1230, 1254-55
(1950).
38. See OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 2; see supra notes 6-29 and ac-
companying text.
39. See United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 462, 513 (1950)
(where eleven high-ranking Nazi military officers were convicted of war crimes and crimes
against humanity). See also Matthew Lippman, War Crimes: American Prosecutions of Nazi
19981
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staff officers to implement his evil designs and that these officers "cannot
escape criminal responsibility for their essential contribution to the final
execution of such orders on the plea that they were complying with the or-
ders of a superior who was more criminal." The Austrian Commission also
noted that Waldheim must assume a measure of moral guilt, and possibly le-
gal responsibility, for having lacked the courage and strength to meet his
"human duty to intervene," to impede, or to halt criminal acts.4
As United Nations Secretary General, Waldheim was involved in at-
tempting to resolve various international issues. Some of these issues were
the Iranian hostage crisis,4" the conflict over Cyprus, 3 apartheid in South Af-
rica," the decolonization of Africa," division in the Middle East,46 the eco-
nomic conflict between industrial and industrializing countries," the
protection of global human rights,4" and the plight of refugees. 9 He later was
elected President of Austria."0 Was this post-war activity relevant in calcu-
lating Waldheim's culpability? Should there be a statute of limitations on
Waldheim's moral and legal liability? Would permitting Waldheim to visit
the United States denigrate the sacrifice of those involved in halting Nazi
aggression? Might this provide moral approbation for Waldheim's misdeeds
and permit him to continue to benefit from his misrepresentations? Wald-
heim already had been resident in the United States for many years during
his United Nations service. Would an additional visit be of significant moral
import? Did not other European leaders possess questionable war records?
Why should Waldheim be singled out? Were not various former Nazis still
residing in America? Would not the United States appear more credible if
resources were first devoted to prosecuting former high-level Nazi officials
who escaped prosecution? Waldheim's exclusion arguably denigrated his
status as the elected representative of the Sovereign State of Austria and
strained relations with a Central European bulwark against Communist ex-
pansion. Was America arrogantly imposing its moral standards on the Aus-
trian State? Did Waldheim's exclusion merely constitute a symbolic gesture
that permitted the United States to avoid discussing the more appropriate
remedy of criminal prosecution?5'
Military Officers, 6 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 261, 280-88 (1995).
40. Id at 515.
41. International Commission of Historians, supra note 25, at 291.
42. See WALDHEIM, supra note 30, at 156-57.
43. See iUt at 78-79, 91-92.
44. See id at 98-99.
45. See id. at 95-97, 107.
46. See id at 60-61, 75-77.
47. See id at 111, 115, 120-25.
48. See id at 134-36.
49. See id at 147-52.
50. He was elected to this position on June 8, 1986.
51. For an inquiry into the philosophical considerations involved in prosecuting Nazi war
criminals, see generally ALAN S. ROSENBAUM, PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS (1993).
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These types of issues continue to shadow the debate in those countries
confronted with determining the appropriate disposition of Nazi war crimi-
nals. As recently as March 1998, the German government announced the ar-
rest of a suspected Nazi war criminal accused of a number of killings,
including 500 Jews in the Maidanek death camp in Poland in November
1943.5" In France, Maurice Papon, a leading official of the Vichy Regime,
was convicted in 1998 of complicity in crimes against humanity.53 Lithuania
recently became the first former Soviet-ruled country to announce that it
would conduct a war crimes prosecution of a former Nazi official. 4 In May
1998, the Croatian government acquiesced to pressure from Western gov-
ernments and Jewish organizations and announced that it would seek extra-
dition from Argentina of Dinko Sakic, camp commander of the Jasenovac
concentration camp. An estimated 85,000 Jews, Serbs, Gypsies, and Com-
munist partisans had been killed in the camp, and Sakic reportedly had been
personally involved in clubbing, shooting, and stabbing thousands of prison-
ers. 
55
This renewed commitment to bringing Nazi war criminals to justice
follows forty years of general inaction. It is estimated that roughly 250,000
individuals were involved in carrying out Nazi atrocities. The Allied Powers
and Eastern European States convicted an estimated 35,000 individuals fol-
lowing the war. German courts punished an additional 6,000 defendants.
Over eighty percent of these indictments were brought between 1945 and
1949 and only one hundred involved manslaughter or murder; fifteen con-
cerned murders in concentration camps.56 Journalist Tom Bower, in 1982,
ironically observed that in post-war West Germany "[mlany of those who
had given the orders in the Third Reich were again giving the orders .... [I]t
was those who obeyed the orders who were, in the last resort, expendable,
not those who had given orders and who now gave them again."57
The disposition of Nazi war criminals once again challenges the con-
science of the international community. These largely sick, infirm, and aged
individuals soon will be beyond legal judgment and sanction. This Article
surveys the contemporary response to Nazi war criminals in England, Can-
ada, and Australia, and then details the prevailing legal doctrine within the
United States. The concluding section sketches the problems of proof and
procedure that threaten future efforts to bring former Nazi war criminals be-
52. See Allan Cowell, Ex-Nazi is Seized; Accused of Gunning Down 500 at Maidanek,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1998, at A5.
53. See Craig R. Whitney, Ex-Vichy Aide is Convicted and Reaction Ranges Wide, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1998, at Al.
54. See Judith Matloff, Hip Image Cloaks Lithuania's Past, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR,
Apr. 7, 1998, at 6.
55. See Chris Hedges, War Crimes Horrors Revive as Croat Faces Possible Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, May 2, 1998, at Al, A4.
56. See TOM BOWER, THE PLEDGE BETRAYED: AMERICA AND BRITAIN AND THE
DENAZIFICATION OF POSTWAR GERMANY 361 (1982).
57. Id at 378.
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fore the bar of justice.
I. NAZI WAR CRIMINALS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The Allied Powers repeatedly condemned Nazi atrocities during World
War II and warned that those who perpetrated these barbarities would be
prosecuted and punished. The Declaration of St. James, in January 1942, an-
nounced that a principal aim of the armed struggle against the Reich was
bringing accused war criminals before the bar of justice."S President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt subsequently warned neutral nations against providing
asylum to suspected war criminals. 9 He admonished that assisting such indi-
viduals to escape would be contrary to the war aims of the United Nations
and undermine the rule of law." On August 10, 1943, President Roosevelt
attacked Germany's brutal military measures in Poland. He condemned the
Reich's killing and deportation of children to Germany for purposes of
"Aryanization" and slave labor and denounced the dispatch of adolescents,
the sick, infirm, elderly, and females to concentration camps. Roosevelt con-
cluded by affirming the resolve of the United States to punish the instigators
and perpetrators of these crimes."
The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union, on Octo-
ber 30, 1943, issued a statement that served as a blueprint for post-war
prosecutions. The tripartite pronouncement vowed that those German offi-
cers, combatants, and party members who had been involved in atrocities,
massacres, and executions would be sent back for trial to the countries in
which they committed their crimes. Those whose delicts were not limited to
a single locale were to be punished by the joint decision of the Allied gov-
ernments. The document warned, in conclusion, that the Allied Powers
would pursue alleged war criminals to the "uttermost ends of the earth and
will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done."62 On
March 24, 1944, President Roosevelt affirmed these earlier statements and
denounced the Nazi's systematic elimination of the Jews as "one of the
blackest crimes of all history"63 and promised that the leaders and the func-
tionaries who planned and perpetrated these atrocities would be pursued and
punished.'
58. See Resolution by Allied Governments Condemning German Terror and Demanding
Retribution-London, Jan. 13, 1942, 144 BRrr. FOR. STATE PAPERS 1072, 1073-74 (1952).
59. See Refuge in Neutral Countries for Axis Leaders Statement of the President (Roose-
velt) (July 30, 1943), in VI Docs. AM. FOREIGN REL. 190 (1943-44).
60. Id
61. Declaration of the President (Roosevelt) on German Crimes in Poland (Aug. 30,
1943), in VI Docs. AM. FOREIGN REL. 191 (1943-44).
62. Declaration on German Atrocities (Oct. 30, 1943), in VI Docs. AM. FOREIGN REL.
231-32 (1943-44).
63. War Refugees, Statement of the President (Roosevelt) (Mar. 24, 1944), in VI Docs.
AM. FOREIGN REL. 191 (1943-44).
64. See id at 191.
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On May 9, 1945, Germany unconditionally surrendered to the Allied
Powers65 and pledged to apprehend and surrender all those suspected of
having committed, ordered, or abetted war crimes or analogous offenses."
The Allied Powers disagreed over the appropriate disposition of major Nazi
war criminals. The British argued that a formal trial would absorb time and
resources and provide the Nazi defendants with a propaganda forum. The
unprecedented nature of the proceedings and charges would diminish the le-
gitimacy of the trials and the prosecutions would come to be viewed as ritu-
alistic exercises designed to justify the executions of Nazi leaders. German
officials clearly were deserving of death and the British believed that these
executions could be carried out in a summary fashion without compromising
the integrity of the judicial process.67 The United States opposed this as vio-
lative of the core concepts of justice. In an April 1945 memorandum, the
Americans contended that the Nazi leaders had violated the generally-
accepted standards of conduct under international law. The principles of jus-
tice, equality, and the rule of law animated the war effort and the summary
execution of German leaders would undermine the very values that the Al-
lied Powers fought to protect and promote. There was no more basic princi-
ple than that punishment only should be imposed following trial. The
Americans also pointed out that the prosecution and conviction of Nazi offi-
cials would serve to deter others from engaging in wartime atrocities and
help to promote the rule of law and to educate the German populous as to the
excesses of the Third Reich.68 In response, the British agreed to enter into
discussions leading to the prosecution of German war criminals.69
The Nuremberg Charter of 1945"0 authorized the International Military
Tribunal to prosecute and punish the major war criminals of the European
Axis countries for crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity.7 In the end, the Tribunal found nineteen of the twenty-two defen-
65. See Unconditional Surrender of German Forces at Berlin, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 170
(Supp. 1945).
66. See infra note 70, art. 6.
67. See Aide-Me'moire from the United Kingdom (Apr. 23, 1945), reprinted in REPORT
OF ROBERT H. JACKSON UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 18-19 (1943) [hereinafter JACKSON REPORT].
68. See American Memorandum Presented at San Francisco (Apr. 30, 1945), reprinted
in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 67, at 28, 34-37.
69. See Aide-Me'moire From the United Kingdom (June 3, 1945), reprinted in JACKSON
REPORT, supra note 67, at 41.
70. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Nazis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
71. See id art. 6. The three crimes were defined in Article 6:
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for
the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
1998]
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dants guilty on one or more of the charges, and three were acquitted. Twelve
were sentenced to death by hanging, three to life imprisonment, and four
others to terms of between ten and twenty years in prison. The International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg also declared that the Leadership Corps"
and various branches of the Nazi Party were criminal organizations.73 In his
report to the President, the chief American prosecutor, Supreme Court Jus-
tice Robert H. Jackson, argued that prosecutions also should be brought
against various industrialists, militarists, diplomats, and police officials
whose guilt differed only in degree from that of the major leaders."
The United States subsequently conducted twelve additional trials of
German officials and civilian industrialists under Control Council Law No.
10. The latter agreement, which closely paralleled the Nuremberg Charter,
was an expression of the Allied Powers' sovereign jurisdiction over the
Reich. It was intended to provide a uniform legal and procedural basis for
the prosecution of accused war criminals within occupied Germany.76 The
Americans ultimately prosecuted 177 individuals: 142 were convicted; and
35 were acquitted. Twenty-four were sentenced to death; twenty to life im-
prisonment; and eighty received prison terms ranging from five to twenty-
five years. The average sentence was close to ten years. Brigadier General
Telford Taylor, the American Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, noted that
the sentences had become progressively less harsh as public support and in-
terest in the trials waned.77
A third set of proceedings involved the prosecution of accused war
criminals before national tribunals under domestic war crimes statutes.
(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such viola-
tions shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to
slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied terri-
tory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns
or villages, or devastation notjustified by military necessity.
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslave-
ment, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian popula-
tion, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
72. The Leadership Corps was comprised of the high-ranking officials of the Nazi Party.
It was declared to be a criminal organization by the Nuremberg Tribunal. See XXII TRIAL OF
THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INT'L MILrr. TRIB. 501-03 (1948).
73. See Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson (Oct. 7, 1946), reprinted in
JACKSON REPORT, supra note 67, at 432.
74. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 70, at 435.
75. See Control Council Law No. 10, reprinted in TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO
THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAWNO. 10 250 (1949).
76. See id
77. See id at 90-92.
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These trials were conducted in the territories in which the delicts occurred or
before national West German or Israeli courts.78
The newly-formed United Nations adopted various resolutions which
recognized the Nuremberg Principles as fundamental precepts of interna-
tional law.79 In 1946, the General Assembly affirmed "the Principles of in-
ternational law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the
Judgment of the Tribunal."8 The Committee on the Codification of Interna-
tional Law was directed to treat "as a matter of primary importance, plans
for the formulation in the context of a general codification of offences
against the peace and security of mankind, or of an international criminal
code... the principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal
and in the judgment of the Tribunal."'" In a separate resolution, the General
Assembly resolved that "genocide is a crime under international law which
the civilized world condemns, and for the commission of which principles
and accomplices... are punishable."82
In 1950, the General Assembly invited member States to comment on
the International Law Commission's formulation of the Principles of Inter-
national Law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. The
Commission's draft recognized that individuals who committed an act con-
stituting an international crime were responsible and liable to punishment.
This was the case regardless of whether or not the act was punishable under
domestic doctrine. 3 In 1954, the International Law Commission completed
the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind
which, although never acted upon by the General Assembly, recognized that
the Nuremberg Principles constituted offenses against the "peace and secu-
rity of mankind."84
The General Assembly subsequently urged States to take all necessary
measures to arrest those who were responsible, or who had taken a consent-
ing part, in war crimes and in crimes against peace and humanity as defined
in the Nuremberg Charter. Countries apprehending those involved in, or re-
sponsible for, such offenses were urged to send these individuals back to the
78. See UNIrED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 471-75 (1948).
79. See generally Cherif Bassiouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 202, 235 (1979).
80. G.A. Res. 95(I) (1946).
81. Id
82. G.A. Res. 96(I) (1946).
83. See Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles: Report of the International Law
Commission, U.N. GAOR 2nd Sess., Supp. No. 12, Principle I, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316
(1950). Various acts punishable as war crimes and crimes against humanity were legal under
the domestic law of the Third Reich. See generally Matthew Lippman, Fifty Years After
Auschwitz: Prosecutions of Nazi Death Camp Defendants, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 199 (1996);
Matthew Lippman, Law, Lawyers and Legality in the Third Reich: The Perversion of Princi-
ple and Professionalism, 11 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 199 (1997).
84. U.N. GAOR 9th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 9, 11, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954).
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countries in which their abominable acts were committed in order that they
might be tried and punished.85 Fearing that the prosecution of individuals
charged with violating the Nuremberg Principles would be barred by various
domestic statutes of limitations, the General Assembly, in 1968, adopted the
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. The Preamble noted that war crimes
and crimes against humanity were among the "greatest crimes in interna-
tional law." Further, the "effective punishment" of these offenses constituted
an "important element in the prevention of such crimes, the protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, the encouragement of confidence,
for furtherance of co-operation among peoples and the promotion of interna-
tional peace and security."" On December 15, 1973, the General Assembly
adopted a resolution proclaiming the principle of international cooperation in
the detection, arrest, extradition, and punishment of persons guilty of war
crimes and crimes against humanity.87 The resolution, inter alia, proclaimed
that war crimes and crimes against humanity, wherever they were commit-
ted, shall be investigated and that persons suspected of having committed
such crimes shall be apprehended, arrested, tried, and punished, if found
guilty.88 Every State possessed the right to prosecute its own nationals89 and
States were to assist in detecting, arresting, and bringing to trial those sus-
pected of having committed these crimes and in punishing the guilty."
The resolution further provided, as a general rule, that individuals shall
be prosecuted and, if found guilty, punished in the countries in which they
committed their crimes. States were to cooperate in extraditing individuals to
these States9' and in collecting information and evidence that would be of
assistance in bringing such persons to trial.92 States neither were to grant
asylum to individuals suspected of having committed war crimes, crimes
against humanity, or crimes against peace, nor enact legislation that may be
prejudicial to the arrest, extradition, and punishment of such individuals.93
In sum, the United Nations recognized the Nuremberg Principles as part
of the fundamental principles of international law.94 The General Assembly
85. See G.A. Res. 3(1) (1946).
86. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 40,
U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).
87. See Principles of International Cooperation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 3074,
U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30A, at 448, U.N. Doc. A/9030/Add. 1 (1973).
88. See id art. 1.
89. See id art. 2.
90. See id art. 4.
91. See id art. 5.
92. See id art. 6.
93. See id arts. 7-8.
94. See Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson, reprinted in JACKSON REPORT,
supra note 67.
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also urged States to cooperate in the detection, prosecution, and punishment
of those violating these Principles and to extradite offenders to the territories
in which their crimes had been committed.95 These resolutions, however,
have not been interpreted as imposing either a conventional or customary
obligation on States.96
Following World War II, the disposition of German war criminals ap-
peared to be an issue that largely concerned States on the European conti-
nent. However, there was a large influx of migrants into England, Canada,
and Australia in the post-war period. The Allied Powers had been faced with
the resettlement of roughly eight million persons. This included individuals
who were liberated from concentration camps, prisoners of war, workers
who were involuntarily transported to Germany, as well as thousands who
had fled the advancing Russian armies. Roughly one million of these dis-
placed persons refused to return to their Soviet-controlled homelands and to
countries stricken by social and political unrest.97 The Allied Powers, desir-
ous of augmenting their labor forces, agreed to resettle these individuals.
However, England, Canada, Australia, and the United States soon realized
that a number of migrants were suspected of having committed war crimes.
All four governments, thus, were forced to confront the issue whether to
bring former Nazi functionaries before the bar of justice.99
II. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THE UNITED KINGDOM
A. The Hetherington and Chalmers Report
In 1988, the British Government responded to allegations that alleged
95. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
96. The relevant United Nations resolutions do not constitute binding conventional or
customary law. They are not binding treaties. In addition, they are not deemed to reflect the
established and continuous usage and practice of States and also do not constitute binding
customary law. See generally MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCrlON TO
INTERNATIONAL LAw 23-34 (1982). The United Nations resolutions do not incorporate the
strong language requiring States to enact effective penal sanctions contained in the Geneva
Conventions. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 49-50, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S.
No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. The resolutions also do not incorporate the traditional prosecute or
extradite obligation characteristic of various international instruments. See Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic
Agents, Dec. 14, 1972, art. 7, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532. Other international treaties
provide for universal jurisdiction. See International Convention on the Suppression and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of "Apartheid," Nov. 30, 1973, art. IV, U.N. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), U.N.
GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974).
97. See S. REP. No. 80-950, at 8 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2028, 2035.
98. The first case to bring the issue of Nazi war criminals to public attention was Attor-
ney General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.J. 18 (Jm. Dist. Ct. 1961).
Eichmann was convicted of crimes against the Jewish people and was executed. See Matthew
Lippman, The Trial of Adolf Eichmann and the Protection of Universal Human Rights Under
International Law, 5 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1982).
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Nazi war criminals were residing in the United Kingdom. Sir Thomas Heth-
erington and William Chalmers were appointed to study whether to amend
statutory standards "in order to make it possible to prosecute for war crimes
persons who are now British citizens or resident in the United Kingdom."99
Hetherington and Chalmers' analysis was limited to murder, manslaughter,
or genocide committed within Germany and in the German occupied territo-
ries during World War II.100
Their completed report noted that most of the accusations lodged
against individuals resident in the United Kingdom were directed against
former residents of the Baltic States, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine. These
territories were marked by a historically-recurrent conflict between indige-
nous nationalism and the territorial ambitions of outside powers. In the
twentieth century, the entire area gradually became subordinated to the So-
viet Union. The area's inhabitants viewed the invading German forces that
swept into Russia understandably as liberators. Hitler's unarticulated aim,
however, was to evacuate or assimilate the indigenous populations and to
colonize these countries with ethnic Germans. The Reich's short-term strat-
egy was to encourage nationalist sentiment in order to mobilize support for
the war against Russia. Part of this plan involved the promotion of anti-
Soviet and anti-semitic animus. The Jews were portrayed as Soviet support-
ers and" sympathizers and were targeted for extermination. The success of
this strategy is evident from the fact that the Germans and their Baltic sub-
alterns killed virtually all the Jews in Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia.''
Some Soviet satellites defied the Reich's liquidation policy. The local
population in Byelorussia, for instance, quickly became disillusioned with
the German occupation and refused to participate in the pogroms against the
Jews. German and Baltic forces moved in and expeditiously liquidated the
territory's fifty thousand Jews. In contrast, the Ukrainians required little en-
couragement and the indigenous, volunteer militias systematically gathered
and exterminated the Jewish population.' 2 The ability of the international
agencies and the Allied Powers to screen prospective migrants in an effort to
prevent the entry of war criminals was limited by deficiencies in the avail-
able databases. The United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) and
the Central Registry of War Crimes and Security Suspects (CROWCASS),
the two systems established to catalogue the identity of alleged war crimi-
nals, were under-staffed and under-funded and received virtually no coop-
99. SIR THOMAS HETHERINGTON & WILLIAM CHALMERS, REPORT OF THE WAR CRIMES
INQUIRY ii (1989) [hereinafter HETHERINGTON & CHALMERS].
100. See id
101. See id at 5-11. The Germans later deployed the Baits in Byelorussia and Poland.
Many of the members of the Baltic units later were drafted into the Waffen SS Units on the
Eastern Front.
102. See id at 11-14. The Ukrainians subsequently served in Poland and formed the core
of the volunteer Falacia Division which was formed in 1943 to fight the Red Army on the
eastern front.
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eration or support from the suspicious Soviets. Both systems were comprised
of a number of independent and uncoordinated lists, which made tracing the
names of visa applicants cumbersome and complex. Following the war, the
British participated in prosecutions of the major war criminals, but the inef-
ficient identification system resulted in thousands of others inadvertently
being freed from Allied prisoner of war camps. By 1950, the British had lost
interest in further war crimes prosecutions. The Western world was ex-
hausted from war and desired to look to the future. The Cold War conflict
with the Soviets had become a major concern and it was feared that addi-
tional trials would strain relations with West Germany, which was viewed as
a valuable bulwark against Soviet expansion. The sheer numbers of indi-
viduals potentially subject to criminal prosecution also made the prospect of
a renewal of war crimes trials appear to be an overwhelming task. Selecting
a small number of individuals for prosecution inevitably would be criticized
as a selective and senseless exercise in victor's justice. In addition, war
crimes trials were of little interest to the British populous which was con-
cerned with post-war economic recovery. Others feared that additional
prosecutions would fuel support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland
in Palestine."3
The British remained confident that suspected Nazi war criminals had
not entered the country. Extradition requests by the Soviet Union were
viewed as an exercise in Cold War propaganda and routinely were rejected
on the grounds that there was no extradition treaty between the two coun-
tries. In 1950, the British closely considered the deportation of a doctor ac-
cused by Poland of having participated in medical experiments and
selections for the gas chambers at Auschwitz. The doctor's name appeared
on the UNWCC list, but the British government determined that the passage
of time mandated against deporting an alien at the request of a foreign gov-
ernment which only was required to establish a prima facie case that the ac-
cused was a war criminal. This was a clear indication that alleged war
criminals might be resident in Great Britain. Nevertheless, the British gov-
ernment announced that it no longer considered itself obligated to surrender
war criminals and, over the course of the next decades, proceeded to reject
five Soviet extradition requests."
Hetherington and Chalmers concluded that, despite this pronouncement,
the English government remained committed to prohibiting the entry of al-
leged war criminals. This was complicated by the fact that a post-war labor
shortage compelled the British to aggressively recruit foreign workers from
displaced persons and prisoner of war camps and from the 115,000 members
of the Polish armed forces resident in the United Kingdom. The Allies were
reluctant to defy the desire of members of these groups to remain in the West
rather than to return to territories which had been absorbed by the Soviet
103. See id at 19-29.
104. See id at 29-33.
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Union. Many fought for the Germans against what they viewed as Soviet
imperialism and faced the prospect of incarceration or execution if sent be-
hind the Iron Curtain. The British sedulously screened those entering Eng-
land, but the international databases of suspected war criminals contained
little material concerning events in Eastern Europe. This was compounded
by the unorganized and unstructured nature of these lists and by the diffi-
culty in transliterating names."'
The British adhered to the position that an individual's prior member-
ship in the Waffen SS did not render him ineligible for entry. The Germans
conscripted many of the foreign members of these units and deployed them
against the Russians instead of placing them in concentration camps. How-
ever, others served in auxiliary police units which were involved in war
crimes. The migrants admitted to England as voluntary workers also in-
cluded 8,000 Ukrainian members of the Galicia SS Division, a unit that was
accused of committing atrocities in Czechoslovakia and in Yugoslavia.
Hetherington and Chalmers observed that the significance of an applicant's
membership in these units likely was not fully appreciated by those charged
with migrant screening. Nevertheless, once having gained entry into the
United Kingdom, those accused of war crimes were safe from deportation or
extradition to the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the refusal of a Russian re-
quest to repatriate 124 officers in the Galicia SS Division, such refusal based
upon a purported lack of evidence. 6
Hetherington and Chalmers reluctantly concluded that there were few
available avenues of redress against alleged war criminals currently residing
in the United Kingdom. Their report noted that English law provided for ex-
tra-territorial jurisdiction over murder and manslaughter, but that this did not
extend to acts committed abroad by individuals who, at the time, were not
British subjects. Following World War II, the British prosecuted persons ac-
cused of war crimes before military courts sitting in Europe and in the Far
East. These courts were convened under the authority of a Royal Warrant
issued on June 14, 1945. These tribunals adhered to military procedures and
were provided with jurisdiction over all war crimes, irrespective of the ter-
ritory in which they were committed. Hetherington and Chalmers noted that
it was open to question whether the Royal Warrant would authorize prose-
cutions within the United Kingdom. At any rate, they contended that it
would be unacceptable to prosecute individuals before a military court sit-
ting without a jury, forty years following the cessation of hostilities. An ex-
isting statutory provision did provide British courts with extra-territorial
jurisdiction over any individual accused of grave breaches of the 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions, including murder and manslaughter. However, this had
not been given retroactive effect. In addition, a trial for genocide within the
105. See id at 43.
106. See id at 36-42.
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United Kingdom was statutorily limited to acts committed after 1969."°
Contemporary British law provided that an individual could be extra-
dited to stand trial for murder, manslaughter, or genocide to any country in
the world, regardless of whether there was an extradition treaty.' 8 But, the
report noted that the British government retained doubts concerning the
quality of justice in Russia and remained reluctant to extradite individuals to
a country which still suffered from the severe wounds inflicted by the Nazi
regime. Extradition to the newly-independent Baltic States was complicated
by the ,fact that individuals would be facing trial for acts committed on ter-
ritories which, forty years ago, were part of the Soviet Union.0 9
Deportation was another option. English law prohibited the deportation
of British citizens. As a result, individuals first would have to be deprived of
their citizenship. The latter step was reserved for those rare occasions in
which a naturalized citizen was convicted of a serious crime. Hetherington
and Chalmers expressed doubts whether the Immigration Appeals Tribunal
and Secretary State would adopt the view that the continued presence of an
elderly, alleged war criminal, who lived without incident in the United
Kingdom for over forty years, was inimical to the public welfare. Deporting
individuals to countries in which they were subject to trial for the same of-
fense for which they were deported also would be subject to attack as dis-
guised extradition. On the other hand, deportation without the expectation of
criminal prosecution would not significantly advance the interests of jus-
tice.10
Hetherington and Chalmers advised that the United Kingdom fill the la-
cunae in existing law and adopt a criminal statute directed against war
crimes committed during World War II."' The proposed statute would not
constitute retroactive punishment. State-sponsored murder and manslaughter
in an occupied territory during wartime were recognized as crimes under in-
ternational law several decades prior to the initiation of World War II. There
was a consensus among legal scholars that the Allied Powers possessed ex-
tra-territorial jurisdiction over war crimes which could be asserted through
the passage of domestic legislation which vested either their domestic courts,
or a multilateral tribunal, with international jurisdiction. In addition, interna-
tional law prohibited the imposition of a statute of limitations on the prose-
cution of war crimes."2
107. See id at 55-56, 59.
108. See Criminal Justice Act Ch. 33 (1988), cited and quoted in id at 57.
109. See HErHERINGTON & CHALMERS, supra note 99, at 56-57.
110. Seeid. at 58-60.
111. See id at 60-61. The United Kingdom gradually had extended its criminal jurisdic-
tion beyond its territorial boundaries. This generally was reserved for offenses which were
punishable under international treaties which required States either to extradite or to punish
offenders.
112. See id at 61-63 (citing Hague Convention: Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 46, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631).
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Hetherington and Chalmers, however, argued that there was no jurisdic-
tional basis for prosecuting alleged war criminals for either crimes against
humanity or genocide. They contended that prior to World War II, interna-
tional law had not been extended to encompass those killings committed by
a State which were not directly related to an international armed conflict.
The Nuremberg Charter of 1946 authorized the prosecution of crimes against
humanity; large-scale acts of violence committed by a State against its own
citizens or against the residents of territories which were annexed without
resort to military force. However, the Nuremberg judgment required these
acts to be undertaken in connection with a war of aggression. The report
contended that crimes against humanity were not recognized as an independ-
ent crime under international law prior to Nuremberg. They were created to
combat the evil of the Hitlerite regime and were not the product of a pre-
existing multilateral agreement or customary international law."3
Hetherington and Chalmers also concluded that prosecutions could not
be undertaken for acts of genocide committed during World War II. They
argued that genocide was not recognized as a crime prior to the Nuremberg
Judgment and only was fully defined as an international delict in 1948. The
term was used in the Nuremberg indictment to describe the murder and ill-
treatment of the civilian population of an occupied territory, but was absent
from the judgment."4 The authors of the report thus concluded that the pro-
hibition on retroactive punishment barred prosecution for crimes against
humanity and genocide. However, Great Britain was authorized under inter-
national law to adopt legislation asserting jurisdiction over war crimes com-
mitted during World War II because such acts were regarded as offenses
under international law at the time of their commission. " '
Hetherington and Chalmers cautioned that support for the proposed
legislation punishing war crimes must be tempered by the practical problems
associated with the prosecution of alleged Nazi war criminals resident within
the United Kingdom. The inquiry considered 301 allegations of war crimes;
in only four of these were there adjudged to be a realistic chance of convic-
tion for murder. One of the four accused already had died and another was
suffering from poor health. Investigations in the other 297 cases were hin-
dered by various factors, including difficulties in tracing the alleged perpe-
trator, the death of the accused, the unavailability of witnesses, and
insufficient evidence or charges that did not amount to murder or man-
113. See id. at 62.
114. See id Crimes against humanity are defined in article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Char-
ter. See Whitney, supra note 53. Genocide was defined and punished in the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
115. See HErHERINGTON & CHALMERS, supra note 99, at 63-64. See also id at 63 (citing
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 15(1), U.N. Res.
2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967)). Article
15 provides, in part, that an individual shall not be held criminally liable of a criminal offense
"on account of any act of omission which did not constitute a criminal offense, under national
or international law, at the time when it was committed." Il
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slaughter."6
The report also queried whether Great Britain should undertake the
criminal prosecution of the relatively small number of alleged Nazi war
criminals. These individuals had lived in the United Kingdom for over forty
years and the decision had been made some years ago to abandon war crimes
prosecutions. Trials would prove costly and the accumulation of evidence
would be complicated and complex. In some cases, the accused also might
be able to present compelling excuses or defenses, such as necessity or supe-
rior orders." 7
In the end, Hetherington and Chalmers concluded that such objections
were not compelling. These were monstrous crimes that could not be con-
doned and their prosecution hopefully would serve as a deterrent. A formal
decision to abandon war crimes prosecutions never had been made and a
failure to act would taint the United Kingdom as a haven for war criminals.
The decline of Soviet communism resulted in greater access to evidence,
such as witnesses and documents, which had been adjudged to be credible
by courts in other countries. Further, the "superior orders" defense was not
recognized in the military codes of Germany or the United Kingdom. The
lapse of time also was of little legal concern since this did not constitute a
bar to the prosecution of murder under either domestic or international law
and prosecutors were free to exercise their discretion and to drop charges in
the interests of justice."8
In summary, Hetherington and Chalmers recommended the adoption of
legislation extending jurisdiction over the war crimes of murder and man-
slaughter committed in Germany or in German occupied territory during
World War II. Individuals would be subject to prosecution regardless of their
nationality at the time of the alleged offense. The report recommended
against including other war crimes, such as rape, on the grounds that English
law already recognized extra-territorial jurisdiction over homicide and that
the problems of proof were compounded in the case of other offenses. The
report conceded that it was offensive that this proposed legislation would not
encompass mass murder committed within Germany prior to Word War II
and in peacefully-annexed territories. However, there was a question
whether the prosecution of these crimes against humanity might constitute ex
post facto punishment. In addition, most of the cases that had been brought
to the attention of investigators concerned crimes committed in German oc-
cupied territory."9 Hetherington and Chalmers recognized that the enforce-
ment of this legislation depended upon overcoming problems of proof. Many
witnesses were elderly, lived in isolated locales, spoke foreign languages,
and would be testifying as to events which had transpired over forty years
116. See HErHERINGTON & CHALMERS, supra note 99, at 92-93.
117. See id at 94.
118. See id at 94-95.
119. See itt at 92-98.
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ago. Others were dead. Prosecutors would be forced to present evidence in
the form of videotape, satellite networking, affidavits, depositions, and in-
vestigative files. Juries would have to be cautioned and carefully instructed
as to the weight to be accorded to the various forms of proof.20
Despite these difficulties, the report argued that extradition was not a
viable option. The judicial system in Russia remained subordinate to the So-
viet political machine and defendants were not guaranteed meaningful pro-
cedural protections. Public opinion likely would not tolerate extradition to a
country that had demonstrated a reluctance to prosecute those responsible for
committing crimes during communist rule.'
In 1991, the recommendations contained in the Hetherington and
Chalmers report were incorporated into the War Crimes Act of 1991."' The
Act provided that proceedings for murder, manslaughter, and culpable homi-
cide may be brought against a citizen or resident of the United Kingdom, re-
gardless of the individual's nationality at the time of the alleged offense.
Jurisdiction was extended to such violations of the laws and customs of war,
committed between September 1, 1939, and June 5, 1945, in territories
which were part of Germany or under German occupation. Individuals who
were British citizens or residents on, or subsequent to, March 8, 1990, were
encompassed within the Act. The Act, thus, omitted acts of murder which
were not sufficiently connected to an act of aggressive war to constitute a
war crime.'23 In addition, the restriction to persons who were citizens or resi-
dents of England on, or after, 1990 precludes the punishment of individuals
who were part of the large transient population of persons who moved
through Great Britain and subsequently settled in Australia, Canada, or the
United States. These individuals presumably were not considered to possess
a sufficient relationship with Great Britain to sustain a jurisdictional claim.
Of course, in these cases, the individuals' current state of nationality or resi-
dence might undertake legal action. 4
III. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: CANADA
A. The Rauca Case
In 1983, Canada took its first action in over thirty years against an ac-
cused Nazi war criminal when it agreed to extradite Helmut Rauca to West
Germany.'25 The Ontario Court of Appeal, in approving Rauca's extradition,
120. See id at 98-102.
121. See id at 102-03.
122. See War Crimes Act 1991, ch.13 (Eng.) [hereinafter English Act].
123. See id § 1(a)(b), ch.13.
124. See generally HETHERINGTON & CHALMERS, supra note 99, at 42, 95-96.
125. See generally DAVID MATAS, JUSTICE DELAYED NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN CANADA
(1987); HAROLD TROPER & MORTON WEINFELD, OLD WOUNDS, JEWS, UKRAINIANS AND THE
HUNT FOR NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN CANADA (1989).
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ruled that the order did not contravene the defendant's right as a citizen to
reside in Canada and that the crimes with which he was charged were within
the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Germany." 6
Rauca was alleged to have served as an officer in a killing squad sta-
tioned in German-occupied Lithuania. The five-count German warrant
charged Rauca with ordering the removal and subsequent execution, in
August 1941, of approximately 534 persons from the Kowno ghetto. A
month later, he allegedly beat and shot a Jew suspected of concealing a sil-
ver fork. Shortly thereafter, Rauca purportedly ordered the arrest and execu-
tion of 1,845 Jews apprehended on the streets of the Kowno ghetto. He was
further charged with having ordered the execution of an additional 9,200
Jews at the end of October 1941. In December 1943, Rauca, along with two
other officers, allegedly executed the wife and family of the Chief Rabbi of
the Kowno ghetto. These allegations were supported by depositions sworn
by survivors of the Jewish ghetto. Following the war, Rauca was detained
and held in custody by American forces for three years, and was released in
1948. He immigrated to Canada two years later, worked as a farm laborer
and hotel manager in Ontario, and in 1956, became a naturalized Canadian
citizen."V
The Ontario Court noted that in July 1941, Hitler declared the Baltic
States, together with a portion of Byelorussia, to be the territory of the Reich
Commissariat128 under the rule of the Reich Minister for the Occupied East-
ern Territories. This resulted in offenders being subject to the jurisdiction of
Nazi courts sitting in these territories. The Canadian Tribunal observed that
the Reich ordered, condoned, and tolerated the killing of Jews despite the
fact that murder was punishable with life imprisonment under the German
criminal code. West German courts subsequently claimed jurisdiction over
these acts on the grounds that the Federal Republic of Germany was a reor-
ganized version of the Third Reich. In 1979, West Germany had entered into
an extradition treaty with Canada recognizing murder as an extraditable of-
fense. '29
The Ontario Court ruled that the right of a citizen to remain in Canada,
as protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,3 ' was subject
to reasonable limits.3 Canada historically had entered into extradition trea-
ties and exchanges with other States in order to ensure that offenders were
brought to the bar of justice. Canada only assumed extra-territorial jurisdic-
tion over the criminal conduct of its nationals in limited instances. Extradi-
tion appeared to provide the single avenue available to ensure that the
126. See In Re Federal Republic of Germany and Rauca [1983] 445 D.L.R.3d 638.
127. See id at 642-46.
128. The four territories were consolidated into a single military district under the control
of the Reich. Eventually, it all was to be annexed into the Reich.
129. See ide at 648-49.
130. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms §§ 1, 6, quoted and cited in id. at 653.
131. See id at 654-55.
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seventy-five year old Rauca was brought to trial. Rauca's prosecution in
Germany was consistent with the text of international human rights treaties,
none of which prohibited the extradition of a State's own nationals.' The
Appellate Court also noted that its interpretation of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms was consistent with Canada's desire to bring to justice those who
participated in atrocities and war crimes during World War 11.'3
The Rauca case served as the catalyst that stimulated the-Canadian gov-
ernment to undertake a comprehensive study of the appropriate disposition
of alleged Nazi war criminals resident within its territory.
B. The Deschenes Commission
In 1985, the Canadian government appointed a commission of inquiry
on war crimes headed by Jules Deschenes, Chief Justice of the Quebec Supe-
rior Court.'34 The Commission was charged with investigating the entry and
presence of alleged war criminals in Canada and with recommending action
to bring these individuals to the bar of justice.3
Following World War II, Canada was less active in war crimes prose-
cutions than the other Allied Powers. It conducted only four trials involving
seven defendants prior to repatriating its nationals from Europe in 1946.
Great Britain acted on Canada's behalf in carrying out six additional prose-
cutions involving twenty-eight suspects. In 1948, the British Commonwealth
Relations Office sent a secret telegram to Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India,
New Zealand, Pakistan, and South Africa suggesting that all existing war
crimes cases should be disposed of by August 31, 1948. The British ex-
plained that war crimes trials already had achieved the desired degree of de-
terrence and that the Commonwealth's concern with exacting retribution
should be subordinated to the interest in strengthening West Germany as a
bulwark against communist expansionism. Over the course of the next thirty
years, Canada devoted little effort to the detection and prosecution of war
criminals.3 6 The Deschenes Commission defended this on the grounds that
Canadian policy had not markedly differed from that of other countries.'37
In 1962, an allegation that the infamous Nazi Doctor Josef Mengele was
resident in Canada stimulated interest in the question whether other alleged
Nazi war criminals had migrated to Canada. The Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP) dismissed the inquiry by noting that war crimes inquiries
were of limited interest. This policy of benign neglect remained in place un-
til 1983 when the RCMP initiated an investigation that resulted in the extra-
132. See id at 657-60.
133. See id at 660-63.
134. See JULES DESCHENES Er AL., COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON WAR CRIMINALS, REPORT
PART I: PUBLIC 17 (1986) [hereinafter DESCHENES].
135. See idt
136. See id at 25-27.
137. See id at 31-32.
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dition of Albert Helmut Rauca, who subsequently died in a German prison
while awaiting trial.'
The Deschenes Commission stated that it would restrict its recommen-
dations to crimes related to the activities of Nazi Germany during World
War II. The Commission further explained that it broadly interpreted the no-
tion of war crimes to include the Nuremberg delicts of war crimes and
crimes against humanity as well as crimes against peace, or the waging of an
aggressive war. 9
The Commission surveyed the legal mechanisms that were available to
bring accused war criminals resident within Canada before the bar of justice.
Extradition, according to the Commission, had the advantage of providing a
trial in a country that was intimately connected with the alleged offense.
However, the availability of this remedy was dependent upon a request being
lodged by a country with which Canada had an extradition treaty and which
also was adjudged to be able and willing to afford the accused with a fair
trial.1
40
The Commission noted that since World War I, Canada received and
rejected a number of extradition requests from States in Eastern Europe
seeking to prosecute alleged Nazi war criminals. According to the Commis-
sion, the recent democratic reforms within these former communist States
likely would result in such requests receiving a favorable response in the
future. For example, additional requests from Germany, the logical country
to carry out these prosecutions, should be particularly encouraged. 4' On the
other hand, the existing text of Canada's extradition treaty with Israel was
limited to crimes committed on the territory of the Jewish State subsequent
to the signature of the instrument in March 1967. Extradition of accused
Nazi war criminals to Israel, thus, was not possible absent the amendment of
the treaty.'42 In order to overcome the prohibition on extradition to countries
with which Canada had not entered into an extradition treaty, the Commis-
sion recommended domestic legislation providing for the extradition of all
individuals accused of committing war crimes during World War I.143
The most obvious alternative to extradition was criminal prosecution
within Canada, but the Commission failed to find a statutory basis for the
assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction over war crimes by Canadian courts.
Canada's genocide statute failed to provide for retroactive application.'44 The
existing War Crimes Act also did not provide a viable option; it only
138. See id at 27-30. The Commission's research indicated that Mengele neither entered
nor attempted to enter Canada. Id at 67, 76-77, 82.
139. See id at 44. The Nuremberg Charter defined crimes against peace and war crimes.
See supra note 66.
140. See DESCHENESETAL., supra note 134, at 86-88.
141. See id at 88-91.
142. See id at 91-96.
143. See id at 105-08.
144. See id at 113-14.
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authorized military trials in times of armed conflict in a theater of war and
did not encompass crimes against humanity or crimes against peace. A de-
fendant prosecuted before a military court also was denied due process pro-
tections, such as trial by jury, and was subject to the death penalty. There
also was a question whether acts such as the deportation of civilians for pur-
poses of slave labor, would fall within the purview of military law. In the fi-
nal analysis, the Commission concluded that even the pursuit of war
criminals could not justify subjecting citizens to the jurisdiction of military
courts, thereby compromising the fundamental values of Canadian jurispru-
dence. "5
Customary international law, however, offered a remedy. The general
principles of law recognized by the community of nations were recognized
as part of the supreme law of the land under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms.'46 This incorporated acts, such as murder, rape, and plunder,
which were prohibited in all civilized legal systems during periods of peace
as well as war. The Commission determined that an individual could be
subjected to trial for an act that was contrary to these general principles,
notwithstanding the lack of a domestic statute. The Commission, however,
determined that this constituted too unconventional a foundation upon which
to base a prosecution."
The Commission thus determined that existing Canadian law failed to
furnish a basis for domestic war crimes prosecutions. It advocated the
amendment of the Canadian criminal code to provide for the retroactive
punishment of war crimes committed during World War II. This would not,
however, contravene the prohibition on ex post facto punishment. Canadian
law, consistent with international documents, did not recognize this principle
as a barrier to the prosecution of individuals who were accused of violating
the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations.'48 The
Commission had little fear that such a law would be abused. It noted that the
Executive Branch retained the discretion to enforce the statute and likely
would exercise caution in initiating prosecutions. A Canadian Court also
might sustain a motion to stay the prosecution of an alleged war criminal on
the grounds that a trial forty-five years following the termination of World
War II constituted undue delay in contravention of the principles of funda-
mental justice."'
The Commission advocated a clear, easily-administered amendment to
the criminal code that would encompass war crimes as well as crimes against
humanity. The latter would cover crimes committed in periods of peace as
well as war. The proposed amendment would be premised on Canada's ju-
risdiction over acts that contravened the general principles of law common
145. See id at 117-23.
146. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, art. 11(g), quoted in id. at 131.
147. See DESCHENES ETAL., supra note 134, at 131-32.
148. See id at 147-48.
149. See id at 148-50.
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to all legal systems. This jurisdiction would be triggered in those instances in
which an offender was apprehended within Canada. The law would extend
to all military conflicts, regardless of whether Canada was involved, in order
to avoid singling out individuals aligned with the Nazi cause during World
War II. Prosecution would be provided without regard to the nationality of
the offender or victim, the situs of the crime, or whether the offender or the
victim was a civilian or a member of the military. Trial by jury would be
guaranteed. 5' The Commission stressed that the conventional criminal jus-
tice system should be utilized to prosecute war criminals in order to guaran-
tee the same quality of justice that was provided to other defendants.
However heinous the offenses of accused war criminals, the Commission
stressed that the rule of law should not be compromised. 5'
The Commission favored defining war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity in accordance with the Nuremberg precedent. Courts then could look
to the Nuremberg judgment for assistance in interpreting the war crime stat-
ute. It also was desirable to vest the discretion to conduct prosecutions in the
federal attorney general rather than in state officials. This would provide uni-
formity, experience, and expertise in conducting these high-profile and con-
troversial cases that might impact upon Canada's foreign affairs. Citizens
also would be prohibited from initiating private prosecutions in this complex
and delicate area.'
The Commission declined to address whether individuals who had re-
ceived foreign pardons should be subject to prosecution within Canada. This
only had arisen on a single occasion in the past and efforts should be devoted
to more central concerns. The prohibition on the prosecution of individuals
who had been acquitted or who had been convicted abroad already had been
incorporated into Canadian constitutional doctrine.'53 The Commission also
added that it had decided that it was unnecessary to provide for the punish-
ment of crimes against peace. Most of those involved in planning Germany's
aggressive wars already had been brought to the bar of justice and this of-
fense raised issues of retroactive punishment. The prospective application of
this crime in regards to future wars also presented political problems that re-
quired extensive analysis and discussion. 4
The Commission noted that its recommendation to adopt legislation that
would authorize the civilian trial of alleged Nazi war criminals coincided
with a proposal endorsed by the Canadian Bar Association in 1981. The bar
association favored authorizing the prosecution of war crimes and crimes
against humanity regardless of whether Canada was involved in the conflict.
Jurisdiction under the bar association's draft would extend to crimes com-
mitted against civilian or military personnel by an individual apprehended
150. See id at 150-51.
151. See id at 154.
152. See id at 164-65.
153. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Art. 11(h), quoted in id. at 164.
154. See DESCHENES ETAL., supra note 134, at 165-66.
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within Canadian territory.'
The Commission viewed denaturalization and deportation as the least
desirable alternatives to extradition. This cumbersome and time-consuming
process involved revoking a naturalized citizen's status and transferring him
or her to another country.'56 This procedure was not available against native-
born citizens, but all the suspected war criminals resident within Canada had
been born abroad, and thus were naturalized citizens. These individuals were
subject to the loss of citizenship and deportation if it was established that
they fraudulently concealed or misrepresented their wartime activities in
their visa or naturalization applications.'57
The Commission noted that this alternative was impractical, and philo-
sophically troubling. Most alleged war criminals within Canada ranged from
sixty to eighty years of age. Many already had died and others likely would
pass away prior to the completion of the denaturalization and deportation
processes. The Commission recommended that the two procedures should be
consolidated and streamlined."8 This, however, would not overcome the time
constraints involved in investigating each suspect's activities in various ar-
chival sources and comparing this information with his declarations to Ca-
nadian officials. Canada's incomplete archives of citizenship and
immigration documents further complicated the process.' The Commission
also noted that denaturalization and deportation may not lead to a satisfac-
tory result. There may be little choice other than to deport an individual to a
State in which he or she would likely find a safe haven or in which due proc-
ess standards were deficient.60
Estimates of the number of alleged Nazi war criminals resident within
Canada varied from under one hundred to well over a thousand. 6 ' According
to the Deschenes Commission, the largest influx of potential criminals oc-
curred when Canada was persuaded by the United Kingdom to approve the
entrance of several thousand members of the Galicia Division. The Commis-
sion, however, stressed that mere membership in the Division was insuffi-
cient to justify either criminal prosecution or denaturalization and
deportation.'62
The Deschenes Commission developed several lists that contained a to-
tal of over 774 potential war criminals.6 ' It recommended closing 606 files,
denominated ninety-seven cases in which additional investigations abroad
155. See Canadian Bar Association Resolution (Sept. 3, 1981), quoted in id. at 154.
156. See DESCHENES ETAL., supra note 134, at 86.
157. See id at 169.
158. See id at 173.
159. See id at 207, 214, 224-25. For the Commission's recommended revisions in Cana-
dian law, see id. at 226-27, 232.
160. See id at238.
161. See id, at 248.
162. See id at261.
163. See id
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were advisable,' and singled out twenty-nine cases in which the seriousness
of the allegations and the availability of evidence warranted special consid-
eration.'65 In twenty of the latter cases, the Commission recommended that
either immediate criminal prosecution or revocation of citizenship and de-
portation should be pursued.'66
C. The Finta Case
In 1985, the Canadian Parliament incorporated the Deschenes Commis-
sion's recommendations into the criminal code. 67 These provisions provided
for jurisdiction over individuals who committed an act or omission outside
of Canada which constituted a war crime or crime against humanity that, had
it been committed within Canada, would have constituted an offense against
the then-existing laws of Canada. The accused was deemed to have com-
mitted the act within Canada when three additional conditions were satisfied.
First, at the time of the act or omission: 1) the suspect was a Canadian citi-
zen or employed by Canada in a civilian or military capacity; 2) the suspect
was a citizen or was employed in a civilian or military capacity by a State
engaged in an armed conflict against Canada; or 3) the victim of the act or
omission was a Canadian citizen or was a citizen of a State which was allied
with Canada in an armed conflict. Second, Canada was authorized under in-
ternational law to exercise jurisdiction over the accused on the basis of his or
her presence in Canada. Third, the individual was presently within Canada.'68
An individual was entitled to rely on any justification, excuse, or defense
available under the laws of Canada or under international law.'69 Notwith-
standing the latter provision, an accused might be convicted of an offense
that was committed in obedience to, or in conformity with, the law in. force
at the time and place of its commission.7
Crimes against humanity were defined in accordance with the Nurem-
berg Charter. These delicts included murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, persecution, or any other inhumane act which was committed
against "any civilian population" or "any identifiable group of persons" and
which was in contravention of conventional or customary international law
or which was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized
by the community of nations. 7 ' War crimes were defined as any act or omis-
164. See id at 270, 272.
165. See id at 262.
166. See id at 827-28. The Commission did not recommend the creation of a special unit
to prosecute alleged Nazi war criminals, fearing that this would become a flashpoint for eth-
nic competition and conflict. See id at 828-29.
167. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-30 (1985) (Can.) [hereinafter Canadian Act].
168. See id § 7(3.71).
169. See id. § 7(3.73).
170. See i. § 7(3.74).
171. lId § 7(3.76).
1998]
27
Lippman: Pursuit of Nazi War Criminals in the United States and in Other A
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1998
28 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
sion which was "committed during an international armed conflict," whether
or not in "contravention of the law in force at the time and place of its com-
mission."'
In 1994, the Canadian Supreme Court, in Regina v. Finta,'73 upheld the
constitutionality of these amendments to the criminal code in a plurality
opinion written by Justice Peter deCarteret Cory.'74 Irma Finta served as a
captain and commander of the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie in Szeged. The
Gendarmerie were under the effective control of German occupation forces.
The puppet Hungarian regime deferred to the dictates of the Reich and
adopted a series of anti-Jewish measures that culminated in the Baky Order
of April 7, 1944. The latter provided a master plan for the extermination of
Hungarian Jewry, culminating in the ghettoization and deportation of Jews
to concentration camps. Finta allegedly was responsible for directing the
collection of the city's 8,617 Jews in a brickyard where they were stripped of
their valuables. The Jews then were packed into sealed boxcars and trans-
ported to their death. Most of the weak and elderly suffocated or died of
starvation or illness during the journey to the concentration camps.'75
Finta fled Hungary and was prosecuted and convicted in abstentia. In
1951, Finta immigrated to Canada and was naturalized as a Canadian citizen
in 1956. The execution of his Hungarian sentence was later barred by the
statute of limitations, and, in 1970, Hungary issued a general amnesty which
encompassed Finta. In 1988, the Canadian government charged Finta with
unlawful confinement, robbery, kidnapping, and manslaughter, which were
separately charged as both war crimes and crimes against humanity. The
Crown relied on nineteen eyewitnesses to support the allegation that Finta
was the senior officer in charge of the Gendarmerie at Szeged and exercised
effective control over the brickyard. Finta admitted having been present, but
denied that he was in a position of responsibility, instead contending that he
was subject to the command of the German security forces. The trial judge
exercised his discretion to call three witnesses who provided some corrobo-
ration of Finta's claim and the jury adjudged that there was sufficient rea-
sonable doubt to acquit the defendant of all charges.'76 The Crown appealed
that the judge incorrectly instructed the jury and Finta filed a cross-appeal
challenging the constitutionality of the recently enacted criminal code provi-
sions.'77
The Crown contended that the judge improperly directed the jury to de-
172. Canadian Act, supra note 167, § 7(3.76).
173. Regina v. Finta [1994] S.C.R. 701.
174. See id at 788. Justices Charles Doherty Gonthier and John Charles Major joined the
plurality opinion. See id. Chief Justice Antonio Lamer concurred in this opinion. See id at
723. Justices Gerard La Forest, Claire L'Heureux-Dube and Beverley McLachlin dissented, in
part. See id at 726.
175. See id at 789-91.
176. See iL at 792-96.
177. See id at 804-05.
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termine whether the accused had committed a war crime or crime against
humanity that would have been punishable in Canada. The prosecution ar-
gued that whether the accused's actions constituted a war crime or a crime
against humanity was a threshold jurisdictional issue which should have
been determined by the judge utilizing a balance of probability standard. The
jury should have been limited to considering whether the defendant satisfied
the act and intent standard required to be adjudged guilty of the underlying
domestic offense under the Canadian criminal code. Justice Cory rejected
the prosecution's contention. He pointed out that the jury might determine
that the defendant was guilty of homicide and yet conclude that there was a
reasonable doubt as to whether his actions and state of mind satisfied the
standard for war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Crown's interpre-
tation would deny the accused the right to have the essential elements of the
charges against him proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of
a jury of his peers."'
Justice Cory stressed that these were grave international crimes that
shocked the conscience of humanity and strongly stigmatized the perpetra-
tors. They carried distinctive act and intent requirements that must be estab-
lished in addition to the actus reus for the underlying common domestic
crimes. The distinct act element of crimes against humanity was that the
enumerated inhumane act discriminated against or persecuted an identifiable
group. As for war crimes, the added component was that the defendant's act
constituted a violation of the laws of armed conflict.'79
Justice Cory also upheld the trial court's jury instructions pertaining to
the required mental state. He noted that the prosecution was required to es-
tablish the requisite moral culpability demanded for the underlying domestic
offense as well as the level of moral blameworthiness required for a crime
against humanity or war crime. The mental element required for a crime
against humanity was that the accused was aware or willfully blind to the
facts or circumstances that would bring his or her conduct within the defini-
tion of a crime against humanity. The jury, for example, must determine
whether the defendant was cognizant that his or her actions constituted the
deportation of an identifiable racial group. Justice Cory stressed that it would
not be necessary to establish that the accused was aware that his or her ac-
tions were inhumane. 8' Therefore, it would have been sufficient for Finta to
have been aware of the conditions within the boxcars, even if he did not re-
alize that his actions in loading people into the train were inhumane.
A distinctive mental test also was to be applied for war crimes. The
mental element was satisfied so long as the accused knew or was willfully
blind to the facts that brought his or her actions within the definition of a war
crime. It was unnecessary to establish that the defendant actually was aware
178. See id at 810-11.
179. See id at 812-13.
180. See id at 819.
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that his acts constituted war crimes. Thus, knowingly or recklessly executing
civilians or prisoners of war was sufficient to establish the requisite mens rea
for a war crime. 8 '
The plurality also rejected the claim that the judge improperly submitted
the superior orders defense to the jury. The legal provision was permissive
and provided that an individual "may be convicted" of an offense notwith-
standing the fact that the act or omission was "committed in obedience to or
in conformity with the laws in force at the time and place of its commis-
sion. ' The plurality opinion noted that absent this exception, even Adolf
Hitler could claim that he was obeying the laws of his country and avoid
criminal conviction." 3 This consideration was counter-balanced by the fact
that military organizations depended upon obedience to command authority
and that individuals could not be expected to examine the merits of every
order or law.'84 The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court correctly bal-
anced these concerns in instructing the jury that the superior orders defense
was unavailable if the jury determined that a reasonable person would have
found that the order was "manifestly illegal" and that the accused possessed
the choice whether to obey the command.'85
Justice Cory also rejected Finta's contention that given the uncertain
and variable state of international law during World War II, he was not fairly
informed of the consequences of his conduct; and that the war crimes and
crimes against humanity provisions were so vague that they failed ade-
quately to define the acts which were prohibited. Cory ruled that the Cana-
dian legislation condemned grave, cruel, and heinous acts which any
reasonable person would have realized contravened the basic human values
of the laws of war. This conduct was so repulsive, reprehensible, and univer-
sally condemned that it was ingenuous to contend that the definitions of
crimes against humanity and war crimes were vague and uncertain.'86
The plurality opinion also rejected the contention that the provisions
constituted a retroactive enactment in violation of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. In order to avoid creating new offenses, Cory noted
that the Act was drafted so as to provide that accused war criminals were
deemed to have contravened pre-existing crimes under the Canadian crimi-
nal code. However, Cory argued that the Act should be interpreted as creat-
ing two new offenses, war crimes and crimes against humanity. But, this,
nevertheless, did not contravene the prohibition on ex post facto punish-
ment. 87
Cory noted that some argued that the humanitarian law of war had
181. See id at 820-21.
182. Id at 843 (citing Canadian Act, supra note 167, § 7(3.74)).
183. See Finia, [1994] S.C.R. at 840.
184. See id at 838-39.
185. Id at 841. See also id. at 845-46.
186. See id at 869.
187. See id at 870.
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evolved over 7,000 years and had been assimilated into conventional inter-
national law by 1907. According to this view, the war crimes and crimes
against humanity provisions of the Canadian legislation merely incorporated
pre-existing legal principles. Cory, however, adopted the unique position
that individuals charged with having committed war crimes and crimes
against humanity provisions must have been aware of the immoral character
of their conduct. Justice required their punishment despite the fact that they
were not subject to sanction under positive international law at the time that
they committed their criminal acts. Under such circumstances, the prohibi-
tion on retroactive punishment must yield to the more significant value of
punishing those who committed international crimes during World War I."'
The plurality also failed to find merit in Finta's contention that he suf-
fered prejudice as a result of the fact that forty-five years elapsed between
his alleged criminal conduct and trial. Cory noted the delay likely was more
prejudicial to the Crown than to the defense. Most of the relevant documen-
tary and physical evidence was destroyed during the war and any prejudice
resulting from the death of witnesses was cured by the trial judge's solicita-
tion and admission of the statement of a Hungarian eyewitness who disputed
the claim that Finta headed the Gendarmerie. Cory adjudged the one-year
delay between the legislation and the formal charge reasonable in light of the
amount of investigative work required. 189
The Canadian legislation also could not be considered to be impermissi-
bly discriminatory for having singled out individuals who committed war
crimes and crimes against humanity. Those subject to punishment were not a
discrete and insular minority 9' that suffered historical disadvantage or preju-
dice.1 9
1
Justice Gerard V. La Forest, dissenting in part, noted that the Canadian
legislation was premised on the impracticability of relying on territorial ju-
risdiction to enforce the international proscription against war crimes and
crimes against humanity. Territorial jurisdiction customarily was considered
to be the most efficient and effective mechanism for criminal prosecution.
However, it was not realistic because a defendant's State of nationality may
be implicated in war crimes and crimes against humanity and, as a conse-
quence, might be reluctant to initiate a prosecution following the cessation of
hostilities. In addition, perpetrators may flee to other countries in order to
elude punishment. Justice La Forest noted that these practical problems mo-
tivated the Deschenes Commission to recommend the adoption of legislation
which permitted the prosecution of crimes against humanity and war crimes
within Canada. Parliament was uncertain concerning the permissibility of
extra-territorial jurisdiction over these offenses and, as a result, it adopted
188. See id at 870-74.
189. See id at 875.
190. See id at 875-76.
190. See id at 726, 733.
191. See id at 875-76.
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legislation that permitted the trial of suspected war criminals for the viola-
tion of Canadian criminal law. 92
La Forest, in contrast to Justice Cory, argued that the trial judge was re-
quired to make a threshold determination whether the act or omission
amounted to a war crime or a crime against humanity. The jury then was to
determine whether the defendant's mental state and physical actions satisfied
the requirements of the underlying domestic delict.'93 The complicated and
intricate nature of the international law issues dictated that this threshold re-
quirement should be assigned to the presiding judge. The judge was the ap-
propriate person to determine international legal issues that were unrelated to
the determination of culpability. These issues included whether the defen-
dant's actions occurred during a state of war and whether the victims were
enemy soldiers, illegal combatants, prisoners of war, or civilians.94 Justice
La Forest also contended that there was no specific mental state required for
a war crime or a crime against humanity. It thus was unnecessary to demon-
strate that an accused charged with crimes against humanity was aware that
his or her actions were directed against a civilian population or an identifi-
able group. The forcible confinement or kidnapping of 8,617 Jews was
blameworthy regardless of whether the accused was cognizant that his vic-
tims were members of an identifiable group.'
In sum, in contrast to the English Act, the Canadian war crimes legisla-
tion punished war crimes as well as crimes against humanity! 6 Punishing
crimes committed abroad as crimes under the Canadian criminal code com-
plicated the application of the Canadian legislation to crimes which were
carried out on Canadian territory.'97 This legal fiction reduced the discomfort
of judges charged with enforcing an extra-territorial statute that seemingly
violated the spirit of the prohibition on retroactive punishment.'98 As a result
of this provision, jurors were encumbered with the responsibility of deter-
mining whether the accused's conduct contravened domestic as well as in-
ternational law. 9
IV. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: AUSTRALIA
A. The Menzies Report
In 1986, the Australian Special Minister of State requested Mr. A.C.
Menzies to report on the entry, residence, and legal disposition of alleged
192. See id at 726-73.
193. See id at 746-48.
194. See id at 774-75.
195. See id at 756-57.
196. See supra notes 123 & 171-72 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
198. See Finta, [1994] R.C.S. at 870-94.
199. See id at 810-13, 820.
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Nazi criminals in Australia."'
A series of radio programs produced by the Australian Broadcasting
Corporation in 1986, alleged that a substantial number of war criminals had
entered Australia. Many of these individuals purportedly were permitted to
enter at the request of American and British intelligence agencies."0' This
was a shock to the Australian government who consistently claimed that the
country's comprehensive screening systemn°' limited the entry of suspected
war criminals. The government also rationalized that the flow of migrants
had enriched the country and that even if suspected war criminals managed
to enter the country, they should be permitted to pursue their lives free of
fear of prosecution. Australia further pointed out that it already had fulfilled
its obligation to bring Axis criminals to justice by participating in the Inter-
national Military Tribunal at Tokyo and by conducting roughly one thousand
trials before military courts in the Pacific." 3
The government had no settled post-war policy on the disposition of in-
dividuals resident within Australia who were suspected of having committed
war crimes. This confusion was compounded by the fact that these crimes
were committed outside Australia by individuals who, at the time, were na-
tionals of a foreign State. Security agencies, upon receiving a complaint,
typically confined their investigations to questioning the suspect concerning
his wartime activities. In other instances, the allegations merely were noted
or resulted in a cursory inquiry."°
Mr. Menzies considered the arguments in favor of refraining from ac-
tion against alleged war criminals. Most of these individuals had lived re-
spectable lives over a number of years and had acquired Australian
citizenship. Their crimes were committed abroad against residents of foreign
countries and Australia had little interest in bringing these former Nazi
functionaries to justice. Menzies concluded that in the case of minor war
criminals who were alleged to have been guilty of membership in criminal
organizations, or who were accused of committing property crimes, that
these considerations were persuasive. In contrast, he contended that those
accused of severe atrocities or mass murder should be brought to the bar of
justice. Prosecution was required in order to condemn and to deter such of-
fenses. Moreover, the guilt of these individuals was not mitigated by the fact
that they lived admirable lives over the last forty years. However, Menzies
stressed that the interest in bringing such persons to justice did not justify the
200. See DEPARTMENT OF THE SPECIAL MINISTER OF STATE, REVIEW OF MATERIAL
RELATING TO THE ENTRY OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS INTO AUSTRALIA 3, 5 (1987) [herein-
after MENZIES].
201. See id at 10-11.
202. Individuals applying for immigration initially were screened by the International
Refugee Organization. Australian Military Intelligence Officers further evaluated prospective
immigrants. See id. at 47-49.
203. See id at 10-11.
204. See id at 117-20.
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compromise of legal standards and procedures."5
Menzies noted that the government's policy of encouraging mass mi-
gration of individuals into Australia following World War II was based on
the belief that the country's future security depended upon an increase in
population. Roughly 1.2 million persons entered Australia. Approximately
250,000 of these individuals were refugees who were unable or unwilling to
be repatriated to their country of origin. The largest resettlement program
was the displaced person scheme administered by the International Refugee
Organization (IRO)." 6 This was supplemented by various programs designed
to attract skilled workers and to reunite families and friends.2"
The IRO Constitution specifically denied assistance to war criminals,
individuals involved in assisting the enemy in persecuting civil populations,
and to persons who voluntarily assisted enemy forces in their operations
against the Allied Powers. Individuals of German ethnic origin, whether
German nationals or members of minorities in other countries, also were ex-
cluded. Residents of the Baltic States who were able to demonstrate that they
were conscripted into the German military and who were able to satisfy IRO
officers that they had not committed atrocities, or otherwise persecuted ci-
vilians, were eligible for admission. Despite these precautions, a number of
press reports appeared in Australia in 1948 that Nazis loyalists entered under
the displaced persons scheme. In reaction, Australia dispatched two military
intelligence officers to assist the Department of Immigration in evaluating
the background of individuals applying for entry visas."08
The Australian government still failed to take the entry of suspected war
criminals into the country seriously. The Australian government did not spe-
cifically exclude suspected war criminals from entering the country until
1951. The government presumed that the criminal prosecutions of Nazis car-
ried out in Europe, along with the IRO's detailed selection process, had
eliminated the possibility of suspected war criminals being referred for im-
migration. However, the increasing number of Germans who were being
admitted to Australia under the skilled worker scheme apparently alerted of-
ficials to the possibility that war criminals might seek to enter the country.
At the same time that protections against major war criminals were being
strengthened, the intelligence service determined that it was permissible to
admit ordinary rank and file members of the Nazi Party as well as various
low ranking officials. This modification in policy, which reflected a desire to
integrate Germany into the Western Alliance, was withheld from the public
in order to avoid offending and provoking Australia's ethnic and Jewish
communities. The 1955 immigration protocol further relaxed entry require-
ments and limited the category of persons who were to be rejected automati-
205. Seeid at 11-13.
206. See id at 33-34.
207. See id at 45-46.
208. See id at 47-48.
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cally to persons found guilty of crimes against humanity. Individuals listed
by the UNWCC and CROWCASS merely were subject to a criminal inves-
tigation. As the Cold War became of increasing concern, the role of Austra-
lian intelligence agencies in investigating residents with alleged Nazi
affiliations was further restricted; they were legislatively limited to reporting
on war criminals and Nazi officials who posed a present threat to the secu-
rity of the State."9
Mr. Menzies also noted that Australia's security apparatus in Europe for
detecting war criminals had been inadequate. IRO screening was superficial
and the standards established by Australia often were disregarded. Australian
security officials reviewing migrants endorsed by the IRO typically lacked
the required training and language skills and expressed misplaced confi-
dence in the IRO. Immigration officials found themselves overwhelmed by
the number of applicants and reportedly were pressured to act expeditiously
in order to fill empty berths on ships departing for Australia. The problems
confronting Australian officials were compounded by the difficulty of de-
tecting forged documents and investigating the wartime activities of indi-
viduals who claimed that their documents were lost or destroyed.21
These difficulties were exacerbated by the limited data on Eastern
Europeans which was available from the Berlin Documents Center, the
United States' central depository of Nazi documents. The lists of war crimi-
nals that were compiled by the Allies and the United Nations also were in-
complete and poorly organized." An additional problem was that Australian
security officials were not authorized to check the security background of
refugees or applicants resident in various countries, including France, Italy,
and the United Kingdom."2 Security officials also were assigned to other
countries, such as the Netherlands, until the early 1950s and host govern-
ments often withheld information which they did not consider incriminating.
At the same time, Australia continued to relax the limitations on immigra-
tion. For instance, by 1956, Australia began to admit Dutch collaborators on
a case-by-case basis. 3
In addition, immigration officials were impatient with the slow security
screening process and permitted a number of German migrants to enter
Australia without having received security clearances. Several of these indi-
viduals later were determined to have been ineligible for admission. In one
instance, a member of the notorious Totenkopf Unit of the SS, which staffed
the concentration camps, was granted an immigration permit prior to the is-
209. See id at 60-62.
210. See id at 60-70. The third stage involved a review by the Combined Travel Board
which was comprised of representatives of Britain, France, and the United States. See id. at
71.
211. Seeid at 74-84.
212. See id at 74-75.
213. See id at 82-84.
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suance of his security clearance." 4 The Australian government nevertheless
failed to make use of the procedures in the displaced persons program for
deporting individuals deemed to be undesirable within two years of their ar-
rival. The government rationalized this inaction on the grounds that it was
improbable that suspected war criminals violated the security screen."'
Mr. Menzies reviewed a number of specific cases. One such case was
that of Sprecko Rover, who entered Australia and was naturalized as a citi-
zen in 1956. The evidence indicated that Rover was an active and decorated
member of the fascist Yugoslav Ustashi, which engaged in mass atrocities
against partisans and civilians. In 1941, he allegedly served in the so-called
mobile court martial which carried out summary executions. Menzies con-
cluded that this information was not available to IRO or to Australian offi-
cials at the time that Rover applied for an immigration visa. Rover and his
family apparently made a strong impression on security officials and pro-
vided a false, but convincing, account of his wartime activities. Rover also
migrated from Italy, a country in which Australian officials were not per-
mitted to carry out independent security checks.216 The Rover case, thus,
pointed to the porous nature of the Australians' security screening of pro-
spective migrants.
Another case reviewed by Mr. Menzies was that of Lazlo Megay, mayor
of Ungvar in Hungary. Mr. Megay was allegedly involved in the persecution
of Jews. He nevertheless was able to migrate to Australia in 1950.17 Menzies
could only echo the conclusion which he had reached in several other cases:
"[h]ow Mr. Megay passed the security checking process for migration to
Australia must remain a mystery."
218
In the end, Menzies examined allegations of war crimes against nearly
200 persons known to have migrated to Australia, most of whom were from
Eastern or Southeastern Europe.219 These individuals generally were alleged
to have participated in deporting, ill-treating, or murdering persons on racial
or political grounds, or were suspected of having participated as guards or
administrators at German concentration camps, or had served as officials in
pro-Nazi puppet regimes. Menzies did not pursue allegations concerning the
production of propaganda or membership in various fascist organizations in
Nazi-controlled Europe on the grounds that these delicts were not suffi-
ciently serious to warrant legal action forty years following the termination
of the war.22 However, based upon his preliminary inquiry, Menzies con-
214. See id at 76-78.
215. See id at 85.
216. See id. at 87-91.
217. See id at 97-100.
218. Id at 101. Menzies failed to find evidence that American or British intelligence
agencies misled or conspired with Australian officials to provide for the entry of alleged Nazi
war criminals who had cooperated with the Allied Powers following the war. Id. at 107-08.
219. See it at 118, 122.
220. See id at 121-23.
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cluded that "it is more likely than not that a significant number of persons
who committed serious war crimes in World War II entered Australia; cer-
tainly the likelihood of this is such that some action needs to be taken."22'
Menzies again stressed that these individuals generally had not gained entry
as a result of a conscious policy of the Australian government.2 Most were
admitted as a result of "serious limitations... in numbers and [the] geo-
graphical spread of staff available to do the necessary checking and the
equally serious gaps in the data against which Australian security officers
would have made their checks .... ,,223
Mr. Menzies proceeded to review the legal remedies available to the
Australian government. Requests had been made for the extradition of six
alleged war criminals since World War II, all of which were rejected. These
decisions were based on various rationales: an insufficiency of evidence;24 a
reluctance to extradite offenders to communist States; and the lack of a bilat-
eral extradition treaty. However, in each case, the fundamental rationale for
the refusal to extradite was the belief that these types of cases no longer
should be pursued.2
Menzies recognized that extradition had inherent limitations as a
mechanism for bringing accused war criminals to justice. A request had to
be lodged by a foreign government who had an extradition agreement with
Australia. The offense for which extradition was sought must be encom-
passed within the terms of the treaty and there must be a substantial basis for
believing that the accused committed the crime and would be accorded due
process protections. Despite these obstacles, Menzies concluded that extra-
dition could prove effective so long as the Australian government committed
itself to cooperating in good faith with foreign States in bringing war crimi-
nals to justice. However, he recognized that extradition was not appropriate
in every instance because some countries lacked an equitable and fair system
of justice. 6
On the other hand, Mr. Menzies argued that deportation did not provide
a viable alternative. Deportation only was available in Australia against a
non-citizen who obtained an entry permit by false representation. However,
it was inapplicable in those instances in which an individual had proceeded
to obtain citizenship and thus would be unavailable against virtually all of
the alleged war criminals resident in Australia. Menzies also noted that un-
der existing law, it was questionable whether deportation was available even
following the revocation of an individual's citizenship. At any rate, an action
to revoke citizenship which was obtained through false representation or the
221. Id at 125.
222. See id
223. Id
224. See id at 151-55.
225. See id at 151-52.
226. See i. at 153-55.
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concealment of a material fact was required to be commenced within ten
years and thus would be inapplicable against most alleged war criminals
resident within Australia. Menzies further noted that poorly preserved and
incomplete immigration records would make it difficult to establish that a
migrant made a false or misleading statement or concealed a material cir-
cumstance.227 Prior to deporting an individual, Australia also would need to
locate a country prepared to accept the deportee. In addition, Australian
courts likely would resist deporting a suspected war criminal to a country
intending to initiate a prosecution, viewing such a procedure as a form of
disguised extradition. This would effectively insulate the individual from le-
gal accountability."' Mr. Menzies concluded that deportation was both an
impractical and unprecedented mechanism for bringing suspected war crimi-
nals to justice. Support for this lies in the fact that in the last thirty years,
only two individuals had been deprived of citizenship in Australia, neither of
whom had been deported."9
Criminal prosecution provided a third alternative. The existing Austra-
lian war crimes statutes were enacted immediately following World War II
and authorized the prosecution of individuals before military courts. The tri-
bunals' jurisdiction was limited to violations of the laws and usages of war
committed during an armed conflict, regardless of the location of the crime.
The Act extended to crimes committed against a person who was at any time
resident in Australia, or against a British subject or a citizen of a power al-
lied or associated with his Majesty. Mr. Menzies argued that it was unthink-
able that civilians resident in Australia should be brought before a military
court forty years following the close of World War II. He also was critical of
the fact that the Act imposed the same penalties for all varieties of war
crimes. In addition, there was some doubt whether the statute encompassed
the vast number of war crimes that were committed by individuals currently
living in Australia. These offenses generally were committed against the
residents of the Baltic States during World War II. Because Australia had
not recognized the Soviet's annexation of these territories, the defendant's
criminal acts thus could not be considered to have met the statutory standard
of having been directed against the citizens of an Allied Power.3'
Menzies recommended investing civilian courts with jurisdiction over
war crimes, limiting the statute to serious war crimes warranting harsh pen-
alties or providing for a range of penalties which fit the seriousness of vari-
ous crimes, and clarifying that war crimes against persons resident in the
Baltic States were covered by the Act. These modifications would not con-
stitute retroactive punishment since war crimes were established as a viola-
tion of international law at the beginning of the twentieth century. However,
227. See id at 156-58.
228. See id at 161-62.
229. See id at 157-58.
230. See id at 163-64.
38
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 1 [1998], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol29/iss1/2
THE PURSUIT OF NAZI WAR CRIMINALS
Mr. Menzies cautioned that the relevant witnesses likely would be found in
the territories in which the crimes were committed. As a result, these prose-
cutions likely would be complicated, time-consuming, and expensive. Mr.
Menzies therefore concluded that trials in Australia only should be under-
taken if it appeared that a major war criminal otherwise would not be
brought to the bar of justice. Mr. Menzies adopted no position as to whether
the existing War Crimes Act should be amended or whether entirely new
legislation should be adopted. 3 Whatever course was pursued, he recom-
mended the establishment of a special unit to enforce the legislation, carry
out deportations, and to review extradition requests.2
Mr. Menzies conceded that the utilization of evidence obtained from the
Soviet Union presented problems of reliability. He nevertheless noted that
there was no reported instance of a falsified or fraudulent Soviet document
and expressed confidence that Australian courts were fully capable of evalu-
ating the integrity of evidence. 33
In sum, Mr. Menzies concluded that it was likely that a significant num-
ber of persons who committed serious war crimes entered and currently were
resident in Australia. They inadvertently were admitted into Australia as a
result of the limitations in the number and geographical assignment of secu-
rity personnel in Europe and the lack of pertinent security data. Mr. Menzies
urged the Australian government to make a renewed commitment to bring
these war criminals to justice. 34 He recommended the adoption of a war
crimes statute which would provide Australian courts with jurisdiction over
acts abroad against Australian or Allied citizens or combatants in violation
of the laws and customs of war committed.235 Menzies stressed that the
prosecution of war criminals should be undertaken without compromising
customary standards of justice and that legal investigations should avoid
promoting prejudice against ethnic groups within the Australian commu-
nity.236
B. Polyukhovich v. Australia
In 1989, the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia passed the
War Crimes Amendment Act of 1988.237 The preamble proclaimed that con-
cern had arisen that a number of persons who committed serious war crimes
in Europe may have entered Australia and become Australian citizens or
residents.23 The Statute went on to observe that it was appropriate that such
231. See id at 164-66.
232. See ide at 168.
233. See ide at 145.
234. See id at 177-80.
235. See id at 164.
236. See id at 180.
237. See War Crimes Amendment Act, 1988 (Austl.) [hereinafter Australian Act].
238. See id pmbl.
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individuals should be brought to trial in ordinary criminal courts and ac-
corded a fair trial with all the requisite safeguards, "having particular regard
to matters such as the gravity of the allegations and the lapse of time since
the alleged crimes."39
The Act defined war crimes in relation to Australian domestic law. Arti-
cle six stated that an act was a "serious crime" if it was "done in a part of
Australia and was, under the law then in force in that part," either the offense
of murder, manslaughter, causing grievous bodily harm, wounding, rape, in-
decent assault, or abduction."0 Article Seven provided that a "serious crime"
was a "war crime" provided that it was committed in the course of hostili-
ties; belligerent occupation; or in conjunction with a policy associated with
such acts; or committed on behalf of a power conducting a war or engaged in
an occupation.24' A "serious crime" also was a "war crime" when committed
in the course of political, racial or religious persecution; or with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as
such; and ... [was] committed in the territory of a country when the
country was involved in a war or... was subject to an occupation.242
Article Nine further established that a war crime under the Act was limited
to the period between September 1, 1939, and May 8, 1945.243
Only Australian citizens or residents were punishable under the Stat-
ute.2" Article Sixteen provided that the fact that an individual acted under the
orders of his or her government or of a superior did not constitute a defense,
but might be taken into account in sentencing.245 Article Seventeen added
that it was a defense that the defendant's act was permitted by the laws,
customs and usages of war and did not constitute a crime against humanity
under international law.2" The Act clarified that the defendant's act was
"permitted by the laws, customs and usages of war if it was reasonably justi-
fied by the exigencies and necessities of the conduct of war. 247 The willful
killing of an individual was punished by imprisonment for life while the
punishment for any other offense was imprisonment for not more than
twenty-five years.248
The Australian High Court upheld the constitutionality of the War
239. Id pmbl., 135-36.
240. Id art. 6. Accessoryship, attempt, or concern in such offenses also are punishable.
Id. art. 6(k).
241. Id art. 7(a)-(d).
242. Id art. 7(3)(a).
243. See id art. 9.
244. See id art. 11.
245. See id art. 16.
246. See id art. 17(2)(a)(b).
247. Id art. 17(2)(a)(b)-(3).
248. See id art. 10.
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Crimes Statute in Polyukhovich v. The Commonwealth.49 Ivan Polyukhovich
immigrated to Australia from the Ukraine following World War II and sub-
sequently was naturalized as an Australian citizen. He later was charged with
having committed war crimes between September 1, 1942, and May 1943,
during the period in which the Ukraine was under German occupation. There
was no Australian criminal legislation at the time of Polyukhovich's acts
which made it a criminal offense for an Australian citizen to have engaged in
war crimes in the Ukraine. Polyukhovich brought an action seeking a decla-
ration that the War Crimes Amendment Act of 1988 was unconstitutional.25
Chief Justice Anthony Mason directed the Court to address two issues.
The first issue was whether the War Crimes Act was beyond parliament's
legislative powers with respect to defense and external affairs. The second
issue was whether the Act, by specifying that past conduct constituted a
criminal offense, had made an invalid attempt to usurp the judicial power of
the Commonwealth.25'
The Chief Justice noted that Parliament possessed plenary power to de-
termine whether an Act concerned an area of extra-territorial concern to
Australia. He observed that it was inconceivable that the Court should over-
rule a legislative determination that Australia possessed an interest in the
subject matter of the War Crimes Act. Justice Mason thus found it of little
concern whether the law fulfilled Australia's obligations under international
law, implemented a resolution of an international body, or facilitated the ex-
ercise of international jurisdiction.25
Chief Justice Mason also ruled that parliament was empowered to create
a retroactive criminal offense. 53 The only limitation was that Parliament was
not authorized to enact a bill of attainder which adjudged a specific person
guilty for a past, legally permissible act. The latter would impinge on judi-
cial prerogatives in contravention of the separation of powers. Mason thus
dismissed Polyukhovich's claim, observing that
[I]t has never occurred to anyone to suggest that an ex post facto law...
not being a bill of attainder, could amount to a usurpation of judicial
power because such an ex post facto law simply does not amount to a trial
y legislature."4 It leaves for determination by the court, the issues which
would arise for determination under a prospective law.
Justice Daryl Dawson, in his concurring opinion, argued that there was a
strong presumption against interpreting a criminal statute so as to impose
retroactive punishment. The ex post facto punishment of war crimes, how-
249. (1991) 172 C.L.R. 501.
250. See id at 523 (Sir Anthony Mason, C.J.).
251. See id
252. See id at 531, 605.
253. See id at 534-49.
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ever, was singularly justifiable, particularly when such acts already were
punishable when committed in Australia. At any rate, the wrongful nature of
the war crimes made punishable under the Act should have been apparent to
Polyukhovich.256 Justice John Toohey also dismissed the claim of retroactiv-
ity. Toohey observed that the plaintiff knowingly was involved in the murder
of roughly 850 Jews in the village of Serniki. This certainly was a crime in
the Ukraine and it was difficult to accept that Polyukhovich was unaware
that he might be subject to criminal prosecution and punishment.257
Justice Toohey also noted that the Act did not constitute a bill of attain-
der as it did not punish particular individuals and provided that guilt should
be determined at trial. Penal punishment was not vicariously imposed on all
members of the government and military of the European Axis countries. In-
stead, criminal culpability under the Act only was imposed on those who
were demonstrated at trial to have possessed the necessary state of mind, and
whose conduct either constituted murder, manslaughter, wounding, or vari-
ous sexual offenses."8
Justice Francis Brennan drafted a detailed and demonstrative dissent59
which was supported by the separate opinions of Justices William Deane 6 °
and Mary Gaudron.26 ' Brennan contended that the Act was retrospective in
application in that it attached penalties under Australian municipal law to
acts that were within Australia's criminal jurisdiction at the time they had
been committed. Polyukhovich's alleged conduct constituted heinous of-
fenses against the laws of the Ukraine and the laws and customs of war. Yet,
he was charged under a retrospective statutory scheme with delicts under
Australian municipal law.262
Justice Brennan argued that parliament only was entitled to legislate on
extraterritorial matters in those instances in which there was a nexus be-
tween Australia and the subject of the statute. This was satisfied in those in-
stances in which a law purported to protect or to control the extraterritorial
conduct of Australian citizens or residents. However, the War Crimes Act
did not require Australian involvement in an armed conflict as a condition
for vesting jurisdiction in a domestic court. Brennan noted that he was "un-
able to see how an act by an individual in the course of any European armed
conflict occurring between 1 September 1939 and 8 May 1945 could be re-
garded, without more, as an aspect of Australia's external affairs in 1989. '263
Brennan added that an individual's subsequent acquisition of Australian citi-
256. See id at 642, 643 (Dawson, J.).
257. See id at 651, 690-91 (Toohey, J.).
258. See id at 685. Justice Michael McHugh joined Mason, Dawson, and Toohey in up-
holding the constitutionality of the War Crimes Act. See id at 708.
259. See id at 540 (Brennan, J.).
260. See iL at 593 (Deane, J.).
261. See id at 693 (Gaudron, J.).
262. See id. at 548 (Brennan, J.).
263. Id at 553.
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zenship or residence did not transform conduct that was. not within Austra-
lia's external affairs power into a matter of constitutional concern."6 Justice
Brennan also rejected the argument that Australia was fulfilling an interna-
tional obligation to the community of nations by bringing Polyukhovich to
trial. He failed to find a conventional or customary norm that stipulated that
States were under a legal obligation to seek out Axis war criminals and to
bring them to trial.265
In addition, Justice Brennan argued that the War Crimes Act was a ret-
rospective statute. He argued that international law prohibited the ex post
facto creation of international crimes and condemned retrospective munici-
pal criminal punishment as contrary to human rights. The Nuremberg crimes
were recognized by international law prior to the convening of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal.266 The Australian statute, however, did not incorpo-
rate the Nuremberg standard. Instead, it subjected members of an enemy
force to municipal law in respect to acts committed during wartime. The jury
was authorized to acquit an individual in those cases in which his or her act
was "reasonably justified by the exigencies and necessities of the conduct of
war."267 The Statute thus made the laws and customs of war an excuse rather
than a source of liability. A jury might determine that an act was not "rea-
sonably justified" despite the fact that it was consistent with the code of
armed conflict.268 The Australian statute, according to Justice Brennan, thus
possessed the fatal flaw of creating a retrospective municipal offense that
was in "disconformity" with war crimes as defined by the community of na-
tions.269
Brennan next turned his attention to Article 7(3) of the Australian stat-
ute. That article described serious offenses as: 1) a war crime that was com-
mitted in the course of political, racial, or religious persecution; or 2) a war
crime that was committed with the intent to destroy in whole or in part a na-
tional, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such.27 These acts were required
to have been committed in the territory of a country that was involved in
World War II or which was subject to occupation. The "intent to destroy"
standard was intended to punish the crime of genocide, which Brennan con-
tended was not recognized as a crime during World War II under either in-
ternational or Australian law. He also contended that the racial persecution
language was aimed at punishing crimes against humanity, which also was
considered a distinct offense, separate and apart from war crimes, until fol-
lowing World War II. Brennan thus determined that Australia lacked a claim
264. See id at 555.
265. See id at 560.
266. See id at 572-73, 575.
267. Id at 580.
268. Id at 578.
269. Id at 579.
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under international or municipal law to prosecute defendants for these of-
fenses."
Justice Brennan concluded that the prerogative to punish war criminals
was premised on the violation of international law. However, a retrospective
municipal law, such as the Australian War Crimes Act,"2 which varied from
the international standard, did not provide a basis for universal jurisdiction.2"
Brennan also observed that the statute's abrogation of the "superior orders"
defense was not clearly in accord with international law, which appeared to
permit the defense in those instances in which an order was not manifestly
illegal." He noted, in conclusion, that the law was fatally discriminatory in
that it had singled out former combatants of the Axis Powers who were sus-
pected of having committed war crimes."5
The majority thus upheld the Act as an expression of the plenary par-
liamentary power to legislate on matters of international relevance and to
impose retroactive criminal liability, 76 particularly over matters of central
concern.277 The judges observed that the objection that the Act imposed ret-
roactive punishment was weakened by the fact that Polyukhovich should
have been aware of the international prohibition on war crimes at the time
that he committed his alleged delicts." 8 The dissenters objected that the ex-
tra-territorial conduct condemned in the War Crimes Act did not possess a
sufficiently close connection with Australia and was not of constitutional
concern. 79 The dissent also pointed out that the Act defined war crimes in
accordance with domestic standards of conduct rather than pre-existing in-
ternational law.28 The acts condemned under the War Crimes Act were not
punishable under Australian municipal law at the time that they were com-
mitted and, as a result, the dissent argued that the Australian statute consti-
tuted an ex post facto law. 8'
V. SUMMARY: UNITED KINGDOM, CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA
The United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia all experienced an influx
of migrants following World War II.282 The inefficiency and disorganized
nature of post-war immigration procedures and records resulted in a number
271. See id at 588-89.
272. See id at 590, discussing War Crimes Act, 1988. See supra notes 253-64 and ac-
companying text.
273. See id at 589.
274. Id. at 583-85.
275. Id at 593.
276. See Polyukhovich, 172 C.L.R. at 531, 540.
277. See id at 540, 642-43 (Dawson, J.).
278. See id at 642-43.
279. See id at 553.
280. See id at 578-80.
281. See id at 579.
282. See, e.g., supra notes 105, 206-08 and accompanying text.
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of alleged war criminals gaining entry into the three countries.283 Most of
these individuals were anti-Russian nationalists who served under the Ger-
man occupation forces in the Baltic States and the Soviet Union.284 The Al-
lied Powers' determination to bring alleged war criminals to trial gradually
gave way to a desire to rebuild the war-torn Western European states and to
create a strong anti-Soviet liberal democratic coalition. There was little in-
terest in conducting trials that might rekindle wartime animosities or under-
mine the stability of West Germany. 85 Embarrassed by the disclosure that
alleged war criminals had entered their countries following the war, the gov-
ernments of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia each convened
commissions to study the extent and solution of this problem. The consensus
was that primary reliance should be placed upon domestic criminal prosecu-
tions to bring alleged war criminals to justice.286
The three countries each adopted statutes which provided for the pun-
ishment before domestic courts287 of individuals accused of committing war
crimes during World War 11.28 Jurisdiction was limited to those who pres-
ently were citizens or residents, regardless of their status at the time they
committed the crimes with which they were charged. 89 The English Act was
a straightforward application of international law and was limited to the
punishment of murder, manslaughter, or culpable homicide committed dur-
ing World War II in violation of the laws and customs of war.2"' In contrast,
the Canadian law punished the full range of war crimes and crimes against
humanity,"' while the Australian legislation encompassed serious domestic
crimes that constituted war crimes or crimes against humanity. 92
The latter two countries adopted complex statutory schemes which were
intended to provide secure jurisdictional bases for the extra-territorial asser-
tion of domestic criminal law and to rebut claims of retroactivity. The Cana-
dian statute punished war crimes and crimes against humanity defined in
general conformity with the Nuremberg standard. These acts were punish-
able under the Act providing that they would have constituted offenses
against the laws of Canada in force at the time of their commission.2 93 The
Act, thus, incorporated the legal fiction that war crimes and crimes against
humanity were committed in Canadian territory and thus fell within Can-
ada's territorial jurisdiction. The requirement that such acts constituted vio-
283. See, e.g., supra notes 103, 210-14 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., supra notes 101-02, 106 and accompanying text.
285. See, e.g., supra notes 136-37, 209 and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., supra notes 120, 150-51 and accompanying text.
287. See, e.g., Australian Act, supra note 237 and accompanying text.
288. See, e.g., English Act, supra note 122 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., id. and accompanying text
290. See id and accompanying text.
291. See, e.g., Canadian Act, supra note 167 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 240-42, 247 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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lations of Canadian law in force at the time appears to have been intended to
anticipate and to rebut the claim that the amendments to the Canadian code
constituted retroactive enactments.294
The Australian Act defined serious crimes in accordance with domestic
law.295 These serious crimes were considered to be war crimes when com-
mitted during the course of wartime or belligerent occupation.296 The hu-
manitarian law of war was conceived as a defense to criminal culpability
rather than as a basis of penal liability.297 This scheme thus limited war
crimes to severe acts and attempted to avoid the uncertainty of international
law by casting the statutory definitions in terms of domestic doctrine.298
It remains to be seen whether criminal prosecutions of suspected war
criminals conducted in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia will
serve to vindicate the cause of justice. The prosecution will be forced to en-
gage in the arduous task of gathering evidence from abroad. The passage of
time and the desire of individuals to exact retribution may create questions
concerning the reliability of documents, depositions, and eyewitness identi-
fications. These concerns likely will be exacerbated by the potential prob-
lems involved in translating documents, transcribing interviews, and locating
witnesses. The larger issue is the propriety of prosecuting naturalized citi-
zens or residents for crimes committed abroad over forty years ago. Most
alleged war criminals are elderly and infirm and nearing the end of their
lives. They have made social and economic contributions to the countries in
which they now live and, in return, these countries, until recently, have cho-
sen to ignore their past transgressions."'
There also is a question concerning the philosophical rationale for
prosecuting alleged war criminals in countries that are distant from the situs
of the defendant's alleged crimes. An English, Canadian, or Australian judge
and jury clearly will bring an objective and neutral stance and legal credibil-
ity to these prosecutions. But, these tribunals likely will lack an emotional
investment in the outcome of the trials and their verdicts may carry limited
moral weight. Trials conducted in England, Canada, or Australia will not
serve to compel the States that were involved in the defendant's crimes to
confront the past and will do little to educate the populace on the dangers of
totalitarianism. On the other hand, most countries have little interest in
bringing Nazi functionaries or collaborators to trial and in drawing public
attention to the often embarrassing events which transpired during the Third
Reich. Domestic criminal prosecutions within Canada, the United Kingdom,
and Australia may be the only available mechanism for bringing these al-
leged war criminals to the bar of justice. However, the question remains
294. See generally supra note 187 and accompanying text.
295. See Australian Act, supra note 237 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
298. See generally supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
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whether these statutory schemes are serious or merely symbolic. Even if ser-
ous, will the procedural and evidentiary difficulties undermine the effective-
ness of these efforts? 00
VI. THE UNITED STATES AND NAZI WAR CRIMINALS
A. The Ryan Report
The United States had adopted a significantly different approach to the
disposition of Nazi war criminals. In March 1983, the Justice Department
directed Allan Ryan, head of the Office of Special Investigations, to examine
the relationship between alleged Nazi war criminal Klaus Barbie and the
United States government."' Klaus Barbie served as head of the Gestapo in
Lyon, France, between November 1942 and the summer of 1944.02 Barbie's
primary concern was with combating the French resistance and he was infa-
mous for abusively interrogating and torturing detainees.33 The most infa-
mous episode involved his apprehension and execution of the partisan
patriarch, Jean Moulin. " Barbie also pursued, detained, and deported an in-
calculable number of Jews."5 His zealous pursuit of his semitic prey culmi-
nated in a raid on an isolated mountain orphanage in Izieu and the dispatch
of forty-two Jewish children to their death. 6 As the war drew to a close,
Barbie ordered his retreating troops to engage in a spree of slaughter against
the French populous.3"
Following World War II, the French informed the United Nations War
Crimes Commission that the fugitive Klaus Barbie was wanted for murder,
massacre, systematic terrorism, and the execution of hostages.0 Barbie,
however, managed to disappear into the disarray of post-War Europe and
made his way to South America. It was not until the early 1970s that the
French discovered that he had taken refuge in Bolivia. The Bolivian Su-
preme Court refused an extradition request in December of 1974 on the
grounds that there was no treaty between France and Bolivia. In December
1982, Bolivia, embarrassed by Barbie's continued presence, expelled him.
The French apprehended Barbie as his plane set down in French Guyana and
300. See generally Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative
Massacre, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (1995).
301. See ALLAN RYAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, KLAUS BARBIE AND THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, A REPORT TO THE ATrORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES (1983) [herein-
after Ryan Report].
302. See ERNA PARIS, UNHEALED WOUNDS, FRANCE AND THE KLAUS BARBIE AFFAIR 78,
99 (1985).
303. See id at 94-95.
304. See id at 106.
305. See id at 96-97.
306. See id at 210-12.
307. See id at 99.
308. See Ryan Report, supra note 301, at 12.
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spirited him to Lyon for trial."' He was subjected to prosecution and, in July
1987, he was convicted of seventeen different counts of crimes against hu-
manity.
10
The Ryan report determined that following the war, Region IV of the
United States Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) in Germany deployed Bar-
bie as an agent to report on French, Soviet, and Nazi intelligence activities. " '
The Americans, according to Ryan, subordinated their concern over em-
ploying a former Gestapo officer to their interest in combating the commu-
nist threat. The report stressed that the United States had a firm policy
against employing war criminals and that there was no clear and convincing
evidence that the Americans initially were aware of Barbie's wartime activi-
ties in Lyon."2
In 1949, French newspapers alleged that Klaus Barbie was residing in
the American zone in Germany.3 United States intelligence headquarters
quietly directed that Barbie should be dropped as an informant pending an
investigation, but were well aware that local agents continued to employ
Barbie as an agent. Intelligence officials later accepted Barbie's denial of the
French accusations and took no additional steps to investigate the matter.
1 4
They also refrained from revealing Barbie's whereabouts to civilian deci-
sion-makers in Washington who continually communicated to the French
that they lacked knowledge of Barbie's activities and movements." 5
The CIC continued to employ Barbie while simultaneously denying
knowledge of Barbie's presence and activities."6 However, they were appre-
hensive that either the American military, German police, or French secret
service would discover him. It was feared that this would lead to the disclo-
sure of Barbie's involvement with the United States, strain Franco-American
relations, and compromise American intelligence activities."' As a result,
despite the fact that CIC agents and officials by late 1950 had learned of
Barbie's activities in Lyon,"8 they arranged for him and his family to be
smuggled into Bolivia through an underground network directed by a Croa-
tian Catholic priest who remained sympathetic to the fascist cause. 9
Ryan concluded that the United States had little choice in its battle
against Communism, other than to rely upon experienced, knowledgeable,
309. See Federation Nationale des Deportes et Internes Resistants et Patriotes v. Barbie,
78 I.L.R. 125 (Court of Cassation 1985).
310. See Federation Nationale des Deportes et Internes Resistants et Patriotes v. Barbie,
100 I.L.R. 331 (Court of Cassation 1988).
311. See Ryan Report, supra note 301, at 37-39.
312. See id at 49-53.
313. See id at 71-72.
314. See id at 78-80.
315. See id at 87-88, 91-92.
316. See id at 116, 119-20.
317. See id at 121-22.
318. See id at 146-47.
319. See id at 36-37.
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and politically reliable former intelligence officials such as Barbie. The
Americans found Barbie to be an effective and professional operative and
initially, were unaware that the former Gestapo officer who was in their em-
ploy was a suspected war criminal. Ryan recognized that some objected to
this pragmatic position and believed that the employment of a former Ge-
stapo officer betrayed those who died in defense of the United States. 2
Ryan noted that the former argument was based on a regard for the fu-
ture interests of the United States while the latter was based on the legacy of
the past. Those conscientious individuals who decided to utilize Barbie, in
Ryan's view, had made a difficult and defensible decision to defend the in-
terests of the United States against the communist threat. This was indistin-
guishable from the policies pursued by the other Allied Powers. 2' Ryan
stressed that he considered it illegitimate to employ former war criminals,
but that United States officials only learned of Barbie's depredations after he
worked for the Allied Powers for several years.322 However, he criticized the
CIC's decision to secretly smuggle Barbie to South America as having con-
stituted an effort to impede Barbie's extradition to the French. It clearly was
unacceptable to frustrate the prosecution of a war criminal in order to avoid
the possible divulgence of embarrassing revelations.323 This cover-up contin-
ued until 1972, when the French government discovered that Barbie was
living in Bolivia under the assumed name of "Altmann.
324
The revelations concerning United States involvement with Klaus Bar-
bie were followed by the disclosure that the United States had admitted a
number of former Nazi scientists following the war. These individuals
helped to fuel the American space program and to augment the United
States' military might. 25 However this group also included doctors who had
been involved in compelling concentration camp inmates to participate in
human aviation experiments326 as well as Nazi sympathizers, such as scientist
Arthur Rudolf, who had been involved in utilizing slave labor at the Nord-
hausen bomb factory. A total of roughly 1,558 scientists ultimately entered
the United States. 28
Of course, the vast number of Nazi war criminals resident in America
were admitted as part of the influx of over 400,000 European immigrants
following the war. The United States established generous quotas for refu-
320. See id at 191-93.
321. See id at 192-95.
322. See id at 195-97.
323. See id at 204-05, 208.
324. Id at 214.
325. See TOM BOWER, THE PAPER CLIP CONSPIRACY AND THE HuNT FOR NAZI WAR
CRIMINALS 272 (1989).
326. See Ryan Report, supra note 301, at 214, 231-32, 255.
327. See id at 111, 275-77.
328. See ROCHELLE G. SADDLE, THE OUTRAGED CONSCIENCE: SEEKERS OF JUSTICE FOR
NAZI WAR CRIMINALS INAMERICA 5 (1984).
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gees from the Baltic States and for Germans who resettled in the occupied
territories. These preferences, along with the policy of admitting any indi-
vidual who professed to having worked as an agricultural worker and the
problems associated with conducting accurate background checks,329 led to
the inadvertent admission of between 1,000-10,000 Nazi war criminals.3"
B. The Holtzman Amendment
The United States government has filed a number of denaturalization
actions seeking to deprive alleged Nazi war criminals of their American citi-
zenship. Typically then, these denaturalized aliens have been subjected to
deportation proceedings. The actions have been based on various statutory
provisions that are sketched below.3 '
The United States, as a first step towards resettling European refugees
following the war, joined the other Allied Powers in adopting the Constitu-
tion of the IRO.332 This provided international standards for policies towards
refugees and displaced persons.33 Congress subsequently implemented the
IRO Constitution by adopting the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA) 34
The IRO Constitution excluded from the category of displaced persons eligi-
ble for resettlement, war criminals, quislings, traitors, and individuals who
assisted in the persecution of civil populations.335 The DPA broadly imple-
mented this provision by excluding from entry any person who is or has
been a member of, or has participated in, any movement which is, or has
been, hostile to the United States or the form of government of the United
States. 36 Section 2(b) of the DPA also incorporated, by reference, the defini-
tions of a refugee and of a displaced person contained within the IRO Con-
stitution.3 In 1950, the DPA was amended to more closely reflect the IRO
standard and specifically excluded from displaced person status "any person
who advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person because of race,
religion, or national origin or... who has voluntarily borne arms against the
329. See ALLAN A. RYAN, JR., QUIET NEIGHBORS PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN
AMERICA 325-27 (1984).
330. See CHARLES R. ALLEN, JR., NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN AMERICA: FACTS... ACTION
THE BASIC HANDBOOK 1 (1985). See generally HOWARD BLUM, WANTED! THE SEARCH FOR
NAZIS IN AMERICA (1977); CHARLES HIGHAM, AMERICAN SWASTIKA (1985).
331. See generally K. Lesli Ligorner, Nazi Concentration Camp Guard Service Equals
"Good Moral Character?" United States v. Lindert, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 145
(1997).
332. See Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, 62 Stat. 3037 (1948)
[hereinafter IRO Constitution].
333. See id art. 1, 62 Stat. at 3038.
334. See Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 [hereinafter
Displaced Persons Act I], as amended by Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat.
219 (expired 1952) [hereinafter Displaced Persons Act 1H].
335. See IRO Constitution, supra note 332, annex I, pt. 2, 62 Stat. at 3051-52.
336. See Displaced Persons Act I, supra note 334, § 13, 62 Stat. at 1014.
337. See id § 2(b), 62 Stat. at 1009.
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United States during World War ll."' Section 10 of the DPA provided that
any individual was inadmissible who willfully made a misrepresentation in
order to gain entrance into the United States. 39
The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 (RRA) was intended to assist post-
World War II refugees fleeing communist-controlled Europe. 4 The Refugee
Relief Act, while not specifically excluding the perpetrators of war crimes,
provided in section 14(a) that entry visas were not to be issued to individuals
who "advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person or group of per-
sons because of race, religion, or national origin."34'
The Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952 (INA) estab-
lished the structure of contemporary United States immigration and nation-
ality law. 4 ' The INA sets forth various classes of aliens who are subject to
deportation from the United States. This includes individuals who procured a
visa or other documentation, or who entered the United States by fraud or by
willful misrepresentation of a material fact;343 individuals who, before enter-
ing the United States, were convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or
who admitted to having committed such a crime;' individuals with past or
current membership in, or affiliation with, any totalitarian party, its affiliates,
or predecessor or successor organizations;31 5 and individuals who, upon their
entry into the United States, were excludable under existing laws, such as the
Displaced Persons or the Refugee Relief Acts.
The Act of October 30, 1978, sponsored by Congresswoman Elizabeth
Holtzman of New York, modified the INA specifically to exclude Nazi war
criminals from eligibility to receive entry visas34 7 and made such individuals
deportable if found within the United States. 48 The Act applies to any alien
who, between March 23, 1933, and May 8, 1945, in conjunction with the
Nazi government or an associated government, "ordered, incited, assisted, or
otherwise participated in the persecution of any person because of race, re-
ligion, national origin, or political opinion. 3 49 Individuals who engaged in
genocide also were excludable.35 In addition, the Amendment limited the
Attorney General's discretion to stay the deportation of an individual to any
country in which the individual's life or freedom would be threatened on ac-
338. Displaced Persons Act II, supra note 334, § 11, 64 Stat. at 227.
339. See Displaced Persons Act I, supra note 334, § 10, 62 Stat. at 1013.
340. See H.R. REP. No. 974-83 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2103, 2104.
341. Refugee Relief Act, § 14(a), Pub. L. No. 83-203, § 14(a), 67 Stat. 400, 406 (1953).
342. See Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
343. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(A)(19) (1952) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) (1997)).
344. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(A)(9) (1952) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2)(A)(I) (1997)).
345. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(A)(28)(c) (1952) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D)
(1997)).
346. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(1952) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1))(A) (1997)).
347. See Holtzman Amendment, supra note 2.
348. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D) (1997).
349. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(E)(i) (1997).
350. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E)(ii) (1997).
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count of race, religion, nationality, or membership in a social group."' The
Holtzman amendment also prohibited the Attorney General from granting
Nazi war criminals temporary admission into the United States. 52 The pri-
mary purpose of the text was to close a loophole in the law by permitting the
deportation of alleged Nazi criminals who entered the United States under
the INA. Prior to the Holtzman Amendment, deportation was limited to
those who entered under either the DPA or the RRA. 53
Five Republican members appended a dissenting statement to the Judi-
ciary Committee Report on the Holtzman Amendment. 54 Their views echoed
various points propounded by critics of war crimes legislation in Great Brit-
ain, Canada, and Australia.355 The dissenters pointed out that the term "per-
secution" was vague and imprecise and might be extended to encompass
situations in which America's friends and allies were alleged to have re-
pressed enemies of the United States. The Act also was criticized for unduly
limiting the discretion of the Attorney General to temporarily admit alleged
war criminals. A decision to admit such individuals might be justified in the
interests of science, culture, or business. According to the five dissenters, the
preclusion of the power to grant a visa to Nazi war criminals made little
sense in light of the fact that the attorney general retained the authority to
admit other classes of excludable individuals, including common criminals
and socially dangerous individuals.3 56 The Congressmen also objected to
limiting the attorney general's authority to stay the deportation of an accused
war criminal, pointing out that the persecution confronting such individuals
may be far more severe than the repressive acts in which they allegedly had
been involved.357
The dissenters also criticized the Holtzman Amendment as unconstitu-
tional, retroactive legislation. Deportation was a civil action, but forcible
removal from the United States to face penal prosecution abroad certainly
constituted a severe sanction. They pointed out that under the Holtzman
Amendment, an individual legally admitted and present in the United States
could be deported for actions committed prior to his arrival based on a law
enacted subsequent to his admission. The dissenters also claimed that an ar-
gument might be made that the amendment constituted a bill of attainder
which singled out certain individuals for punishment."'
The United States, in contrast to England, Canada, and Australia, thus
made a decision to rely upon denaturalization and deportation rather than
351. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)(i) (1997).
352. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (d)(3) (1997).
353. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1452 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700, 4702.
354. See id at 4714 (dissenting Views of Mr. Wiggins, Mr. Kastnmeir, Mr. Butler, Mr.
Hyde, and Mr. Ertel).
355. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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criminal prosecution."' This reflected the belief that alleged Nazi criminals
illegally entered the United States and fraudulently obtained their citizenship
and possessed little equitable claim to continued residence. In addition, the
activities of these accused offenders during World War II were contrary to
democratic values and dictated that they should be expelled from the Ameri-
can community. Reliance on deportation and denaturalization possessed the
practical advantage of requiring the prosecution to satisfy a civil statutory
standard rather than a criminal burden of proof. This also shifted the respon-
sibility for criminal prosecution to other States. However, denaturalization
and deportation have proven to be complex and cumbersome processes that
have led to the expulsion of relatively few alleged war criminals. 6
C. The Federenko Case
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Fe-
dorenko"' established the legal standard governing denaturalization actions.
Fedorenko, a Ukrainian, was conscripted into the Soviet army in June 1941,
as part of the mobilization against the invading German forces. He immedi-
ately was captured by the Germans and was interned in a series of prisoner-
of-war camps where, along with the other internees, he reportedly was sub-
jected to depraved and destitute conditions and was exposed to random
beatings. Fedorenko testified that he involuntarily was selected by the Ger-
man authorities to serve as a concentration camp guard and stated that he
was deployed in two camps before being assigned to Treblinka in September
1943.362
The District Court described Treblinka as a "human abattoir"363 and six
survivors of the camp testified that Fedorenko played a prominent part in
this system of terror. These witnesses allegedly witnessed Fedorenko shoot
and beat prisoners and separate new arrivals into those who were to be di-
rected to the gas chambers and those who were to be worked to death. Fe-
dorenko protested that he was forced to work involuntarily as a guard and
denied that he committed any atrocities."
In August 1943, following his service in Treblinka, Fedorenko was as-
signed to a series of German camps and installations. At the completion of
the war, he worked for the British and lived in a displaced persons camp in
Hamburg. In October 1949, Fedorenko applied for an American visa under
the DPA. His application, which concealed his wartime activities, was ap-
proved and he arrived in the United States in November 1949 and went to
359. See supra notes 348-53 and accompanying text.
360. See generally Ryan Report, supra note 301, at 342-44.
361. 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd 449
U.S. 490 (1981).
362. See. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 900-01.
363. Id at 901 n.12.
364. See id at 902.
19981
53
Lippman: Pursuit of Nazi War Criminals in the United tates and in Other A
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1998
54 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
work on a farm in Litchfield, Connecticut.65 In 1969, Fedorenko applied for
naturalization. He failed to disclose his service as a concentration camp
guard in his application as well as in his sworn testimony to INS examiners.
The Superior Court of New Haven County, pursuant to the recommendation
of the INS examiner, granted Fedorenko's application. 66
The District Court found that during the three decades in which Fe-
dorenko was resident in the United States, he was a diligent and devoted
worker and husband. He retired after working in a factory for twenty years
and presently subsisted on a meager monthly social security check.367 In
1970, the government filed a denaturalization action to revoke Fedorenko's
citizenship. The seven-count complaint alleged that Fedorenko was ineligi-
ble for a DPA visa due to the fact that he served as an armed guard at
Treblinka and, while at Treblinka, that he committed crimes against Jewish
inmates which were animated by an anti-semitic animus. The indictment
also charged that Fedorenko willfully concealed this information in both his
DPA visa and citizenship applications and that Fedorenko procured his citi-
zenship illegally through the misrepresentation of material facts.368
The District Court entered a judgment in favor of Fedorenko. The court
affirmed the standard established in Chaunt v. United States3 69 for adjudging
the materiality of a misrepresentation in naturalization hearings.37 Chaunt
held that the government possessed the burden of proving that if suppressed
facts were disclosed, it would have warranted the denial of citizenship, or
that the disclosure of these facts "might have been useful in an investigation
possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizen-
ship."37' The District Court ruled that the true facts regarding the defendant's
birthplace and nationality neither would have justified the denial of citizen-
ship, nor would have led to further investigation.72
The District Court questioned the accuracy of expert testimony that
concentration camp guards were ineligible for DPA visas.7 According to the
court, camp guards served under the threat of execution. 74 Thus, Fedorenko
had not assisted voluntarily in the persecution of civilian populations, and
the failure to disclose his activity as a concentration camp guard did not con-
stitute a material misrepresentation under Chaunt that would disqualify him
from entry into the United States. The District Court pointed out that a con-
365. See id at 910-11.
366. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 497.
367. See Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 896.
368. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 497-98.
369. 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
370. See Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 915 (citing Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350
(1960)).
371. Id (citing Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 355).
372. See id
373. See id at 912.
374. See id at 914.
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trary interpretation would result in the denaturalization of Jews (Kapos) who
were compelled to work for camp authorities.375
The court elaborated that the second prong of the Chaunt materiality
standard required a demonstration by clear and convincing proof that con-
cealed facts would have led to an investigation which would have resulted in
the denial of citizenship or a visa. The court noted that Fedorenko falsely
claimed on his visa application that he served as a factory worker at Poelitz
in Poland rather that as a prison-guard. The court speculated that this infor-
mation very well may have triggered an investigation which could have un-
covered Fedorenko's service as a guard. Yet, he was permitted to enter the
United States. This persuaded the District Court to resolve in favor of the de-
fendant its doubts as to whether an investigation, which would have resulted
in Fedorenko's denaturalization, may have been undertaken.376
The District Court also held that even if the court determined that the
defendant willfully concealed material facts in applying for citizenship, that
federal courts properly could consider equitable and mitigating considera-
tions.377 In this case, the inconclusive nature of the evidence that Fedorenko
committed war crimes at Treblinka, as well as the uncontroverted evidence
that Fedorenko had been a law-abiding and responsible individual since his
arrival in the United States, dictated that Fedorenko should be permitted to
retain his citizenship."8
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Fedorenko
with instructions to enter a judgment for the government and to cancel the
petitioner's certificate of citizenship.379 The Appellate panel agreed with the
District Court that Chaunt was controlling on the question of the materiality
of Fedorenko's misrepresentations on his visa application concerning his
service as a prison camp guard. 8 However, in contrast to the District Court,
the Court of Appeals endorsed the view that the second prong of the Chaunt
test merely required that the government prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the disclosure of the true facts would have led the government to
make an inquiry that might have uncovered other facts warranting the denial
of citizenship.' The Court of Appeals further ruled that the District Court
lacked the equitable authority to vary the statutory standard and to enter a
judgment in Fedorenko's favor. 82
The Appellate Court explained that the District Court's interpretation of
Chaunt would encourage visa applicants to misrepresent their background in
375. See id at 913. The term voluntary was not included in the relevant standard, but
was read into the provision by the Court as a matter of statutory interpretation. Id.
376. See id at 916.
377. See id at 918-19.
378. See id. at 918-21.
379. See Fedorenko, 597 F.2d at 946.
380. See id at 950.
381. See id at 951.
382. See id at 954.
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order to discourage investigations into their past activities. In the event that
the misrepresentation was discovered, the government then would be forced
to revisit the historical record in order to establish facts which would have
warranted the individual's exclusion."' The Appellate Court, in overturning
the District Court decision, ruled that had the defendant disclosed his guard
service, the American authorities would have conducted an inquiry that
might have resulted in the denial of his visa. The defendant thus was guilty
of misrepresenting and concealing a material fact within the meaning of
Chaunt. The court accordingly found it unnecessary to address the defen-
dant's alleged war crimes. 4
The United States Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Court of
Appeals." 5 Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the majority, stressed that
the precious nature of American citizenship dictated that a denaturalization
action should be supported by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence
that did not leave the issues in doubt. 6 At the same time, Justice Marshall
recognized that Congress possessed the constitutional authority to prescribe
rules for naturalization. As a result, the Courts were charged with the re-
sponsibility of insisting that the government meet its evidentiary burden
while also insuring that those seeking citizenship strictly complied with the
congressionally-imposed procedural prerequisites.3"
Marshall noted that a misrepresentation must be considered material if
disclosure of the true facts would have made the applicant ineligible for a
visa. Marshall, however, did not address whether the Chaunt standard gov-
erned false statements in the visa and in the citizenship application. He
merely ruled that disclosure of the true facts concerning Fedorenko's service
as an armed guard at Treblinka, as a matter of law, would have made him
ineligible for a visa under the DPA.388
The DPA provided that individuals who "assisted the enemy in perse-
cuting" civilians were ineligible for visas under the Act. 89 The Supreme
Court ruled that the statutory text did not provide for an "involuntary assis-
tance" exception and concluded that Fedorenko's service as a concentration
camp armed guard made him ineligible for a visa.9 ° There was little doubt in
the mind of the Court that, had Fedorenko disclosed that he served as an
armed guard at Treblinka, he would have been found ineligible for a visa
under the DPA. Fedorenko's statements about his wartime activities thus
contravened the DPA in that they constituted willful and material misrepre-
sentations that were made for the purpose of gaining admission into the
383. See id at 951.
384. See id at 954.
385. See United States v. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
386. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 505-06.
387. See id at 506-07.
388. See id at 509.
389. Id at 510.
390. Id at 512.
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United States."'
Justice Marshall noted that the conclusion that Fedorenko, as a matter of
law, was ineligible for a visa under the DPA made the resolution of the case
relatively easy. At the time of Fedorenko's entry into the United States, a
naturalized citizen's failure to comply with the statutory prerequisites for
naturalization rendered his or her certificate of citizenship revocable on the
grounds of illegal procurement. In 1970, when Fedorenko filed his applica-
tion and was admitted to citizenship, the INA required that an applicant for
citizenship must have been legally admitted into the United States. Lawful
admission for permanent residence, in turn, required that the individual pos-
sess a valid, unexpired immigrant visa. A visa obtained through material
misrepresentation was not valid. Accordingly, the Court majority ruled that
Fedorenko failed to satisfy a statutory requirement which Congress had im-
posed as a prerequisite to the acquisition of citizenship, and that his citizen-
ship should be revoked.392
As for the District Court's exercise of its equitable discretion, the Su-
preme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that federal judges lacked the
authority to refrain from entering a judgment of denaturalization against a
citizen whose citizenship was procured illegally or by a willful misrepre-
sentation of material facts.393
Three separately authored opinions in Fedorenko proved to be influen-
tial in subsequent lower court decisions. Justice Harry Blackmun, in his con-
curring opinion, noted that there was no substantial difference between the
first prong of the test articulated under Chaunt and the standard established
in Fedorenko.3 "4 Blackmun contended that the privilege of citizenship in the
national community only may be revoked based on clear and convincing
proof of disqualifying facts.395 The adoption of the standard articulated by the
Court of Appeals, which merely required the government to establish that
disclosure of the facts which were concealed would have triggered an in-
quiry that might have uncovered disqualifying facts, would weaken the
status of naturalized citizens. Blackmun argued that the government's bur-
den under both tests articulated in Chaunt was the same; it must prove the
existence of a disqualifying fact, not simply a fact which might have led to
the discovery of a disqualifying fact.396
Justice White, in his dissent, stated that he would have decided the case
under the Appellate Court's interpretation of the second prong of the Chaunt
standard. Under the latter. test, the government must establish that a truthful
response would have triggered an investigation that might have uncovered
facts justifying the denial of citizenship. The defendant may rebut the gov-
391. Seeid at 513-14.
392. See id at 515.
393. See idl at 517.
394. See id at 519-20.
395. See idt at 524.
396. See id at 524-26.
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emnment's case by demonstrating that the underlying facts would not have
justified the denial of citizenship. According to Justice White, this approach
was preferable to the District Court's test, which required that the govern-
ment bear the heavy burden of establishing disqualifying facts. Adoption of
this stricter standard would encourage applicants to withhold information
and limit the ability of the government to bring successful denaturalization
and deportation actions. White concluded that he would have remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether Fedorenko's service as a
armed guard for the Germans constituted a material misrepresentation. 97
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, argued that citizens' past involuntary
conduct may not provide a basis for depriving them of their citizenship." 8
Stevens would have held that a willful misstatement was material if it was
more probable than not that a truthful answer would have prompted an in-
quiry which would have uncovered a disqualifying fact.399
In sum, Fedorenko established that service as a concentration guard
constituted persecution of civilians under the DPA.4"° The fact that an indi-
vidual's actions were involuntary was not recognized as a defense.4"' The
Court also ruled that the judiciary did not possess the equitable prerogative
to vary the statutory standard.4"2 Fedorenko easily was disposed of on the
grounds that the defendant concealed facts which would have otherwise re-
sulted in his exclusion from the United States. However, ambiguity remained
as to the applicability and interpretation of the second, or investigation,
prong of the Chaunt test.4 3 This was the next issue addressed by the Su-
preme Court.
D. The Kungys Case
In 1983, the Office of Special Investigations brought an action to revoke
the citizenship of Juozas Kungys 4" The defendant was charged with failing
to reveal his role in organizing and leading an armed group of civilians
called the Riflemen. The Riflemen assisted the occupying German forces in
the arrest and execution of Lithuanians who served as government and
Communist Party officials in the District of Kedainiai during the Soviet oc-
cupation. The Riflemen also were accused of assisting in the confinement
and subsequent mass execution and burial of 2,500 Jews. The defendant sub-
sequently moved to Kaunas where he worked in a German industrial con-
397. See id at 528-30.
398. See id at 533.
399. See id at 537.
400. See ia at 505-06.
401. See id.
402. See id at 509.
403. See id at 505, 506.
404. See United States v. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. 1104 (N.J. 1983), rev'd and remanded,
793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'd and remanded, 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
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cern. In 1944, Kungys fled the invading Soviet armies and settled in Ger-
many where he resided until immigrating to the United States in 1948.405
The government charged, and the defendant conceded, that in both his
1948 visa and 1953 citizenship applications, he misrepresented the date and
place of his birth and concealed his employment as a bookkeeper in a Ger-
man factory. The government also charged that he falsely swore that he left
Kedainiai prior to the Jewish pogroms and never committed a crime involv-
ing moral turpitude.0 6
The District Court questioned the reliability of three depositions taken
under the supervision of Soviet officials attesting to Kungy's role in the Ke-
dainai killings. The depositions were admitted by the court for the limited
purpose of establishing that killings occurred in Kedainiai in July and
August 1941. Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise explained that the Soviet Union
had made the witnesses available and possessed a strong interest in estab-
lishing the defendant's role in the killings. In the past, the Soviets distorted
or fabricated evidence and the depositions in Kungys were conducted in such
a fashion that it was impossible to determine whether the witnesses were im-
properly pressured. The prosecution must share some of the blame since it
had been unable to persuade the Soviets to reveal transcripts and protocols
which would have assisted the court in evaluating the reliability of the depo-
nents.4" As a result, the court ruled that the prosecution failed to establish by
clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that Kungys was involved in
the July and August killings in Kedainiai.4 °
Absent the deposition testimony, the District Court held that the most
the prosecution was able to establish was that the defendant was resident in
Kedainiai in July and August 1941, that he was a member of a para-military
group, and that he misrepresented the date and place of his birth in various
immigration and naturalization papers.4 9 The District Court ruled that the
evidence neither supported the allegation that the defendant failed to procure
a valid immigration visa, nor established that he lacked a good moral char-
acter.4" ° The court further rejected the government's contention that false
testimony, regardless of proof of materiality, was sufficient to constitute a
lack of good moral character. " '
The prosecution thus was unable to satisfy the first prong of the Chaunt
test as none of the suppressed facts pertaining to his date and place of birth
and wartime activities warranted a denial of citizenship.412 There also was no
clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that truthful representations
405. See id at 1105.
406. See id at 1106-07.
407. See id at 1132.
408. See id. at 1133.
409. See id.
410. Seeid at 1139.
411. See id
412. See id at 1144.
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would have resulted in an investigation, or that any such investigation would
have uncovered a disqualifying fact.
413
The District Court decision was reversed by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals which determined that the defendant's misrepresentation or con-
cealment of facts on his visa and naturalization applications were material
within the meaning of Chaunt4' The Appellate Court noted that the gov-
ernment possessed the burden of demonstrating that Kungys' citizenship was
"illegally procured" or was "procured by concealment of a material fact or
by willful misrepresentation.,
415
The Third Circuit agreed that the prosecution failed to establish the req-
uisite materiality under the first prong of the Chaunt test The court pro-
ceeded to apply the second prong of Chaunt. It adopted a compromise
version of the test, ruling that "citizenship may be ... subject to revocation
if the government is able to prove by clear, convincing and unequivocal evi-
dence that the concealments or misrepresentation would have triggered an
investigation which probably would have revealed disqualifying facts." 6 In
applying this standard, the court utilized an innovative analysis and held that
the defendant's misrepresentations of his date and place of birth were mate-
rial under the second prong of the Chaunt test. The Appellate Court reasoned
that, had Kungys been truthful at the time of his applications, the discrepan-
cies between his applications and the falsified documents submitted by the
defendant would have led to investigations which would have revealed that
Kungys was warmly welcomed in Germany and received a residency permit
without conditions. This would have undercut Kungys' claim in the docu-
ments that he had been subject to persecution by the Germans and would
have resulted in his being disqualified for a visa under the DPA.4 7
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded Kungys to the
Third Circuit for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.4 8 The Court
noted that the INA provided for the denaturalization of citizens whose citi-
zenship was procured by "concealment of a material fact" or by "willful mis-
representation." ' 9 This required misrepresentations or concealments that
both were willful and materialY.4 1 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, ob-
served that efforts to establish a single Chaunt materiality standard "have not
met with notable success" and that courts "have failed to arrive at a single
interpretation. '42' Scalia noted that the disagreement between the District
413. See id
414. See Chaunt, 793 F.2d at 530.
415. Id at 521 (quoting and citing section 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1982)).
416. Id at 526.
417. See id at 530-31.
418. See Kungys, 485 U.S. at 782-83.
419. Id at 767 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)).
420. See id
421. Id at 769.
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Court and the Court of Appeals in Kungys turned on whether the Chaunt test
required that, had the truth been revealed, an investigation would have re-
sulted which would have disclosed disqualifying facts, or whether an inves-
tigation would have resulted which merely might have disclosed
disqualifying facts. Scalia, however, argued that the established legal mean-
ing of "material" required courts to focus on "whether the misrepresentation
or concealment was predictably capable of affecting, i.e., had a natural ten-
dency to affect, the official decision ... the test more specifically is whether
the misrepresentation or concealment had a natural tendency to produce the
conclusion that the applicant was qualified."422
Scalia held that the scope of the misrepresentation and concealment
provision was limited to naturalization proceedings and ruled that Kungys'
misrepresentations of the date and place of his birth were immaterial in that
there was no suggestion that these facts were relevant to Kungys' qualifica-
tions for citizenship.423 The disclosure of the true date and place of birth also
would not necessarily have led to the disclosure of other facts relevant to his
qualifications.2 4 Scalia went on to modify the Appellate Court's analysis and
ruled that what was of concern was the consequences, which would have en-
sued from official knowledge of a misrepresented fact, not what would have
resulted from an awareness of an inconsistency between present and past
representations."'
Scalia also held that, in determining whether an individual procured his
citizenship by means of a misrepresentation or concealment of a material
fact, the Court should not apply a causality test.26 He, instead, stressed that it
was the misrepresentation which was central; an individual who procured his
or her citizenship in a proceeding in which he made material representations
should be considered to be presumptively unqualified. The naturalized citi-
zen then should be afforded the opportunity to refute this presumption and to
avoid denaturalization by demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the misrepresentation did not possess a natural tendency to pro-
duce a favorable decision.V
Justice Scalia reversed the rulings below that Section ll01(f)(6), which
imposed a good character provision, contained a materiality requirement.428
He explained that the primary purpose of this section was to identify the lack
of good moral character rather than to prevent false pertinent data from be-
ing introduced into the denaturalization process. At the same time, Scalia
recognized that it would be unusual for the government to bring a prosecu-
tion for a misrepresentation which did not possess the natural tendency, and
422. Id at 771-72.
423. See id at 772-74.
424. See id at 774.
425. See idt at 775-76.
426. See id at 776-77.
427. See id at 777-79.
428. See id at 779.
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which was not intended, to influence a decision regarding immigration or
naturalization benefits.429 Justice Scalia accordingly remanded the case in or-
der to determine whether Kungys' misrepresentations constituted "testi-
mony" under section 1101(f)(6) and whether he possessed the requisite
intent to obtain immigration or naturalization benefits. 3 '
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, criticized the relaxed pro-
tection accorded to naturalized citizens under the majority opinion. He ob-
jected that
[e]vidence that simply raises the possibility that a disqualifying fact might
have existed does not entitle the Government to the benefit of a presump-
tion that the citizen was ineligible, for as we have repeatedly emphasized,
citizenship is a most precious right... [a]nd as such should never be for-
feited on the basis of mere speculation or suspicion.
41
As a result, Brennan advocated that a presumption of ineligibility should
not arise unless the Government produces evidence "sufficient to raise a fair
inference that a statutory disqualifying fact actually existed."' 32
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Blackmun
and Marshall, criticized the Court's dilution of the protections afforded to
naturalized citizens.433 He argued that Chaunt required that the government
prove by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence the existence of a dis-
qualifying fact which resulted in the defendant having improperly procured
his citizenship. The Congressional intent was to ensure that an individual's
citizenship was neither easily nor lightly revoked. 34 Yet, the Court's deci-
sion shifted the burden of proof in those instances in which a misrepresenta-
tion or concealment concerned a fact which was relevant to the
naturalization decision or in which the true facts predictably would have dis-
closed other facts relevant to the citizen's qualifications. Stevens noted that,
under this standard, the government was not required to identify or establish
a specific disqualifying fact which might have been revealed. The burden
nevertheless was shifted to the citizen to rebut every possible disqualifying
fact.43 ' The employment of a burden-shifting presumption to lessen the gov-
ernment's obligation was inconsistent with the Court's view that the gov-
ernment must prove its charges in denaturalization cases by clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence which did not leave the issue in
doubt.436 Stevens also contended that the failure to require a materiality ele-
429. See id at 780-82.
430. See id at 782-83.
431. Id at 783-84.
432. d at 783.
433. See id at 783-84.
434. See id at 786-89.
435. See id at 793.
436. See id at 795.
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ment as part of the good moral character provision undermined the protec-
tion of citizenship.3' Under Justice Scalia's formulation, even a minor mis-
representation that was made with the requisite intent might result in the
revocation of citizenship. 38
The Court thus retreated from a standard that required the prosecution to
prove the existence of a disqualifying fact by clear, unequivocal and con-
vincing evidence. Instead, the government only must establish evidence
that a concealment or misrepresentation possessed a tendency to influence
the citizenship application process." This results in the burden of proof be-
ing shifted to the accused to rebut the existence of a disqualifying fact by a
preponderance of the evidence."' In addition, Kungys established that the
moral character requirement did not require a material misrepresentation. 2
VII. THE ASSISTANCE IN PERSECUTION STANDARD
A. The Assistance in Persecution Standard
The United States Office of Special Investigations typically charged
suspected Nazi war criminals with having illegally procured their entry visa
and citizenship through the misrepresentation or concealment of their assis-
tance in the persecution of individuals during World War II. Denaturaliza-
tion and deportation actions thus typically depend upon the government's
ability to document the defendant's wartime activities. The burden on the
government was eased considerably by the federal judiciary's broad inter-
pretation of the "assistance in persecution" standard."3
Justice Marshall, in Fedorenko, addressed the scope of the exclusionary
provisions of the IRO Constitution, as incorporated in the DPA.' The IRO
Constitution's definition of displaced persons eligible for migration excluded
individuals who "assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations" or
who "voluntarily assisted the enemy forces.., in their operations against the
United Nations."" 5 Justice Marshall ruled that the DPA's incorporation by
reference of these IRO provisions meant that those who assisted the enemy
in persecuting civilians were ineligible for visas."6
Marshall went on to hold that the plain language of the IRO, as well as
437. See id at 796 n.8.
438. See id at 796-97.
439. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 505-06.
440. See Kungys, 485 U.S. at 759.
441. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 367 (6th Cir. 1994).
442. See id at 369.
443. James W. Moeller, United States Treatment of Alleged Nazi War Criminals: Inter-
national Law, Immigration Law and the Need for International Cooperation, 25 VA. J. INT'L
L. 793 (1985).
444. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 495.
445. IRO Constitution, supra note 332, § 2(a)-(b), 62 Stat. at 3051-52.
446. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 509-10.
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the testimony of immigration officials, indicated that individuals who, either
voluntarily or involuntarily, served as concentration camp guards during
World War II were ineligible for a visa."7 In a footnote which would prove
to be the subject of intense judicial scrutiny, Marshall noted that the District
Court feared that absent a voluntariness standard, Kapos (Jewish camp
guards) would be subject to denaturalization."8 Justice Marshall, however,
wrote that a fair and equitable result could be achieved in a particular case
through a close analysis of the facts which were alleged to constitute assis-
tance in the persecution of civilians. He noted that an individual who cut the
hair of inmates awaiting execution should not be considered to have assisted
in persecution. However, a guard, such as Fedorenko, who was issued a uni-
form, armed with a firearm, paid a stipend, permitted to visit a nearby vil-
lage, and who admitted to shooting at escaping inmates on orders from the
camp commandant, would fall fully within the statutory standard. Marshall
recognized that "[o]ther cases may present more difficult line-drawing
problems but we need decide only this case." ' 9 Justice Stevens' dissent dis-
puted whether those who served involuntarily should be subject to denatu-
ralization and warned of the "hydraulic pressure" of the gruesome events of
the past which possessed a tendency to distort the Court's judgment.45 He
cautioned that "human suffering will be a consequence of today's venture is
certainly predictable; that any suffering will be allayed or avoided is at best
doubtful." 4
51
A number of federal courts applied Marshall's analysis in denaturalizing
or deporting former Nazi functionaries."5 In United States v. Kairys," an Il-
linois District Court followed Fedorenko and ruled that a former armed
guard at the Treblinka concentration camp was not eligible for a visa under
the DPA."54 The Seventh Circuit, in affirming the District Court decision,
held that there was no requirement that an armed guard was personally in-
volved in persecutions and the fact that Kairys served at a labor rather than
concentration camp was legally irrelevant. '55 The guards performed similar
functions in both institutions and the inmates were subjected to the same in-
humane conditions and treatment.456 The Seventh Circuit Court parentheti-
cally observed that in cases involving unarmed guards, it might be necessary
447. See id. at 512.
448. See id at 511 n.33.
449. Id at 512-13 n.34.
450. Id at 538.
451. Id
452. See generally Jeffrey N. Mausner, Apprehending and Prosecuting Nazi War Crimi-
nals in the United States, 15 NOVA L. REV. 747 (1991).
453. 600 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986).
454. See United States v. Kairys, 600 F. Supp. 1254, 1271 (N.D. 111. 1984), aff'd, 782
F.2d 1374 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986).
455. See Kairys, 782 F.2d at 1378.
456. See iad at 1377 n.3.
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to demonstrate that a defendant personally was involved in persecuting in-
mates.4" Judge Richard Posner, in ordering Kairys' deportation under the
Holtzman Amendment, conceptualized the Nazi concentration camps as
criminal conspiracies in which the armed guards, like lookouts for a gang of
robbers, acted as co-conspirators or as aiders and abettors. '58 He thus failed to
find injustice in deporting guards, such as Kairys, who were not personally
involved in an act of persecution. Posner also noted the Kairys' three pro-
motions were inconsistent with his claim of involuntary involvement."9
In United States v. Schellong,46 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the judgment of a district court which cancelled the naturalization
certificate of Conrad Schellong.46 Schellong joined the Nazi Party in 1932
and was assigned to the Waffen SS Death Head Unit at Sachsenburg Con-
centration Camp in Saxony, Germany. His responsibilities included training
and supervising guards and serving as the rotating chief security officer for
the entire camp. As part of Schellong's duties, he instructed guards to shoot
escaping prisoners. The guards under Schellong's command accompanied
prisoners on work details and witnessed the inmates' harsh treatment and
working conditions. They presumably shared this information with Schel-
long who subsequently was transferred to Dachau.462
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in 1986 ordered Schellong's de-
portation under the Holtzman Amendment.463 The court ruled that his service
as a concentration camp guard constituted persecution of civilians under
both the DPA and Holtzman Amendment." The court further held that per-
sonal involvement in atrocities was not required under either statute because
both were intended to exclude persons who assisted the Nazis in inflicting
the type of sectarian persecution that occurred in the concentration camps.465
The Tribunal refrained from ruling on whether knowledge of racial, relig-
ious, or national persecution was required. It merely noted that Schellong
must have observed that prisoners wore different colored arm bands to repre-
sent their ethnic and racial backgrounds and that he presumably noticed that
the prison population was becoming increasingly dominated by the Jewish
victims of Nazi persecution. The Appellate Court noted that Schellong's
service in the camps, prior to their having been transformed into factories of
death, did not immunize him from deportation. It explained that the inhu-
457. See id at 1378. See also id. at 1377 n.3.
458. See Kairys v. I.N.S., 981 F.2d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 1992).
459. See id
460. 547 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Ill. 1982), afftd, 717 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1983), reh'g and
reh'g en banc denied, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007 (1987).
461. Id
462. See id at 331, 334. See also United States v. Tittijung, 753 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Wis.
1990), aff'd, 948 F.2d 1292, cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1222 (1991).
463. See Schellong v. I.N.S., 805 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1004 (1987).
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mane conditions in the camps during these early years were sufficient to
constitute persecution. 6' Finally, the Schellong court rejected the contention
that the persecution standard was unconstitutionally vague, citing the House
Judiciary Committee's reference to a substantial body of precedent which
held that persecution constituted "the infliction of suffering or harm, under
government sanction, upon persons who differ in a way regarded as offen-
sive... in a manner condemned by civilized governments." '67
The following year, the Seventh Circuit ordered the deportation of
Reinhold Kulle who served as a guard at Gross-Rosen, a slave labor camp in
Silesia.468 The court determined that Gross-Rosen was a site for the incar-
ceration of members of repressed racial and religious groups.469 Kulle con-
tended that his responsibilities were limited to guarding the perimeter of the
camp and escorting work groups. He claimed that he lacked the authority to
shoot escaping prisoners and that he never observed a prisoner being beaten
or shot. On two occasions, he noted that he provided prisoners with food and
water."' The Seventh Circuit pointed out that deportation was a civil rather
than a criminal proceeding and that the prosecution was neither required to
establish personal involvement nor knowledge. The statutory standard
merely required proof that the accused was present at a place of persecution.
This was considered to be sufficient under the Holtzman Amendment to pre-
sume that the defendant assisted in these acts. The fact that common crimi-
nals were among those incarcerated in the camp did not rebut the
presumption that individuals were persecuted based on race, nationality, or
religion."'
In 1991, the Seventh Circuit cancelled the naturalization certificate of
Michael Schmidt. 2 Schmidt, a member of the Death Head's Battalion,
served as an armed perimeter camp guard stationed outside the camp wall at
Sachsenhausen.4 3 There was no evidence that he shot at escaping inmates,
but the Appellate Court noted that at least fifteen prisoners were executed for
attempting to flee during Schmidt's tenure. In addition, thousands died as a
result of starvation, exhaustion, beatings, exposure, disease, and medical ex-
perimentation.' The court ruled that Schmidt's concealment of his service at
Sachsenhausen resulted in the illegal procurement of his visa and in his fail-
ure to fulfill a prerequisite to citizenship.475
466. See id
467. Id at 662.
468. See Kulle v. I.N.S., 825 F.2d 1188 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042
(1988).
469. See idt at 1191-92.
470. See id at 1192.
471. See id at 1192-93.
472. See United States v. Schmidt, 923 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1991).
473. See id at 1255.
474. See id.
475. See id at 1259-60.
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The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed that Schmidt's claim of involuntary
service as a guard was irrelevant in determining the legality of his entry into
the United States. The court also conceded that, in some instances, it might
be difficult to determine whether an individual's conduct constituted assis-
tance in persecution, but that service as an armed and uniformed concentra-
tion camp guard on behalf of an occupying power clearly satisfied the
statutory standard. The fact that some guards may have assisted in trans-
porting prisoners while others, such as Schmidt, only may have guarded
work parties was not controlling. All of these individuals contributed to the
systematic destruction of inmates."' The court also noted that it was unnec-
essary to determine whether Schmidt was aware of events inside the camp as
such knowledge could be presumed from his having viewed the identifica-
tion insignia prominently displayed by the starving and exhausted inmates.477
In summary, federal courts, in determining whether a defendant assisted
in the persecution of individuals on the basis of race, religion, and national-
ity, examined the nature of the accused's involvement in the Nazi's perse-
cutorial activities."8 Armed guards at Nazi concentration and labor camps
were regarded as having aided in the confinement of inmates and were
deemed to have assisted in the persecution of Jews, gypsies, and Slavs, re-
gardless of whether they directly abused, disciplined, or supervised intern-
ees. 9 In fact, most of the former guards who were denaturalized served on
the perimeter.'
The defendants were deemed to have possessed constructive knowledge
of events within the camps.48" ' But courts avoided ruling directly on whether
the prosecution was required to establish that a defendant was aware of the
discriminatory nature of his activities or harbored a persecutorial intent. The
Second Circuit in 1985 ruled that the government was not required to dem-
onstrate in a deportation action under the Holtzman amendment that a Lat-
vian police officer who burned and arrested the inhabitants of a village under
the claim of a lawful reprisal shared the anti-communist motivation of the
occupying German forces.8 In addition, federal courts held that the prose-
cution was not compelled to establish that an accused voluntarily assumed
and continued in his position; the key was the nature, rather than the volun-
tariness, of the defendant's actions. 3
Fedorenko provided a rather loosely sketched continuum of conduct
476. See id at 1258-59.
477. See id at 1258 n.8. But see id at 1260-61 (Pell J., dissenting on court's ruling that
the prosecution was not required to establish knowledge as an element of persecution).
478. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512-13, 538.
479. See idt at 512.
480. See, e.g., Schmidt, 923 F.2d at 1255, 1258-60.
481. See Schellong, 805 F.2d at 661.
482. See Maikovskis v. I.N.S., 773 F.2d 435, 445-46 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1182 (1986).
483. See Schmidt, 923 F.2d at 1258-59 (7th Cir. 1991).
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ranging from cutting inmates' hair to serving as an armed guard. This pro-
vided few guiding principles and left courts with the unenviable task of bal-
ancing a range of facts in determining on a case-by-case basis whether
individuals assisted in persecution." Nevertheless, courts experienced little
difficulty in upholding the denaturalization of individuals who served as po-
lice officers in the territories occupied by Nazi Germany.
Michale Dercacz was a uniformed and armed member of the Ukrainian
police in the town of Novy Yarychev during the Nazi occupation. In 1942,
the Jews in the town were ghettoized and were required to wear identifying
armbands. They also were restricted in movement, food, commerce, and em-
ployment and were deployed as slave laborers. In January 1943, the German
forces rounded up and exterminated the Jews. 8' When his denaturalization
was upheld, Dercacz testified that his duties included arresting and detaining
Jews who refused to wear identifying armbands, and informing on civilians
suspected of having sold food to ghettoized Jews. '86 The court found that
Dercacz concealed these material facts and made willful misrepresentations
in his application for naturalization."
Two years later, in 1984, the Third Circuit affirmed the denaturalization
of Serge Kowalchuk, who occupied a central clerical position with the
Lithuanian police during German occupation."' The District Court con-
cluded that the Lithuanian auxiliary force routinely enforced the martial law
restrictions imposed by the Germans against Jews. There was no clear and
convincing evidence that Kowalchuk personally and directly was involved,
but the court concluded that the defendant must have been aware that he was
assisting the Nazi's persecutorial activities. 489 The Third Circuit affirmed
Kowalchuk's denaturalization, ruling that the defendant's membership in the
Ukrainian police constituted voluntary assistance to the enemy. The court
determined that it was unnecessary to address the District Court's conclusion
that Kowalchuk actively assisted the enemy in persecuting civilian popula-
tions .490
Denaturalization and deportation actions also were brought against ci-
vilians who were deemed to have assisted in persecution. For instance, Ka-
zys Palciauskas, the mayor of Kaunas, Lithuania, was denaturalized for
concealing his activities during the war.491' The evidence indicated that Pal-
ciauskas helped to ghettoize the Jews and to confiscate their property. Fol-
lowing the liquidation of the Jewish population, he distributed their houses
484. See supra note 449 and accompanying text.
485. See United States v. Dercacz, 530 F. Supp. 1348, 1349 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
486. Seeid at 1351.
487. See id at 1353.
488. See United States v. Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd on other
grounds, 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986).
489. See id at 81.
490. See Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 494.
491. See United States v. Palciauskas, 559 F. Supp. 1294 (M.D. Fla. 1983).
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to the town's inhabitants.492
B. Augmenting the Assistance in Persecution Standard
A series of cases broadly interpreted Section Thirteen of the DPA. This
provision prohibits the issuance of a visa to any individual who has been a
member or participant in any movement which is, or has been, hostile to the
United States or the form of government of the United States. 93 Section
thirteen also provides that any person who has advocated or assisted in the
persecution of any person because of race, religion, or national origin, or
who has voluntarily borne arms against the United States during World War
II is ineligible for a visa.494
United States v. Osidach495 was the first prosecution brought under this
provision.496 Defendant Wolodymir Osidach was a member of an anti-Soviet
Ukrainian national group and served as a police officer in the town of Rawa
Ruska during the German occupation. In 1942, the town's entire Jewish
population of between ten and twelve thousand was deported and extermi-
nated. The Jewish quarter then was burned, dynamited, and destroyed.49
The District Court ruled that under Section Thirteen, mere willing
membership in a movement that persecuted civilians was sufficient to war-
rant a finding that an individual was ineligible for a visa under the DPA.4 9 A
review of documentary evidence, eyewitness testimony, and circumstantial
proof persuaded the court that the Ukrainian police constituted a movement
which assisted the Germans in the persecution of civilians in Rawa Ruska
between 1942 and 1945.4 9 Osidach conceded that he acted as an interpreter
for the German gendarmes as well as a street patrol officer, both of which
the couft concluded constituted assistance in persecution."' The District
Court determined that Osidach's involvement as an interpreter provided vital
assistance to the Germans in their repression of Jews. As an armed and uni-
formed officer on patrol, Osidach also was found to have mentally perse-
cuted innocent civilians who feared the infliction of armed force at the hands
of German authorities."' The court concluded that Osidach had misrepre-
492. See id at 1297-98. See also United States v. Karl Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426
(E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 685 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1982) (mem.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883
(1982) (denaturalization of chief of Tartu concentration camp in Estonia).
493. See Displaced Persons Act I, supra note 334 § 13.
494. See Displaced Persons Act I, supra note 334 and accompanying text.
495. 513 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
496. See id
497. See id at 60-62.
498. See ide at 72. See also United States v. Breyer, 829 F. Supp. 773 (E.D. Pa. 1993),
affd in part, vacated in part, 41 F.3d 884 (3d Cir. 1994); United Stated v. Breyer, 841 F.
Supp. 679 (E.D. Pa. 1994), aff'd, 41 F.3d 884 (3d Cir. 1994).
499. See Osidach, 513 F. Supp. at 95.
500. See id at 96-100.
501. See iad at 98-99.
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sented his wartime service and illegally procured his citizenship."'
In a related case, a Florida District Court determined that Bohdan Koizy
had been a member of the Ukrainian Police and the Organization of Ukrain-
ian Nationalists." 3 As a result, he had been a member and a participant in
movements hostile to the United States. The court ruled that, as a member of
the police, Koizy assisted and personally engaged in acts of persecution.5"
In United States v. Sokolov," 5 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that Vladimir Sokolov illegally procured his visa and his subsequent citizen-
ship through the misrepresentation of his wartime activities."6 Sokolov
served as a German army propagandist in the occupied portion of the Soviet
Union. The court found that he advocated the persecution of Jews in various
articles in a Nazi-sponsored Russian language newspaper. In 1944, Sokolov
fled with the retreating German army and, until the end of the war, worked
in Berlin for Russian language newspapers. These publications fomented
anti-Semitism and called upon the Russian people to resist the Allied Pow-
ers.5" In his visa application, Sokolov denied having advocated fascism and,
as a result, the court found that he had procured his visa illegally."'x He also
was considered to have unlawfully concealed the fact that he assisted enemy
forces at war with the Allies and that he participated in a movement which
was hostile to the Allied Powers. The court further determined that Sokolov
voluntarily advocated or assisted in the persecution of Jews. Although there
was no demonstration that the Jews in the area actually were persecuted, the
court concluded that the advocacy of persecution rendered an individual in-
eligible for a visa on the grounds that the incitement assisted in creating a
climate of opinion which facilitated persecution."9
In United States v. Koreh,5"' the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
a District Court's denaturalization of Hungarian, Ferene Koreh.l& In Sep-
tember 1940, Koreh obtained a license to publish a private newspaper,
Szekely Nep. He served as editor between 1941 and 1944, and coordinated
articles and editorials with the fascist Hungarian government. The prosecu-
tion accepted, for purposes of summary judgment, that Koreh had not writ-
ten any of the fifty-five concededly anti-semitic and anti-Allied articles
introduced at trial." 2 The Third Circuit held that his publication of anti-
502. See id at 100-07.
503. See United States v. Koizy, 540 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aftid, 728 F.2d 1314
(11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984).
504. See id at 34-35.
505. 814 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1987).
506. See id at 866.
507. See id at 867.
508. See id at 871-73.
509. See id at 873-74.
510. 856 F. Supp. 891 (N.J. 1994), aff'd, 59 F.3d 431 (3d Cir. 1995).
511. See id.
512. See Koreh, 59 F.3d at 435.
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semitic articles in a private newspaper constituted assistance in persecution
under the Fedorenko standard. According to the court, the articles published
in Koreh's newspaper helped to inject the populous of Northern Transylva-
nia with the virus of racial bigotry which helped to create a foundation for
Hungary's anti-semitic policies."3 The court affirmed that the prosecution
was not required to demonstrate that persecutions resulted from the publica-
tion of articles in the defendant's newspaper."4 Koreh argued in his defense
that in non-death camp cases, the government was required to establish that
a defendant personally was involved in acts of persecution. The court dis-
missed this contention, but nevertheless pointed out that Koreh had taken the
initiative in obtaining and maintaining a newspaper license which permitted
him to continue to disseminate his hate-filled publication."5 The Third Cir-
cuit also convicted Koreh of membership in a movement which was hostile
to the form of the United States government.
516
In sum, under Section Thirteen, the government only was required to
demonstrate knowing membership in a movement which was deemed to be
hostile to the United States or which engaged in persecutorial activities. The
courts concluded that the defendants possessed actual or constructive knowl-
edge of the aims and activities of the organizations in which they had been
involved.5 7 The tribunals expansively interpreted the notion of a "move-
ment" to encompass members of Eastern European police in German occu-
pied territories"t 8 and editors of fascistic and anti-semitic newspapers." 9
Writing, editing, or tolerating the publication of anti-semitic articles also was
considered advocacy of the persecution of individuals on the basis of race,
nationality, or religion.5 There was no requirement that the government
demonstrate that such advocacy had a discriminatory impact. 2 ' In virtually
every case under Section thirteen there was sufficient evidence for the courts
to have convicted the defendants of having assisted or engaged in acts of
persecution. 522
C. Narrowing the Assistance in Persecution Standard
Some judges resisted their brethren's broad interpretation of the grounds
for denaturalization and deportation. Federal courts narrowed these standards
513. See id at 439-40.
514. See id at 441.
515. See id at443.
516. See id at 443-44.
517. See Sokolov, 814 F.2d at 871-73.
518. Koizy, 540 F. Supp. at 34-35.
519. See Sokolov, 814 F.2d at 871-73.
520. See id. See also Koreh, 59 F.3d at 441.
521. See Sokolov, 814 F.2d at 873-74.
522. See Osidach, 513 F. Supp. at 95.
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in three cases. In Laipenieks v. I.N.S.,23 in 1985, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that the prosecution failed to establish Laipenieks' deportabil-
ity under the Holtzman Amendment by clear, convincing, and unequivocal
evidence. 24 Edgar Laipenieks joined the Latvian Political Police (LPP) fol-
lowing the German invasion and occupation of Latvia in 1941. The LPP
worked with the Nazis to apprehend communists and other suspected Soviet
sympathizers. 25 The Appellate Court noted that the court in Osidach had
held that Section Thirteen of the DPA was satisfied by mere willing mem-
bership in a movement that persecuted civilians and that it was unnecessary
to demonstrate that the defendant personally engaged in acts of persecu-
tion."' However, the court argued that under the Holtzman Amendment, a
higher standard was required to establish deportability. It relied on Justice
Marshall's discussion in Fedorenko and concluded that a deportation order
only may be sustained when the evidence established that the accused per-
sonally ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in persecution.5"
The Appellate Court recounted that the Soviet occupation forces plun-
dered, pillaged, and ravaged Latvia. Latvia subsequently aligned itself with
Germany and had good reason to be concerned about the presence and ac-
tivities of Soviet spies, saboteurs, and loyalists. Laipenieks and the LPP thus
possessed a legitimate basis for investigating individuals who were identi-
fied as communists. The court concluded that the government was unable to
establish that these individuals were singled out based on their political af-
filiations or opinions. More importantly, there was no evidence that
Laipenieks personally assisted or engaged in acts of persecution.52 The court
concluded that "[w]ithout proof of at least one instance in which Laipenieks'
investigations resulted in the ultimate persecution of an individual because
of his political beliefs, we are unable to infer that such occurred." '529
Judge James Boochever, in dissent, adopted a more traditional analysis
which focused on Laipenieks' membership in the Latvian police, who,
Boochever argued, were involved in persecuting communists. Judge
Boochever contended that the court, in centering its analysis on whether
Laipenieks committed an act of persecution, overlooked that Laipenieks vol-
untarily joined and assisted a Nazi-run police force whose sole purpose was
to eradicate communists.53 Laipenieks' actions, which the defendant con-
523. 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985).
524. See id
525. See id at 1429.
526. See id at 1431 (citing and discussing United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51
(E.D. Pa. 1981)). For a discussion of Osidach, see supra notes 495-502 and accompanying
text.
527. See id at 1431-32 (citing and discussing Fedorenko v. U.S., 449 U.S. 490 (1981)).
For a discussion of Fedorenko, see supra notes 444-51 and accompanying text.
528. See Laipenieks, 750 F.2d at 1435-37.
529. Id at 1437.
530. See id at 1441.
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ceded included hitting uncooperative internees," 1 all were undertaken in
furtherance of the Nazi's persecutorial policies and plan."' Judge Boochever
reminded his brethren that "[r]egardless of the unpopularity of communism
in our society, the persecution of a person because of communist beliefs is
proscribed.""'3
In summary, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the historical evidence in-
dicated that suspected communists were arrested and interrogated based on a
belief that they constituted a threat to the internal stability of Latvia.534 The
court further held that even if the LPP engaged in persecution, the prosecu-
tion was unable to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
Laipenieks possessed the intent to persecute, and had persecuted, detainees
based on their political beliefs." 5 This legal standard constituted a clear de-
viation from prevailing precedents." 6
In United States v. Sprogis,5" the Second Circuit Court of Appeals re-
jected a petition to denaturalize Elmars Sprogis, a police officer during the
German occupation of Latvia.538 Sprogis conceded that at the time that he
joined the local police in the town of Gulbene in 1941, he was aware that the
force was under the effective control of the Nazi authorities. However, he
explained that the Jewish population was arrested prior to his having joined
the police and that they were being held in a facility under German control.
He conceded that at one point during his tenure, the Germans arrested nine
Jews and that they were detained for several hours under police custody at a
jail that was under his command. The Jews subsequently were transferred to
a German prison where Sprogis testified that they likely were executed.
Sprogis also admitted that he compensated the four farmers who transported
the Jews to the jail with funds which the Germans confiscated from the pris-
oners. In addition, he acknowledged that he witnessed over one hundred
Jews being led to their execution in August 1941."'9
The Appellate Court observed that Sprogis neither was as innocent as
the proverbial prison barber, nor as venal as the stereotypical armed and uni-
formed prison guard. His activities were limited to the performance of min-
isterial acts, and the only evidence connecting Sprogis with persecutorial
conduct was his participation in the detention of the nine Jewish prisoners.
However, he neither ordered nor participated in their arrest, transport, or in
the confiscation of their property. On the other hand, the court recognized
that Sprogis was present during the Jews' incarceration, paid the farmers for
531. See id at 1439, 1441.
532. See id at 1441.
533. Id at 1438.
534. See Laipenieks, 750 F.2d at 1435-37.
535. See id.
536. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 490.
537. 763 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1985).
538. I
539. See id at 118-19.
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transporting the prisoners, and signed papers recording the disposition of
their property. The court, after weighing this evidence, concluded that
Sprogis "passively accommodated the Nazis while performing occasional
ministerial tasks."540 However, this did not constitute the type of personal and
active assistance in persecution which the prosecution was required to dem-
onstrate under Laipenieks 4
The Second Circuit observed that Sprogis joined the police to fulfill his
career ambitions rather than to further the Nazi's policies. It viewed Sprogis'
passive accommodation of the Reich's policies as similar to that of other
civil servants who confronted the German invasion.4 2 Excluding these indi-
viduals from citizenship would require the condemnation of those who
seemingly possessed no alternative other than to perform routine law en-
forcement functions during the Nazi occupation."
In summary, the Second Circuit in Sprogis adopted the Laipenieks re-
quirement that the prosecution demonstrate by clear and convincing evi-
dence that a defendant intentionally, voluntarily, and actively persecuted
individuals based on their race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. The
court determined that Sprogis was not involved in the persecution of Jews.
However, the court's opinion overlooks the fact that Sprogis' involvement in
the detention of the nine Jews was similar to the role performed by concen-
tration camp guards and that he must have been cognizant that his processing
of the paper work pertaining to the nine Jewish prisoners contributed to the
confiscation of their property and to the victims' rapid execution and de-
mise. " The court's argument that it would be unfair to denaturalize indi-
viduals in the occupied territories who involuntarily served the German
cause was contrary to Fedorenko's rejection of the duress defense.545 At the
time that Sprogis joined the Latvian police, he certainly was aware that the
police were assisting the Nazi occupation forces and that he likely would be
requested to engage in persecutorial acts.546 Sprogis' eventual promotion to
the assistant chief of police in a larger city indicates that he must have been
viewed favorably by German authorities.54
In Petkiewytsch v. I.N.S.,"8 the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals that ordered the deportation of Leonid Pet-
540. Id at 122.
541. See id at 122 (citing and discussing Laipenieks v. I.N.S., 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir.
1985)). For a discussion of Laipenieks, see supra notes 523-36 and accompanying text.
542. See Sprogis, 763 F.2d at 122-23.
543. See id at 123.
544. The Court distinguished Sprogis' conduct from that of former concentration camp
guards and police officials. See Sprogis, 763 F.2d at 122.
545. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 505-06.
546. See Sprogis, 763 F.2d at 117 (summarizing expert testimony of Dr. Raul Hilberg).
See also id. at 123.
547. See id at 117-18.
548. 945 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1991).
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kiewytsch.549 Petkiewytsch and his brother were Polish nationals who were
conscripted by the Germans to serve as armed and uniformed civilian pe-
rimeter guards at Kiel-Hasse labor education camp. Petkiewytsch was re-
quired to escort prisoners to work sites, to shoot escapees, and to stand guard
outside a bunker where prisoners were interrogated and often mistreated. He
was allowed unescorted liberty outside the camp, but was warned that he
would be imprisoned or shot if he disobeyed orders or attempted to flee."'
The court noted that forced labor camps primarily were used to punish la-
borers accused of work regulations. A fence did not surround Kiel-Hasse and
the normal period of incarceration only was fifty-six days.
Although German workers were subject to internment, a disproportion-
ate number of the internees were Jews and Eastern European involuntary
workers who had committed offenses such as refusing to display their as-
signed insignias. As a general rule, punishment was carried out by the Ger-
man Security Police rather than by civilian guards such as Petkiewytsch.
Petkiewytsch claimed that during his eight months of service, he never de-
ployed his rifle or abused or struck a prisoner. However, the court noted that
he must have been aware of the overcrowding, malnutrition, starvation, tor-
ture, and execution of prisoners."'
Petkiewytsch attempted to distinguish his case by pointing out that he
involuntarily served as a civilian guard in the least restrictive type of deten-
tion camp. He reluctantly performed this task to avoid imprisonment or
death and never personally committed an act of abuse. The court noted that
Schellong held that the scope of the Holtzman Amendment was the same as
the DPA and that service in a concentration camp was sufficient to constitute
assistance in persecution under both statutes."' The Sixth Circuit also noted
that Maikovskis recognized that the personal motivation of a defendant ac-
cused of assisting in Nazi persecutions was immaterial.553 On the other hand,
Laipenieks held that deportability under the Holtzman Amendment only may
be sustained when the evidence established that the defendant "personally
ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in the persecution of indi-
viduals."554
The Sixth Circuit followed the Laipenieks precedent and ruled that the
Holtzman Amendment required active participation in persecution which
549. Id at 881.
550. See id at 872-73.
551. See id at 872-75.
552. See id at 878 (citing and discussing Schellong v. I.N.S., 805 F.2d 655 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1004 (1987)). For a discussion of Schellong, see supra notes
460-67 and accompanying text.
553. See Petkiewytsch, 945 F.2d at 878-79 (citing and discussing Markovskis v. I.N.S.,
773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986)). For a discussion of Mark-
ovskis, see supra note 482 and accompanying text.
554. Petkiewytsch, 945 F.2d at 878 (citing and discussing Laipenieks v. I.N.S., 750 F.2d




Lippman: Pursuit of Nazi War Criminals in the United States and in Other A
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1998
76 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
went beyond "assistance." 5" It held that the Holtzman Amendment specifi-
cally was intended to exclude war criminals and did not encompass reluctant
civilian guards who served under duress in the least punitive of camps and
who had not engaged in personal acts of persecution.556 The court concluded
that deporting Petkiewytsch would neither serve the purposes of the Holtz-
man Amendment nor advance a discernable policy of the United States."7
These three cases deviated from the prevailing precedents in requiring a
personal and active involvement in war crimes, which went beyond mere
membership in, or assistance to, a criminal enterprise. This involvement re-
quired an intent to persecute individuals on the basis of race, religion, na-
tionality, or political opinion.55 Lastly, the courts recognized the duress
defense for defendants who involuntarily had been involved in assisting acts
of persecution. 59
D. Summary
In summary, three separate standards have been articulated by federal
courts in adjudicating the denaturalization and deportation of those formerly
affiliated with Nazi Germany. Fedorenko and its progeny established an ob-
jective test which scrutinized whether an accused's particular conduct could
be considered assistance in persecution. The threshold test was whether the
defendant's activities rose to the level of a uniformed and armed concentra-
tion or labor camp guard. The difficulty was to determine whether the indi-
vidual's conduct satisfied this standard and whether this was the appropriate
demarcation between innocent and invidious conduct.
560
The Osidach line of cases created an organizational test which exam-
ined whether an individual was a knowing and voluntary member of an or-
ganization which was deemed hostile to the United States or which engaged
in persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, or political opin-
ion.56" ' These cases formally were decided under an organizational analysis,
but the defendants also satisfied the Fedorenko standard for assistance in
persecution. The question remains whether mere membership or service as
an obscure functionary constitutes proper grounds for denaturalization or
deportation."2
The third analytical framework relied upon a subjective test which ex-
amined the defendant's intent, the nature of his personal involvement, and
whether the defendant acted in a free and voluntary fashion. The Laipenieks
555. Laipenieks, 945 F.2d at 880.
556. See id at 880-81.
557. See id at 881.
558. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 505-06.
559. See Petkiewytsch, 945 F.2d at 880.
560. See supra notes 444-92 and accompanying text.
561. See supra notes 493-522 and accompanying text.
562. See Fedorenko, 513 F. Supp. at 97.
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line of cases established a high threshold that limited denaturalization and
deportation to individuals who actively and directly were involved in war
crimes. The concern is whether the subjective approach is based on a model
of legal responsibility which is too narrowly conceived to serve the public
policy rationales animating the denaturalization and deportation of individu-
als affiliated with the Nazi cause.
The contrasting visions of the objective and organizational tests on the
one hand, and the subjective approach on the other, partially are based upon
differing interpretations of the relevant legislative history and intent.5" These
differing analyses also reflect divergent philosophical premises. The objec-
tive and organizational tests elevate the interests of the victims and human
rights over the equitable claims of the defendant. These tests are sufficiently
broad to encompass those who contributed, both directly and indirectly, to
the persecution of civilians. This protects the integrity of the immigration
process by preventing a wide-range of individuals who concealed their in-
volvement in the Nazi cause from continuing to enjoy the benefits of citizen-
ship and residency. The objective and organizational tests also provide an
efficient solution which permits judges to limit the degree to which they are
required to engage in a case-by-case investigation, forty years after the fact,
of individuals' intent, action, and motivation. The criminal prosecution of
many of these relatively minor contributors to the Holocaust likely would
prove difficult to sustain and the broadly conceived objective and organiza-
tional approaches to denaturalization and deportation ensures that Nazi col-
laborators and conspirators will be compelled to confront their culpability.565
The subjective test is based upon the view that the deprivation of an in-
dividual's citizenship and residency should be based upon a strict standard
which requires a demonstration by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant personally and actively engaged in the persecution of individuals
on the basis of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. This approach
also posits that equitable considerations dictate that individuals should not be
held accountable for actions that were the product of duress or necessity. The
subjective standard reflects the view that the interest in excluding those af-
filiated with the Third Reich has diminished over the course of forty years.
Most of the accused have proven to be contributing members to the United
States and it would be inequitable to bring a prosecution at this late date.
Prosecutorial resources, accordingly, should be devoted to more pressing
concerns.566 There are significant problems under all of these standards in re-
liably establishing the nature and scope of an individual's involvement in the
Third Reich.
563. See supra notes 423-43 and accompanying text.
564. See Petkiewytsch, 945 F.2d at 879-80.
565. See generally Stephen J. Massey, Individual Responsibility for Assisting the Nazis
in Persecuting Civilians, 71 MINN. L. REv. 97, 117-19 (1986).
566. See generally id
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VIII. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
A. Witness Reliability
In a number of denaturalization and deportation cases, the United States
relied upon witnesses residing in the former Soviet Union. 7 Defendants
typically challenged the reliability of these witnesses by pointing out that the
Soviet justice system failed to provide due process protections during the
deposition process, and that Soviet intelligence sources were known to have
targeted and forged evidence against members of the anti-Soviet e'migr6
community.568 On" the other hand, the prosecution argued that evidence ob-
tained from Russia and its former constituent Republics and satellites was
not invariably unreliable and its automatic exclusion would effectively im-
munize most alleged Nazi collaborators from legal liability.1
69
Federal courts declined to adopt a per se rule of exclusion of material
evidence and testimony obtained from the former Soviet Union.57 Courts,
instead, weighed and balanced various factors in an effort to determine the
reliability of witnesses and the weight which should be accorded to their
videotaped testimony. These factors included the age of the witnesses at the
time that they purportedly observed the events, the witness' opportunity to
observe the defendant's alleged activities, the availability of corroborating
evidence, the ease and accuracy of translation, the degree to which Soviet
authorities attempted to influence the testimony, and the witnesses' de-
meanor and credibility.57
In Kowalchuk, as previously noted, defendant Serhij Kowalchuk was
charged with having served as deputy commandant of a unit of the Ukrainian
militia in Lubomyl between 1941 and 1944. The militia allegedly engaged in
atrocities and repression against Jews.572 The District Court observed that its
ability to reconstruct events which occurred nearly forty years ago was com-
plicated by the fact that the witnesses' accounts were uncorroborated by
documentary evidence and were unrefreshed by any contemporaneous rec-
ordation of their recollections.5" The witnesses also were not fluent in Eng-
lish and most relied on interpreters in memorializing their testimony on
videotape. This made it difficult to evaluate the accuracy and reliability of
the testimony.574
The first accusations against defendant Kowalchuk and his brother ap-
567. See generally Kairys, 981 F.2d at 941.
568. See Kungys, 571 F. Supp. at 1123.
569. See id at 1124.
570. See Linnus, 527 F. Supp. at 433-34.
571. See Fedorenko, 513 F. Supp. at 86 n.16.
572. See Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. at 74.
573. See id at 75.
573. See id at 79-80.
574. See id at 75.
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peared in a Soviet publication and then were picked up by the wire services
and pursued by the United States. The District Court noted that the Russian
witnesses were selected, controlled, and made available by the Soviet Union
and that they predictably supported the charges which appeared in the So-
viet-controlled press. In addition, neither the prosecution nor the defense was
permitted to interview other witnesses in Soviet-controlled territory or even
to visit Lubomyl to search for additional information. 5" The court ruled that
the witnesses lacked credibility and noted that limiting the testimony to wit-
nesses selected by the Soviets could not be "easily squared with accepted
concepts of due process of law."576
The District Court also noted that it considered the delay in initiating the
proceedings against Kowalchuk in evaluating the weight to be accorded to
the witnesses' testimony. There was no applicable statute of limitations and
the proceedings were not subject to the defense of laches. However, the
court stated that it could not ignore that a substantial number of persons fa-
miliar with the events at Lubomyl, whose testimony may have been favor-
able to the defendant, had died over the past forty years.577 As a result, the
court ruled that it would disregard the government's witnesses and that its
factual conclusions would be based upon the testimony of the defendant
Kowalchuk and his witnesses and other evidence which was not inconsistent
with these accounts.78
In Kungys, the District Court noted that the Soviet judicial system was
structured to produce evidence in political cases to justify the desired result.
The prosecution of war criminals resident in the West was a matter of high
priority. These trials furthered the Soviet interests in tainting the Baltic na-
tionalist movement and in identifying capitalist democracies with Nazi war
criminals. Witnesses who failed to testify in the desired fashion could expect
to suffer the loss of housing and employment, or be charged with perjury.579
The depositions of Russian witnesses were presided over by a Soviet
procurator who, according to the District Court, intimidated witnesses, posed
broad sweeping questions, and permitted the American prosecutors to pose
leading questions while limiting the cross-examination of defense attor-
neys."' This was compounded by the Russians' use of interpreters who
skewed the testimony to implicate the defendant.5 ' During the depositions,
Soviet authorities also had influenced the response of witnesses by refresh-
ing their memory through suspiciously-worded protocols which the wit-
nesses purportedly drafted some years ago. Other protocols which allegedly
were executed contemporaneously with the events at issue, and prior to the




579. See Kungys, 571 F. Supp. at 1123-26.
580. See id at 1127-29.
581. See id at 1129.
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initiation of Kungys' prosecution, were not turned over by the Soviet
authorities. 82
The District Court concluded that the Soviets denied the defense the op-
portunity to investigate the issues in the case and that there was a grave risk
that the Soviet government unduly influenced the testimony of the deposi-
tion witnesses. The court was particularly critical of the United States for
having collaborated with the Russian Totalitarian State and for having ne-
glected to ensure that the witnesses were insulated from improper pressures.
The Americans also failed to ensure that the protocols and transcripts were
turned over to the defense prior to the depositions. In fact, Judge Dickinson
R. Debevoise noted that the Soviets continued to withhold various docu-
ments from the defense. 83 The District Court, in light of these procedural de-
fects, ruled that the depositions of the Soviet witnesses would be admitted
for the limited purpose of establishing that killings had been committed by
Lithuanian and German detachments in Kedainiai in July and August of
1941. However, the testimony of these witnesses was not admitted as evi-
dence that the defendant participated in the killings.8 4
The reliability of evidence in denaturalization and deportation cases also
is threatened by the fact that there is a natural tendency for witnesses who
were victimized in the Holocaust to attribute responsibility to the defendant
in the dock. 85 In Kowalchuk,588 three Jewish survivors identified photographs
of Kowalchuk and testified that he personally committed various atrocities. 87
District Court Judge John F. Fullam cautioned against the understandable
human instinct to translate feelings of outrage and compassion into uncritical
acceptance of the victim-witnesses' testimony.588 The judge pointed out that
these three witnesses admitted to having discussed the events at Lubomyl
among themselves and all had testified in other war crimes trials. Yet, none
had ever mentioned the defendant.588 Judge Fullam noted that the credibility
of one of the witnesses was tainted by the fact that he was active in efforts to
establish a memorial to the Lubomyl victims and that it was difficult to dis-
cern the extent to which his testimony may have been based on various hear-
say accounts which he had heard over the years. The court noted that the
witness "demonstrated [a] willingness to ascribe to the defendant personal
responsibility for virtually every one of the long list of atrocities catalogued
by the witness ... [which] demonstrates a tendency toward exaggeration and
582. See id at 1130-31.
583. See id at 1131-32.
584. See id at 1132.
585. See Debra H. Nesselson & Steven Lubet, Eyewitness Identification in War Crimes
Trials, 2 CARDoZO L. REv. 71 (1980).
586. 571 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
587. See Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. at 74, 79.
588. See id at 79.
589. See id at 77.
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embellishment.""59 Judge Fullam concluded that there was "substantial rea-
son for questioning the reliability" of the testimony of the prosecution's
three survivor-witnesses. 9 '
B. Eyewitness Identification
The issue of bias also arose in considering the reliability of eyewitness
identification. Eyewitness identification is central in convicting defendants
of assisting in acts of persecution. However, the lapse of time, witness bias,
and the susceptibility of witnesses to suggestive influences makes eyewit-
ness identification in the Nazi denaturalization cases particularly problem-
atic.592 Federal courts have applied the standards developed in criminal
proceedings in considering the admissibility and weight to be accorded to
this evidence.593 The general rule is that an identification which has resulted
from a suggestive pretrial photo identification process is not per se excluded
from evidence. Instead, the reliability and weight to be accorded to the iden-
tification must be judged in light of the totality of the circumstances.594
In Koizy, seven witnesses identified Koizy as a member of the Ukrain-
ian police.595 The evidence was presented through videotaped depositions
that were taken in Poland and in the Soviet Union. The witnesses testified
that they selected Koizy's picture from a photo spread containing eight pic-
tures. The court concluded that the reliability of the identifications was bol-
stered by the fact that the witnesses had a close and lengthy exposure to the
defendant during his service in the Ukraine. The witnesses also offered
physical descriptions of the defendant which were consistent with his photo-
graph, thus further adding to their individual and collective credibility. In
addition, there was no evidence that the photographic spreads were sugges-
tive or that those who had directed the process attempted to influence the
witnesses' selection.
596
Other cases have proven more problematic. In United States v. Walus,597
the United States government received information that Walus, a naturalized
citizen, had served as a member of the Gestapo during the German occupa-
tion of Kielce and Czestochowa in Poland. The prosecution alleged that
590. Id at 79.
591. Id
592. See generally Nesselson & Lubet, supra note 585.
593. See Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 905-06; United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699,
712 (N.D. 11. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 616 F.2d 283, 292 n.15 (7th Cir. 1980).
594. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). See also Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188, 199-200 (1977).
595. See United States v. Koizy, 540 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aftd, 728 F.2d 1314
(lth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984).
596. See id at 31 n.13.
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Walus committed various acts of persecution. 98 Walus denied these allega-
tions and claimed that he was a forced laborer in Germany during World
War IIV" The District Court, in revoking Walus' citizenship, emphasized
that twelve former Jewish inmates of the Czestochowa and Kielce ghettos
provided "positive recognition of him [Walus] in photographic displays, rec-
ollection his name and certain physical characteristics (primarily his general
build and height), and in-court identifications. Their testimony was powerful
and convincing; it was also, to a high degree, consistent among the wit-
nesses."
600
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted Walus a new trial based
on newly-discovered evidence.0 l The Court of Appeals also concluded that
although the eyewitness testimony was admissible, the identifications were
"questionable""6 ' and "suggestive.""6 3 Eight of the twelve eyewitnesses iden-
tified a photograph of Walus taken when he was thirty-seven, almost twenty
years after the alleged atrocities had taken place. The reliability of their
identification was further cast into doubt by the fact that the left outline of
Walus' face was barely visible." 0 The witnesses were contacted through ad-
vertisements in Israeli newspapers that solicited individuals who had viewed
the war crimes committed by Frank Walus in Czestochowa or Kielce. An Is-
raeli police inspector who inquired whether the individuals knew about the
activities of Frank Walus in Czestochowa or Kielce contacted other potential
witnesses." 5 The court criticized the District Court for having given "little
separate consideration to the possible effects of these procedures on each
witness' identification of the defendant. . . .We are . . . troubled by the
rather superficial consideration below of the potential effect of the question-
able photographic identification of the defendant and its effect on the in-
court identifications. '" 606
In Fedorenko, the defendant claimed that he was a perimeter guard and
had not committed any atrocities at Treblinka.6" The prosecution countered
this claim by presenting six survivor-witnesses who identified Fedorenko in
a photo array and testified that he was responsible for the perpetration of
atrocities. The District Court stressed that every effort should have been
taken to ensure that the photo spread was as clinically impartial as possible
in light of the interval of thirty-five years that elapsed between the defen-
598. See Walus, 616 F.2d at 285.
599. See id at 285-86.
600. Walus, 453 F. Supp. at 704.
601. See Walus, 616 F.2d. at 302-04.
602. Id at 294.
603. Id at 289 n.10.
604. See id at 292-93.
605. See id at 293-94.
606. Id at 294.
607. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 490.
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dant's alleged acts and the government's denaturalization action."' The
court, however, determined that the photo spread, which was shown to wit-
nesses residing in Israel, was "impermissibly suggestive" and had "led to a
substantial act of misidentification for the three witnesses who attempted
courtroom identification. It also tainted the testimonial identification of the
defendant which was critical because of the serious question whether the
survivor-witnesses were describing the defendant or another Russian at
Treblinka."
609
The District Court stressed that although each witness was shown a
minimum of eight photos, only two of these pictured former guards at
Treblinka, one of whom was Fedorenko. The two photos of the prison
guards were larger and clearer than the others in the array and had a black
border approximately one-half inch in length. The court also observed that
several of the witnesses encountered difficulties and took from one to five
minutes to identify the defendant.
61
In Walus, the Seventh Circuit noted that the witnesses explained that
they were able to identify the defendant after so many years due to the bar-
barity and enormity of his crimes. 61 Courts confronting a tainted photo array
must balance the indelible impact of the Holocaust on the witnesses and the
witnesses' opportunity to have viewed their persecutors for an extended pe-
riod against the lengthy time which has elapsed and the fact that individuals
are likely to respond positively to any suggestion that a given photo pictures
an individual who was involved in atrocities against the witnesses and their
friends and family. The substantial dangers of misidentification, of course,
may be combated on cross-examination. But, even a free and full cross-
examination may not be able to neutralize the impact at trial of a courtroom
identification.1 2
C. Documents
Service records, military orders, employment histories, and other docu-
ments have proven to be central in connecting defendants with persecutorial
activities. Kairys63 outlined the requirements of Rule 901(b)(8) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, which governs the admissibility of so-called ancient
documents. This rule states that a document is admissible if it "is in such
condition as to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity ... was in a
place where it, if authentic, would likely be, and ... has been in existence 20
608. See Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 905-06.
609. Id at 906.
610. See id The District Court rejected the in-court identification of the defendant based
on the fact that the witnesses had discussed the trial among themselves in violation of a court
order. See id. at 907.
611. See Walus, 616 F.2d at289.
612. See generally id at 289-92.
613. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374.
1998]
83
Lippman: Pursuit of Nazi War Criminals in the United States and in Other A
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1998
84 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
years or more at the time it is offered."6 4 The question whether a document
is free of suspicion and therefore admissible is within the discretion of the
trial court. This involves a decision that the document "is what it purports to
be." 5 It is unnecessary to demonstrate a chain of custody for ancient docu-
ments. Rule 901(b)(8) merely requires that a document is located in a place
in which it logically should be found.6
In a number of cases, defendants have challenged the authenticity and
weight to be accorded to documents obtained from Soviet and German ar-
chives. In Kairys, the defendant challenged the authenticity of a Personalbo-
gen, or thirty-year-old Security Police identification card, bearing the name
Liudvikas Kairys. The threshold issue of admissibility required the court to
determine whether the document was a valid identification card. The issue
whether the card correctly identified the defendant went to weight and was a
matter for the trier of fact.617 The Appellate Court concluded that there was a
sufficient basis to support the District Court's admission of the German SS
Personalbogen. The identification card was found in the Soviet archives, the
depository for German SS documents, the paper fiber was consistent with a
document which was more than twenty years old, and the card's design and
type matched that of other authenticated SS identification forms. The Dis-
trict Court also determined that there was sufficient evidence to conclude
that the card belonged to Kairys based on the fact that his thumbprint and
signature appeared on the document. In addition, other camp guards placed
Kairys at Treblinka and identified the photo on the identification as Karys.616
In 1993, Konrad Kalejs requested the Seventh Circuit to review a de-
portation order issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals." 9 Kalejs was
determined to have concealed his service as a company commander with the
infamous Arajs Kommando of the pro-Nazi Latvian Security Service. The
Kommando was involved in the extermination of seventy thousand Jews and
had been deployed as guards at the Salaspile Labor Camp.62° The defendant
claimed that most of the documents introduced against him should have been
excluded based on the fact that they were obtained from Soviet-controlled
archives. The court recognized that the Soviets may have manufactured evi-
dence in some cases involving Nazi collaborators, but refused to adopt a per
se exclusionary rule, particularly when the evidence was corroborated by
Western documentation and eyewitness testimony. It noted that other courts
relied upon such evidence and that Kalejis failed to articulate a reason why
614. FED. R. EvID. 901 (b)(8), quoted in Kairys, 782 F.2d at 1379.
615. Id
616. See id
617. See Kairys, 782 F. Supp. at 1378-79.
618. See id at 1380.
619. See Kalejs v. I.N.S., 10 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1993), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1305 (1994).
620. See id at 442-43.
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the Soviets would target him.62" '
Other defendants also claimed that the Soviet Union tampered with
documents introduced at trial. In 1996, a Massachusetts District Court af-
firmed the revocation of the citizenship of Aleksandras Lileikis, former head
of the Lithuanian internal security service in Vilnus, Lithuania, during the
Nazi occupation.622 The government submitted over one thousand pages of
material that was obtained from the Lithuanian Central State Archives. The
District Court dismissed Lileikis' claim that the documents were a Soviet
forgery. The court queried why the Soviet Union would "go to the trouble of
forging documents implicating Lileikis in war crimes and then bar all access
to its handiwork for some fifty years, while awaiting the collapse of the gov-
ernment whose evil intentions towards Lileikis it presumably sought to
serve? 
623
Jonas Stelmokas, a platoon commander with the pro-Nazi Lithuanian
police battalion, also challenged the trustworthiness of documents implicat-
ing him, which were obtained from archives in the former Soviet Union.624
The Appellate Court noted that acceptance of the defendant's contention re-
quired a belief that "the fabricator most peculiarly placed the bulk of the
documents in a location where they were not accessible to the public and
from which, in fact, they were not released for decades .... Stelmokas was
hardly a prominent figure in the war and it is difficult to conceive why
someone would go to the lengths he suggests in order to frame him."
62
In Walus, District Court Judge Julius Hoffman ruled that limited weight
should be accorded to documents which were obtained from German ar-
chives.626 Walus contended that he worked as an involuntary farm worker in
Germany during the war and had not served in the Gestapo.627 He argued that
the fact that there was no documentary record linking him to the Gestapo in-
dicated that he was not a member of the Nazi intelligence service. Judge
Hoffman, however, noted that expert testimony established that most of the
Gestapo records were destroyed and he concluded that the incompleteness of
the records diminished the weight which should be accorded to the absence
of this evidence.628 There also were documents indicating that payments were
made by German farmers to the General Health Insurance Agency (AOK) on
Walus' behalf. Judge Hoffman observed that these documents were under
Nazi control during the war and that "one who had been involved in Nazi
activities would certainly have had the strongest desire to create a false
621. See id at 447.
622. See United States v. Lileikis, 929 F. Supp. 31, 34 (Mass. 1996).
623. Id at 38.
624. See United States v. Stelmokas, 100 F.3d 302, 307 (3d Cir. 1996), reh'g denied,
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1847 (1997).
625. Id at 313.
626. See Walus, 453 F. Supp. at 708-09.
627. See id. at 704-07.
628. See ic at 708.
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identity." '629 The Appellate Court criticized Judge Hoffman for having failed
to articulate a basis for suspecting that the documents that were introduced at
trial were altered or forged by Nazi sympathizers. The Seventh Circuit con-
ceded that Walus may have possessed a motive to manufacture various
documents, but questioned whether a low-ranking officer possessed the re-
sources to accomplish such a task.63
In summary, documents obtained from German or Soviet archives were
admitted under the ancient documents provision of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.63 Federal courts have conceded that documents obtained from these
sources may have been modified or forged.632 However, the judiciary refused
to adopt a per se rule of exclusion.633 Courts also rejected the contention of
relatively low-level defendants that they were the victims of Soviet or Nazi
plots to target. nationalists through the modification or forgery of docu-
ments.634 The questioning of the authenticity of documents, nevertheless, has
tainted the perceived fairness of denaturalization and deportation proceed-
ings.635
D. Equitable Considerations
The denaturalization and deportation of a Nazi war criminal requires the
reconstruction of events that occurred over forty years ago. The integrity and
accuracy of this process has been limited by the government's reliance on
witnesses 636 and documents which were under the control of Russia and its
former satellite States.6 37 Fact-finding also has been complicated by the pos-
sibility that survivor-witnesses incorrectly may have attributed various
criminal acts to the defendant in the dock.63 In addition, these witnesses may
have been dangerously susceptible to suggestive influences in making identi-
fications in photo arrays.63 9
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted these threats to the judicial
process and warned their brethren against permitting the desire to obtain ret-
ribution for the Holocaust to dull concern for due process protections." °
Public pressure to issue denaturalization or deportation orders, and the ten-
dency to project forty years of pent-up emotions onto the accused also may
629. ld at 710.
630. See Walus, 616 F.2d at 301.
631. See Kairys, 782 F. Supp. at 1378-79.
632. See Kalejs, 10 F.3d at 442-43.
633. See id
634. See Lileikis, 929 F. Supp. at 34; Stelmokas, 100 F.3d at 307.
635. See id.
636. See Kungys, 571 F. Supp. at 1123; Linnus, 527 F. Supp. at 433-34; Osidach, 513 F.
Supp. at 86.
637. See supra notes 617-30 and accompanying text.
638. See Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. at 74, 79.
639. See supra notes 598-634 and accompanying text.
640. See Kalejs, 10 F.3d at 452.
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distort judicial judgments. In addition, the Appellate Court warned against
permitting these relatively minor defendants to serve as vehicles for the vin-
dication of the totality of wrongs perpetrated by Nazi Germany." As the
Third Circuit noted in Stelmokas, the role of judges "is not to proclaim our
visceral reactions to the horrors of history. Rather we must confine ourselves
to the trial record... and decide, as a dispassionate reviewing court. ''"2
The American government has spent millions of dollars in pursuit of
Nazi functionaries who illegally entered and resided in the United States.
This process is intended to vindicate the rule of law, deny safe-haven to for-
mer Nazi war criminals, and exact retribution for the crimes of World War
II.-3 The District Court, in Fedorenko, observed that more government funds
were expended in pursuing and overwhelming the defendant than were spent
in prosecuting the leaders of organized crime.' The question arises whether
this allocation of resources is justified, particularly when only a small per-
centage of Nazi war criminals resident within the United States are likely to
be detected, and those who are denaturalized may not be accepted, let alone
prosecuted, in a third party State. 5
Denaturalization and deportation actions have been tainted by the fact
that these proceedings have been brought over three decades following the
defendants' entrance into the United States. Defendants nevertheless have
failed in attempts to invoke the defense of laches."6 Some courts have recog-
nized that this affirmative defense should be available in those instances in
which a defendant is able to establish prejudice stemming from the govern-
ment's alleged lack of diligence.47 Judge Ruggero Aldisert, dissenting in
Stelmokas, noted that there was no analogue in American jurisprudence to
permitting a trial on events that occurred a half-century ago. He argued that,
with the exception of murder cases, all civil and criminal proceedings are
limited by a statute of limitations. This reflects the understanding that, with
the passage of time, witnesses die, memories fade, and documents disappear.
These developments conspire to irremediably impede the exploration for
truth."4 Judge Aldisert pointed out that, given contemporary notions of due
process, it was doubtful whether an individual could be tried in 1996 for a
murder that had taken place in 1941. He noted that the judiciary, neverthe-
less, inexplicably continued to elevate the interest in prosecuting stale de-
641. See Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 899 (noting the emotional intensity surrounding the
Fedorenko trial).
642. Stelmokas, 100 F.3d at 328.
643. See Schellong, 805 F.2d at 662 (purpose of Holtzman Amendment is to ensure that
the United States did not serve as a safe haven for individuals who assisted the Nazis).
644. See Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 899.
645. See United States v. Trifa, 662 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975
(1982) (Trifa voluntarily surrendered his certificate of denaturalization, but was not deported
due to failure to find an accepting State).
646. See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
647. See Koreh, 59 F.2d at 445-46.
648. See Stelmokas, 100 F.3d at 342-43.
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naturalization cases over the fundamental legal principles which Americans
fought to protect during World War II."
The denaturalization and deportation of Nazi war criminals seems par-
ticularly questionable given that a substantial number of those subject to
prosecution are octogenarians and nonagenarians.65 Virtually all of these de-
fendants have proven to be responsible and contributing citizens. They range
from Michael Schmidt, who worked as a janitor and lived a quiet life in a
Chicago suburb,65 to Konrad Kalejs, who became a millionaire with four
homes.652 Defendant Serhij Kowalchuk worked as a tailor ever since arriving
in the United States. His Jewish employer, along with other witnesses, testi-
fied that they never detected any trace of anti-semitism or racial animus in
the defendant.653
Several of those accused of assistance in persecution involuntarily
served the Nazi occupation forces. Defendant Feodor Fedorenko was a truck
driver in the Ukraine. In 1941, the Red Army mobilized his truck and the in-
vading German forces quickly captured him. He then was subjected to in-
humane conditions in prisoner of war camps before being selected to serve
as a guard at Treblinka.654 Fedorenko claimed that he was involuntarily as-
signed to guard duty: "they (the Germans) didn't ask; if you didn't go they'd
shoot you down like a dog. '655 The District Court noted that it was Fe-
dorenko's lack of education, sophistication, and willingness to conform
which likely motivated the Germans to conscript him for guard duty.656
The court observed that Fedorenko had proven to be a responsible citi-
zen and resident of the United States for over twenty-nine years and that the
evidence concerning his criminal conduct at Treblinka was inconclusive.
Under these circumstances, the court concluded that the equities should be
weighed in the defendant's favor. In addition, Fedorenko's misrepresenta-
tions and concealment of his past were perfectly understandable given his
fear of being repatriated to the Soviet Union.657 The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals queried in Kowalchuk whether those who cooperated with the Ger-
mans under the threat of arrest, imprisonment, and torture and who commit-
ted no cognizable crimes should forever be denied the possibility of
American citizenship. The question arises whether we are holding these in-
dividuals to a higher standard than we would be willing to impose upon our-
selves. 58
649. See id at 342.
650. See id at 343.
651. See Schmidt, 923 F.2d at 1257.
652. See Kalejs, 10 F.3d at 442.
653. See Kowalchuk, 571 F. Supp. at 77.
654. See Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 900-02.
655. Id at 900.
656. See id at 920.
657. See id at 920-21.
658. See Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d at 513.
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The evidentiary, procedural, and philosophical problems associated with
the denaturalization and deportation of those who assisted in the persecution
of civilians during World War II are illustrated in the pursuit of John Dem-
janjuk.659 Demjanjuk's prosecution may have sounded the death-knell for the
effort to bring those affiliated with the Nazis to the bar of justice."'
IX. THE PROSECUTION OF JOHN DEMJANJUK
A. Denaturalization
In 1981, United States District Court Judge Frank J. Battisti affirmed the
government's motion to revoke the Certificate of Naturalization of John
Demjanjuk on the grounds that Demjanjuk concealed and misrepresented his
service with the German Security Police at the training camp at Trawniki
and at the extermination camp at Treblinka, Poland.66'
Demjanjuk was a collective farmer in the Ukraine. In 1940, he was con-
scripted into the Russian army and was captured two years later by the Ger-
man invaders at the Battle of Kerch in the Crimea. After having been
transferred to various prisoner of war camps, the prosecution charged that
Demjanjuk was sent to the SS training facility at Trawiniki, Poland. He
thereafter allegedly was assigned to the Treblinka concentration camp.
Demjanjuk denied that he was present at either location,6 1 and, on his visa
application, he claimed to have worked as a farmer in Poland and as a long-
shoreman in Danzig.63 He subsequently modified this story at trial and testi-
fied that the Germans placed him in a unit of the Ukrainian National Army
but that he never engaged in military combat.6"
The prosecution's accusation that the defendant had been at Trawiniki
was based on an identification card obtained from Soviet archives which was
659. See United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981), aff'd, 680
F.2d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982). See also In re Extradition of John
Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 612 F. Supp. 571
(N.D. Ohio 1985), affid, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
See also Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993), reh'g denied, cen. denied, 513
U.S. 914 (1994) (vacating extradition order); Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir.
1986); In re Extradition of John Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. 1463 (N.D. Ohio 1984 ); In re Ex-
tradition of John Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. 1468 (N.D. Ohio 1984), dismissed, 762 F.2d 1012
(6th Cir. 1985).
660. See generally Lisa J. Del Pizzo, Not Guilty-but Not Innocent; An Analysis of the
Acquittal of John Demjanjuk and its Impact on the Future of Nazi War Crimes Trials, 18 B.C.
INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 137 (1995); Andrew David Wolfberg, Israel v. Ivan (John) Demjan-
juk; Wachmann Demjanjuk Allowed To Go Free, 17 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 474
(1995); Jay L. Chavkin, The Man without a Country: The Just Deserts of John Demjanjuk; 28
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 769 (1995); Cheryl Karz, Injustice Revisited: Did Ivan the Terrible Get
Away Again? 16 LOY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 953 (1994).
661. See Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1363.
662. See id at 1364.
663. See id at 1379.
664. See id at 1377.
1998]
89
Lippman: Pursuit of Nazi War Criminals in the United tates and in Other A
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1998
90 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
authenticated by expert testimony. The card stated that "Iwan Demjanjuk is
employed as a guard in the guard Units of the Reich Leader of the SS" and
carried the boldface heading "Headquarters Lublin, Training Camp
Trawniki. '665 The reverse side of the card accurately recited Demjanjuk's
personal history, described a scar on his back, and bore the defendant's
photo and signature.666 The claim that Demjanjuk served at Tranwniki and
Treblinka also was supported by the distinctive Security Police blood group
tattoo on the inside of the defendant's left arm.667
Five Jewish survivors from Treblinka, as well as Otto Horn, a former
German concentration camp guard, identified Demjanjuk as having been at
Treblinka. Each identified Demjanjuk's photograph as picturing a Ukrainian
named "Ivan" who abused and beat Jews. Ivan also was alleged to have
herded inmates into the gas chambers and to have activated the motors
which propelled the fatal poison into the compartments. This savage cruelty
earned Ivan the nickname of "Ivan Grozny" or "Ivan the Terrible."
66
Five of the identifications were conducted in Israel while Otto Horn was
examined in Germany. Each witness was shown a photo album containing a
picture of the defendant at the age of thirty-one, which was taken from his
1951 immigration application. They all selected the defendant's visa photo-
graph as the man known as Ivan. Four of the five witnesses who were shown
a second photo spread containing the defendant's picture from the Trawiniki
card also identified the defendant as Ivan. The fifth witness failed to identify
the defendant's Trawiniki photo, but later made a successful identification at
trial.669 The Israeli photo album containing the visa picture was deemed
impermissibly suggestive in Fedorenko.6' ° However, the Demjanjuk court
concluded that, despite the passage of thirty-four years, the identifications
were reliable.67'
One witness viewed all forty-three photos contained in the Israeli photo
book. The others examined between eight and seventeen. Demjanjuk's photo
was placed next to that of Fedor Fedorenko, the only other individual in the
photo spread who was suspected of having been at Treblinka. These two
photos were larger than the others on the page and the visual images were
clearer. The court, however, noted that over half the photographs in the al-
bum were of comparable size and visual quality.67 The District Court also
concluded that the two witnesses who only examined eight pictures scruti-
nized a number of photographs which were similar in size and quality to that
of Demjanjuk and, yet, were able to quickly and unequivocally identify the
665. Id at 1366.
666. See id at 1366-68.
667. See id at 1377-78.
668. Id at 1370.
669. See id at 1372.
670. Id at 1375 n.27. See Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 905-06.
671. See Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1375.
672. See id
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defendant. 73
The reliability of the identifications was bolstered by the fact that each
of the witnesses worked adjacent to the gas chambers and regularly observed
the activities of the individual known as Ivan the Terrible. Three of the wit-
nesses testified that they personally witnessed Ivan commit atrocities and
one alleged that Ivan had beaten him. There was no indication that the iden-
tification procedures were prejudicial or that the widespread media coverage
prejudiced the process.67 ' The court also noted that following the witnesses'
viewing of the photographs, they offered physical descriptions which cor-
roborated their identifications of the defendant. 675
Judge Battisti, based on an examination of the factual circumstances,
concluded that none of the pretrial photographs were so impermissibly sug-
gestive as to give rise to a likelihood of misidentification and to deny the de-
fendant due process of law. 6 He went on to rule that the defendant's failure
to have disclosed his service at Trawiniki, as well as his later service as an
armed guard at Treblinka, were material misrepresentations under the DPA.
Testimony indicated that United States officials would have denied Dem-
janjuk a visa had he disclosed his wartime activities.677 As a result, the court
determined that Demjanjuk was ineligible for a visa under the DPA and that
his citizenship should be revoked.678 This was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals.679 Judge Battisti subsequently rejected Demjanjuk's mo-
tion to vacate the judgment on the grounds that the Soviet Union and the Of-
fice of Special Investigations conspired to conceal the falsification of the
Trawiniki document as well as the perjury of two witnesses.68
B. Extradition
On November 18, 1983, the United States Attorney for the Northern
District of Ohio, acting on behalf of the government of Israel, requested the
District Court to conduct a hearing to determine whether John Demjanjuk
should be extradited to Israel.6 ' Judge Battisti denied Demjanjuk's recusal
motion, which alleged that the judge harbored personal animus towards
Demjanjuk and conspired with the Office of Special Investigations and the
Soviet Union to deny the defendant a full and fair hearing.6"2
673. See id
674. See id at 1375-76.
675. See id at 1376.
676. See id
677. See id at 1381.
678. See id at 1381-82.
679. See Demjanjuk, 680 F.2d at 32.
680. See United States v. Demjanjuk, 103 F.R.D. 1, 5-8 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
681. See Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. at 1469 (holding that District Court had subject-matter
jurisdiction and that the matter was not required to be heard by a military tribunal).
682. See Demjanjuk, 584 F. Supp. at 1331-32.
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The District Court subsequently ruled that there was probable cause to
believe that Demjanjuk was Ivan the Terrible, the individual who was al-
leged to have committed crimes by the State of Israel.683 This conclusion was
based on affidavits that were sworn by the eyewitnesses in the denaturaliza-
tion case.684 The court further noted that there was a striking resemblance
between the individual depicted in the photographs submitted by the State of
Israel and the defendant in the dock.685 Judge Battisti ruled that, although
Demjanjuk continued to dispute the authenticity of the Trawiniki identifica-
tion card, there was sufficient evidence to identify the defendant as Ivan the
Terrible without reference to the document.686
The District Court ruled that Israel's assertion of extraterritorial juris-
diction was in conformity with the international law principle of universal
jurisdiction. Judge Battisti observed that international law recognized the
extension of jurisdiction over universally condemned offenses that were the
subject of widely accepted international agreements. He noted that Israel
charged Demjanjuk with murder and claimed jurisdiction under a statute
which punished war crimes and crimes against humanity, both of which fell
within the accepted scope of States' universal jurisdiction.687
The United States-Israeli extradition treaty provided for the mandatory
extradition of offenders charged with an extraterritorial crime in those in-
stances in which the laws of the requested State provided for the punishment
of the offense under "similar circumstances." '688 The District Court noted that
United States law did not currently punish the murder of civilians in Nazi
concentration camps in Europe during World War II. The Treaty provided
that in such cases, the decision to extradite was vested in the discretion of
the Executive Branch. Judge Battisti further ruled that the charges of man-
slaughter, malicious wounding, and the infliction of grievous harm were
barred by the statute of limitations in the United States and that Demjanjuk
would not be subject to extradition for these offenses.689
This left the murder charge. Demjanjuk, however, contended that the
Treaty did not encompass the acts of large-scale murder with which he was
charged. He pointed out that the instrument made no reference to war
crimes, genocide, or to crimes against persecuted nationalities. The court
noted that extradition treaties were to be interpreted broadly in order to fa-
cilitate the surrender of offenders. There was no reason to presume that the
drafters of the Treaty intended to extradite for murder, but not for mass'mur-
der, or to exclude murders motivated by racial, religious, or national animus.
Judge Battisti noted that it would be illogical to hold that an individual who
683. See id at 552.
684. See id at 550-51.
685. See id at 554.
686. See id at 553.
687. See id at 558.
688. Id at 560.
689. See id at 560-61.
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killed a single individual was extraditable, but that an individual who com-
mitted multiple murders was immune from extradition. 9 The judge further
found that, based on the testimony of three eyewitnesses, there was probable
cause to conclude that Demjanjuk committed multiple acts of murder at
Treblinka and that he may be extradited to Israel for such offenses.69'
The District Court rejected Demjanjuk's claim that the Israeli statute
constituted an ex post facto law. It noted that the acts in the statute previ-
ously had been declared unlawful. The extermination of individuals in gas
chambers and the torturing and killing of unarmed prisoners were offenses
under the laws of every civilized State. Demjanjuk could have been brought
to trial following the war under the laws of Poland or Germany or before
Allied military tribunals. Israel merely was enforcing the prohibition on
homicide which was contained in a 1936 criminal statute which had been
enacted by the United Kingdom, the Mandatory Power for Palestine. The
United Kingdom certainly possessed the power to enact a law providing for
the extraterritorial punishment of murder. Israel, as the successor State to
England, in turn, was authorized to prosecute individuals for murders com-
mitted during the period of the British mandate. At any rate, the treaty did
not preclude extradition for delicts which occurred prior to Israeli state-
'hood.69
2
The court also dismissed Demjanjuk's claim that his killing of defense-
less civilians at Treblinka was part of the Nazi war effort and therefore con-
stituted political crimes. The District Court ruled that the fact that the alleged
murders occurred at Treblinka was insufficient to render these offenses po-
litical crimes within the meaning of the treaty. There was no indication that
those Jews and non-Jews who were killed were part of an active attempt to
change the political structure or to overthrow the Nazi regime. 93 Judge Bat-
tisti subsequently rejected Demjanjuk's habeas corpus petition on the
grounds that he failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that he was in
custody in violation of the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United
States.694 This was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 9 In 1986,
Judge Robert Bork, of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, refused to
stay the execution of Demjanjuk's extradition warrant.696
C. The Israeli Prosecution
The District Court of Jerusalem convicted Demjanjuk of causing the
death of Jews and other civilians in the German occupied territories. He was
690. See id at 561-62.
691. See id at 564-66.
692. See id at 567-68.
693. See id at 570-71.
694. See Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 578.
695. See Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 571.
696. See Demjanjuk, 784 F.2d at 1118.
19981
93
Lippman: Pursuit of Nazi War Criminals in the United States and in Other A
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1998
94 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
adjudged guilty of crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against human-
ity, war crimes, and crimes against persecuted peoples.697 The court deter-
mined that Demjanjuk was a central figure in the exterminations at the
Treblinka concentration camp and "participated with his own hands in the
mass murder of human beings, and... did so willingly, displaying initiative
beyond that required by his superiors." '698 This verdict was based on the tes-
timony and statements of witnesses who identified Demjanjuk's photo as
portraying Ivan Grozny. The testimonial evidence was bolstered by the
Trawiniki document and by the defendant's unpersuasive testimony and de-
meanor.
699
The Trawiniki certificate, however, recorded that Demjanjuk served at
Sobibor, but failed to mention Treblinka. The defendant's service at Sobibor
also was corroborated by a fellow Ukrainian, Tarantevich Danilchenko, who
testified that Demjanjuk earned the German's praise and respect for his en-
ergetic and enthusiastic persecution of Jews. The court resolved the apparent
conflict over the site of Demjanjuk's wartime activities by concluding that
the similarities between the accounts of Danilchenko and the prosecution
witnesses suggested that Demjanjuk served at both Sobibor and Treblinka."'
The Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as a Court of Criminal Appeals,
unanimously reversed Demjanjuk's conviction."' The Court upheld the Dis-
trict Court's finding that the Trawiniki document and the eyewitness testi-
mony constituted credible, clear and convincing evidence of the defendant's
wartime activities." 2 However, Demjanjuk submitted summaries of state-
ments which were sworn by former concentration camp guards following the
war. This evidence inculpated Ivan Marchenko as the operator of the gas
chambers. The Supreme Court cautioned that the authenticity and reliability
of these Russian transcripts was in doubt and that the witnesses were not
subjected to cross-examination. The Supreme Court nevertheless determined
that this evidence prevented the Court from reaching a conclusion that was
close to certain concerning whether the defendant was Ivan the Terrible, op-
erator of the gas chambers at Treblinka. °'
The Supreme Court, however, determined that Demjanjuk served in the
Trawiniki unit and in the Sobibor Extermination Camp. The Trawiniki unit,
according to the Court, was the human conveyor belt that removed detainees
from the trains and transported them to the crematorium. The testimony also
697. The State of Israel v. Ivan (John) Demjanjuk (D.C. Jm. 1988), reprinted in ASHER
FELIX LANDAU & HEVER POOL, THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL 1, 385 (1991) [hereinafter District
Court Judgment].
698. Id at 386.
699. See id at 384.
700. See id at 243-44.
701. See Fania Domb, Judicial Decision the Demjanjuk Trial, 24 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs.
323, 324 (1994).
702. See id at 335-36.
703. See id at 337.
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indicated that Demjanjuk directly killed a number of internees. But, the
Court noted that Israel failed expressly and separately to charge Demjanjuk
with participation in murder stemming from his involvement with the
Trawiniki unit at Sobibor. Demjanjuk, according to the judges, could not be
convicted of such offenses absent a reasonable opportunity to introduce evi-
dence in his own defense. An additional trial on these charges seemed ineq-
uitable given that the proceedings against him already consumed seven years
and that the defendant's extradition was based on his activities at
Treblinka.7 M
The Supreme Court acquitted Demjanjuk on the Treblinka charge and
the proceedings on the alternative indictment were discontinued.7 0 5 This cu-
rious decision may well have reflected a court which found itself buffeted by
political pressures and unable to cope with such a complicated and conflict-
ing evidentiary record.7 "6 The Court's judgment also raised substantial ques-
tions concerning the reliability of the eyewitness testimony which placed
Demjanjuk at Treblinka and the unconscious desire of these witnesses to
gain retribution for the crimes of the Nazi regime.
D. Prosecutorial Misconduct
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order in 1993 reopening
Demjanjuk's extradition case.70" The Appellate Court also issued a writ of
habeas corpus enabling Demjanjuk to return to the United States.0 9
In 1992, the Appellate Court appointed Judge Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr.
as a Special Master to determine whether the failure of government attorneys
to disclose exculpatory information in their possession constituted prosecu-
torial misconduct or a fraud which misled the court into approving Demjan-
juk's extradition.710 The Special Master absolved the government attorneys
of deliberately and intentionally failing to disclose information that they
considered exculpatory. Judge Wiseman also determined that the various
proceedings against Demjanjuk were not influenced by political pressure
from congressional sources and various Jewish groups."' The Special Master
found that some of the government's failures were "excusable," others "in-
advertent" and that a third group resulted from a "mistaken understanding"
of prosecutors' "duty of production" under the rules of discovery." 2
704. See id at 339-41.
705. See id at 341.
706. See Mordechai Kremnitzer, The Demjanjuk Case, in WAR CRIMES IN INT'L LAW 321
(Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1996).
707. See generally District Court Judgment, supra note 697, at 10-11. See generally
WILLIAM A. WAGER, IDENTIFYING IVAN, A CASE STUDY IN LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY (1988).
708. See Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 356.
709. See id
710. See id at 357.
711. See id at 339-40.
712. Id. at 341.
1998]
95
Lippman: Pursuit of Nazi War Criminals in the United States and in Other A
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1998
96 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
Demjanjuk's contention that the OSI attorneys engaged in misconduct
primarily was based on the claim that although the OSI had not had access to
all of the statements relied upon by the Israeli Supreme Court, they obtained
documents from official sources in the Soviet Union and in Poland which
identified Ivan Marchenko as the operator of the Treblinka crematorium.
Demjanjuk argued that this material should have raised doubts concerning
his identity as Ivan the Terrible. The court listed five documents that were
particularly problematic." 3 At least three were in the government's posses-
sion prior to the initiation of denaturalization proceedings against Fedorenko
and were singled out by the court as evidencing a "reckless disregard" by the
government of its discovery obligation to provide potentially exculpatory
material to the District Court and to Demjanjuk's counsel."'
The so-called Fedorenko Protocols had come into the government's
possession in 1978. These papers included statements from two former
Treblinka guards who stated that the operator of the crematorium at
Treblinka was named Ivan Marchenko. The protocol also contained the tran-
scription of a 1978 Soviet interview with Fedorenko which raised doubt as to
whether Demjanjuk served at Treblinka. The court also noted a document
provided by the Polish government in 1979 which enumerated the guards
transferred from Trawiniki to Treblinka. The list included Ivan Marchenko,
but not Demjanjuk. The third document consisted of two reports, written in
1980, recounting an interview between OSI investigators and former Ger-
man Treblinka camp guard Otto Horn. The reports revealed that Horn failed
to identify Demjanjuk in the initial photo-spread. He only singled out Dem-
janjuk in a second photo-spread after having observed that the accused's
picture also appeared in the first photo spread, which was visible during the
examination.7" 5
The Appellate Court stressed that the defense attorneys and the District
Court considering Demjanjuk's case should have been given access to those
documents which indicated that Ivan Marchenko was Ivan the Terrible."'
Demjanjuk's legal team also should have been provided with the reports
which incriminated the reliability of Horn's photo identification. This would
have permitted the defense to cross-examine the former concentration camp
guard during his deposition and would have provided the District Court with
the information required to rule on the admissibility and weight of Horn's
statements. The reports on Horn's deposition were sent to Arthur Sinai, the
Deputy Director of OSI, who testified that he failed to read them. Sinai, in
turn, sent them to Norman Moscowitz, the lead government attorney in the
Demjanjuk denaturalization case. Moscowitz testified that he neglected to
review these contemporaneous accounts of Horn's deposition. He also stated
713. See id at 342.
714. Ide at 350.
715. See id at 350-51. See also id at 342-43.
716. See id at 346.
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that he attended the interrogation session with Horn, three months prior to
Horn's deposition, at which the suggestive identification had taken place.
Moscowitz stated that he deliberately glanced away during the photo identi-
fication in order to avoid being called as a witness in the denaturalization
case. The Appellate Court condemned and failed to find any excuse for the
government's seemingly casual approach to evidence, which cast doubt on
the prosecution's case against Demjanjuk.717
The Sixth Circuit observed that Demjanjuk's attorney submitted discov-
ery requests which covered virtually every document that the government
neglected to produce." ' The OSI claimed to have a policy and practice of
turning over all exculpatory information, even if it had not been requested.
Yet, the court noted that the OSI denied Demjanjuk access to the complete
file of the Polish Commission on the grounds that "all relevant and discover-
able documents.., have been provided to you." '719 The court concluded that
the Special Master "cannot find them clearly erroneous" in concluding that
the failure of the OSI attorneys to turn over exculpatory material was a result
of a misunderstanding rather than a deliberate and willful failure to fulfill
their ethical obligations.72 However, the Appellate Court observed that the
certitude of the OSI attorneys that they located Ivan the Terrible led them
recklessly to disregard evidence that suggested that the infamous Ivan
Grozny was Ivan Marchenko. The conviction of OSI lawyers that they ap-
prehended Ivan the Terrible also did not excuse their reckless disregard of
the obligation to provide the information requested by Demjanjuk. This fail-
ure "misled" Demjanjuk's counsel and "endangered" Demjanjuk's ability to
present a defense.'
The Appellate Court noted that the OSI leadership was informed of the
evidentiary difficulties in the Demjanjuk case. Attorney George Parker, the
initial lead attorney in the prosecution, wrote a memorandum, in February
1980, questioning Demjanjuk's guilt which he sent to Walter Rockler, Di-
rector, and Allan Ryan, Deputy Director, of the OSI. Parker noted that the
testimony of Danilchenko and two other Ukrainian guards, as well as the list
of guards compiled by Polish authorities, strongly suggested that Ivan
Marchenko, rather than Ivan Demjanjuk, was the infamous Ivan the Terrible.
Parker wrote that the OSI confronted a dilemma: there was "little admissible
evidence" that the defendant was at Sobibor and "serious doubts" that he
was at Treblinka.722 Parker concluded that "[a] reading of the Canons of
Ethics persuades me that I cannot pursue this case simply as a Treblinka
matter on the premise that it is tactically shrewd and morally acceptable be-
717. See id at 351-52.
718. Id at 341.
719. Id at 349.
720. Id
721. Id at 350.
722. Id at 346.
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cause we think he was a guard elsewhere."" 3
Parker's superiors eventually decided to indict Demjanjuk for activities
at Sobibor as well as Treblinka, but to center the trial on establishing that
Demjanjuk was Ivan the Terrible.2  Parker's ethical qualms led to his resig-
nation from the Justice Department prior to the denaturalization trial.725
Rockler and Ryan testified that they could not recall Parker's memorandum
and attorney Moscowitz testified that he resolved the apparent conflict in the
evidence by concluding that Demjanjuk served at Sobibor as well as at
Treblinka, where he used the name Marchenko.2 In his memorandum,
Parker termed this position as "simply a ruse" to avoid "ethical problems"
raised by the evidenceY.7 The Sixth Circuit noted that while Parker's memo
did not establish that the OSI had committed a fraud on the judicial system,
it "raised a clear warning that there were ethical perils in continuing to
prosecute Demjanjuk as Ivan the Terrible. When his superiors and col-
leagues at OSI refused to heed his warning, Parker resigned. 728
The court concluded that the OSI attorneys acted with a "reckless disre-
gard for the truth" which prevented Demjanjuk from "fully and fairly" pre-
senting a defense.79 This constituted a "fraud on the court in the
circumstances of this case where, by recklessly assuming Demjanjuk's guilt,
they [the government attorneys] failed to observe their obligation to produce
exculpatory materials requested by Demjanjuk. 730 The court attributed this
passionate pursuit of Demjanjuk to the OSI's "win at any cost" attitude
which was fueled by political pressures from lobbying groups and the Con-
gress."'
The Demjanjuk prosecution may mark the death-knell for denaturaliza-
tion and deportation actions against alleged Nazi war criminals. The perils of
faulty memories,732 inaccurate eyewitness identifications,733 doubts concern-
ing the authenticity of documents,7 4 political pressure,735 and overly-zealous
prosecutors," all have combined to undermine the legitimacy of the United
723. Id at 369, 373.
724. See id at 346-48.
725. See id at 347.
726. See id
727. Id at 348.
728. Id
729. Id at 354.
730. Id
731. Id at 355. See generally Steven Lubet, That's Funny, You Don't Look Like You
Control the Government: The Sixth Circuit's Narrative on Jewish Power, 45 HASTINGS L.J.
1527 (1994).
732. See Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1375.
733. See Kalejs, 10 F.3d at 339-40.
734. See Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1363.
735. See supra note 731 and accompanying text.
736. See Kalejs, 10 F.3d at 339-40.
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States government's laudatory aspiration of disassociating itself from the
atrocities of the Third Reich. The decision whether to pursue prosecutions of
war criminals in the future, unfortunately, may be influenced by the events
in the Demjanjuk case."'
X. CONCLUSION
Following World War II, the Allied Powers initiated prosecutions
against various major Nazi war criminals.73 ' Other war criminals and indi-
viduals who assisted in Nazi atrocities were able to take cover under the
canopy created by the chaos of post-war Europe and immigrated to various
Western democracies.739 These countries were preoccupied with post-war
domestic and international reconstruction and had little interest in devoting
resources to the punishment of their former foes. There was a concern with
antagonizing countries, such as Italy and West Germany, which had enlisted
as comrades in the Cold War struggle against Russian communism.74
In the 1980s, the improved relationship between the Western democra-
cies and the Soviet bloc led to increased access to communist archives and to
an enhanced confidence in the competence and credibility of Soviet officials.
This development combined with embarrassing revelations concerning the
presence of suspected Nazis to encourage Anglo-American democracies to
renew their pursuit of war criminals."'
Great Britain, Canada, and Australia adopted the view that it was fun-
damentally unfair to denaturalize and to deport individuals who had resided
within their States for over forty years.742 Instead, these three countries en-
acted statutes permitting the domestic criminal prosecution of suspected war
criminals.4 ' The potential drain on prosecutorial resources, along with the
problems of proof, raise questions regarding the effectiveness of this ap-
proach.
74
The United States, in contrast, has relied on the civil remedies of de-
naturalization and deportation.745 This is based on the belief that those who
assisted, or committed, war crimes or crimes against humanity should not
enjoy the continued benefits of American life.746 The Supreme Court at-
tempted to facilitate the denaturalization process by shifting the burden of
737. But see Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Seeks to Expel Ex-Salesman Accused of Role in Nazi
Killings, N.Y. IMES, Aug. 4, 1998, at Al1.
738. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
739. See supra notes 105-06, 206-08 and accompanying text.
740. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
741. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
742. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
743. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
744. See supra notes 299-300 and accompanying text.
745. See supra notes 386-403, 418-38 and accompanying text.
746. See supra notes 565-66 and accompanying text.
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proof to defendants.747 Courts, however, have differed on the appropriate le-
gal standard. Most have adopted a broad assistance in persecution or organ-
izational standard while others have adhered to a strict subjective test.748 The
implementation of both the broad and strict standards has been complicated
by the vagaries of memory,749 eyewitness testimony,"' the authenticity of
documents,"' and the emotional desire and political pressure for retribution
and revenge.' These problems undermined the integrity and legitimacy of
the judicial process in Demjanjuk, a case which may have sounded the
death-knell for future efforts to denaturalize and to deport Nazi war crimi-
nals.75
3
The victims of the Holocaust lack the ability and authority to bring
those who perpetrated this barbarity to the bar of justice. The efficacy of the
United States' reliance on a civil remedy as means of achieving retribution
might be questioned. The next decade, nevertheless, presents the last oppor-
tunity to denaturalize and to deport those who assisted in the Nazi genocide.
The challenge is to maintain the integrity of the legal process while adjudg-
ing liability for offenses which occurred forty years ago. A failure to prose-
cute those involved in assisting Nazi persecutions will send a strong signal to
individuals currently contemplating atrocities that there will be few, if any,
consequences for their criminal conduct. On the other hand, the rule of law
demands that those accused of even the most venal offenses are accorded
due process protections. 54
Domestic courts within the Western democracies often have seemed
overwhelmed by the enormity of the Holocaust. It is unfortunate that those
countries that were the site of the Shoah generally have expressed little in-
terest in bringing the perpetrators of this atrocity to justice. A partial solution
may involve international cooperation in bringing the remaining Nazi war
criminals before a reconvened and reconstituted Nuremberg Tribunal 55 or
before an international criminal court.5 The sad fact, though, is that the fail-
ure of the Allied Powers to have pursued, prosecuted, and punished Nazi war
criminals following the war has made the smooth and successful prosecution
of these individuals forty years later virtually impossible.
747. See Kungys, 485 U.S. at 777-79.
748. See supra notes 560-63 and accompanying text.
749. See supra notes 585-91 and accompanying text.
750. See supra notes 596-630 and accompanying text.
751. See supra notes 561-73 and accompanying text.
752. See supra notes 640-42 and accompanying text.
753. See supra notes 710-36 and accompanying text.
754. See supra notes 565-66 and accompanying text.
755. See generally Matthew Lippman, Nuremberg Forty-Five Years Later, 7 CONN. J.
INT'LL. 1 (1991).
756. See generally Matthew Lippman, Towards an International Criminal Court, 7 SAN
DIEGO JUST. J. 1 (1995).
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